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Abstract
The growing prevalence of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems in
nuclear power plants is creating a challenge for the nuclear industry with regard to the
assurance of system safety and the assessment of risk. This work develops a framework
for identifying failure modes of digital systems, and provides an approach for
quantitatively assessing the likelihood of particular failure modes based on the contexts in
which they occur. A fundamental contribution of this work is the introduction of the
concept of an "error-forcing context" for software. Armed with this concept, the issue of
risk assessment for digital I&C systems is addressed via the development of a
methodology that utilizes event trees, fault trees, and the Dynamic Flowgraph
Methodology (DFM) to identify "error-forcing contexts" for software in the form of fault
tree prime implicants. The prime implicants specify the conditions under which the
system is vulnerable to software errors. They refer to sequences of events and states of
physical system parameters for which probability distributions can be generated.
The "error-forcing context" concept is also applied to the problem of
requirements analysis for digital I&C systems. An approach for validating the safety
requirements of digital I&C systems is developed which uses DFM to conduct automated
hazard analyses of object-oriented system specification models. The prime implicants of
these analyses can be used to identify unknown system hazards, prioritize the disposition
of known system hazards, and guide lower-level design decisions to either eliminate or
mitigate known hazards. The approach is applied to a case study involving a space-based
reactor control system in which it successfully identifies an unknown failure mechanism.
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Executive Summary
INTRODUCTION
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Nuclear power plants (NPPs) rely on instrumentation and control (I&C) systems
for monitoring, control and protection. In the past, analog systems have performed these
functions, but as existing analog systems become obsolete, the industry is moving to
digital systems and vendors are gradually discontinuing stock and support of analog spare
parts. The reason for the transition to digital I&C systems lies in the important
advantages they have over analog systems. They are free of the drift that afflicts analog
electronics, they have greater accuracy and computational capabilities, and they have
higher data handling and storage capacities. Because of the general shift to digital
systems and waning vendor support of analog systems, the U.S. nuclear power industry
expects substantial replacement of existing analog systems with digital I&C technology.
Also, designs for new, advanced NPPs rely exclusively on digital I&C systems.
The growing prevalence of digital I&C systems in NPPs is creating a challenge
for the nuclear industry in two respects. The first has to do with the fact that, while
digital I&C systems provide important benefits, they also introduce potential new failure
modes that can affect safety. Unlike electro-mechanical systems, whose failure modes are
15
fairly well understood and which can often be built to fail in a particular way, software
errors are very unpredictable. There is virtually no nontrivial software that will function
as expected under all conditions. Consequently, there is a great deal of concern about
whether there is a sufficient basis on which to resolve questions about safety.
The second challenge involves the assessment of risk associated with the use of
digital I&C systems. The move to risk-informed regulation is widely recognized as an
important step toward the elimination of the burden of the current prescriptive regulatory
structure and the restoration of the nuclear industry's economic competitiveness.
However, it is unclear how a risk-informed regulatory framework can be applied to
digital I&C systems when the techniques that are currently available for characterizing
the uncertainty in software failure behavior are still primitive and very controversial.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS
This work develops a framework for identifying failure modes of digital systems,
and provides an approach for quantitatively assessing the likelihood of particular failure
modes based on the contexts in which they occur. The approach is based on an explicit
recognition of the fact that software behavior is not stochastic. Rather, the perceived
uncertainty in its behavior comes from the input to the software as well as the application
and environment in which the software is operating. Failures occur as the result of
encountering some context for which the software was not properly designed, as opposed
to the software simply failing "randomly."
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A fundamental contribution of this work is the introduction of the concept of an
"error-forcing context" for software. Armed with this concept, the issue of risk
assessment for digital I&C systems is addressed via the development of a methodology
that utilizes event trees, fault trees, and the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) to
identify "error-forcing contexts" for software in the form of fault tree prime implicants.
The prime implicants specify the conditions under which the system is vulnerable to
software errors. They refer to sequences of events and states of physical system
parameters for which probability distributions can be generated.
More important than simply measuring the level of safety achieved by a particular
system is, of course, the problem of designing the system to be as safe as possible in the
first place. To this end, the "error-forcing context" concept is also applied to the problem
of requirements analysis for digital I&C systems. An approach for validating the safety
requirements of digital I&C systems is developed which uses DFM to conduct automated
hazard analyses of object-oriented system specification models. The prime implicants of
these analyses can be used to identify unknown system hazards, prioritize the disposition
of known system hazards, and guide lower-level design decisions to either eliminate or
mitigate known hazards. The approach is applied to a case study involving a space-based
reactor control system in which it successfully identifies an unknown failure mechanism.
RISK ASSESSMENT ISSUES RELATED TO DIGITAL I&C SYSTEMS
As the use of digital computers for instrumentation and control functions in
nuclear power plants has increased, there has been a growing debate over the issue of
17
whether probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques can be applied to digital systems.
The purpose of these techniques is, almost universally, to calculate the probability of
occurrence of various system-level events, based on the probabilities of occurrence of
basic events. Naturally, these basic events are usually individual component failures. It
therefore comes as no surprise that, when considering the application of PRA to digital
systems, attention turns almost immediately to the question of software failure
probabilities. A considerable amount of effort has been devoted over the years to
developing various models for estimating software failure probabilities, and there is
controversy within the software engineering community as to which of these models is
most appropriate and, indeed, whether any of them are even meaningful at all.
Unfortunately, all of the attention being focused on the issue of software failure
probabilities is, in effect, putting the cart before the horse. Failure probabilities in a PRA
context are only meaningful when they are linked to well-defined failure modes. Due to
the complexity commonly associated with digital I&C systems, there is the potential for a
number of software related failure modes, most of which are application specific and
unknown. Trying to estimate the probability that the software will fail without first
understanding in what ways the software may fail, as well as what effects its failure will
have on the system, does not make sense. In fact, it is precisely this lack of knowledge of
the potential software failure modes that lies at the root of the controversy surrounding
the estimation of software failure probabilities. In order to calculate the likelihood of any
event (software failure or otherwise), the event in question must be well defined.
18
UNSUITABILITY OF THE CONCEPT OF SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
Simply stated, software reliability assessment and software risk assessment are
entirely unrelated. Reliability assessment is concerned with the probability that the
execution of the code will deviate from its specifications, whereas risk assessment is
concerned with the probability that a software action will lead to the occurrence of a
hazardous condition.
Software reliability has been defined as "the probability offailure-free software
operation for a specified period of time in a specified environment." For the purpose of
risk assessment, this definition is of no practical use for two reasons. The first has to do
with the fact that this is simply the standard definition for the reliability of any system
component, cast specifically in terms of the software. However, it is misleading to think
of the software as simply a "component" of the system, in the sense in which pumps and
valves are considered to be components, i.e., as physical devices which perform a
specific function and whose performance may vary over time. In fact, software is quite
the opposite. In general, the software may perform many functions, and it will perform
each of them without variation. Given a particular set of inputs, it will always produce
the same output. When we speak of software "failures," we are actually talking about
unintended functionality that is always present in the system. The software is more a
reflection of the design of the system than it is a component of the system. As such, it is
more appropriate to think in terms of failures of the system rather than failures of the
software.
19
The second reason is the fact that what is meant by "failure-free operation" is ill
defined. It is not clear whether software can indeed "fail," not simply because it is
incapable of ceasing to perform a function which it used to provide, but, more
fundamentally, because there is no appropriate criteria for judging its "correctness." It is
not sufficient to simply compare the output of the software against the software
specifications. It is well known that a large number of software errors can be traced back
to errors in the requirements specification. Thus, the ultimate arbiter of whether a
specific software action constitutes a "failure" of the software can be nothing other than
the observation of an undesired event in the system that occurs as a result.
For example, consider an incident that occurred when, to save development costs,
Great Britain decided to adopt air traffic control software that had been in use in the
USA. Because the software had been designed for use in the United States, it had no
provision to take into account the 0* longitude line. As a result, when it was installed
into British air traffic control systems, it folded its map of Great Britain in half about the
Greenwich Meridian.
Was this a software failure? The software did what it had been designed to do, so
in that sense, it shouldn't be considered a failure. However, in the context of the system
in which it was operating, it clearly performed the wrong action. Certainly, a failure did
occur, but not on the part of the software alone. It was the application of the (nominally
correct) software in that particular context that resulted in a failure of the system. This
example illustrates the point that software actions can contribute to system failures, but
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the concept of a softwarefailure has, by itself, little meaning. It is only the application of
the software in a particular context that determines whether it is correct or incorrect.
Additionally, software can have many functions, each contributing to the
operation of the system in very different ways. The failures of different functions will
not, in general, have equivalent effects on the system. For instance, some failures may
result in a catastrophic failure of the system, whereas others may only result in degraded
performance. The definition of software reliability does not discriminate between
different types of failures. However, in PRA, because we are concerned with the
consequences of failure with respect to the system, we must be able to account for the
differences.
CONTEXT-BASED APPROACH TO SOFTWARE RISK ASSESSMENT
System failures resulting from software are due to design errors, i.e., incorrect or
incomplete requirements, inappropriate algorithms, and/or coding errors. In some cases,
they may also be due to inappropriate use of the software in an application for which it
was not designed. In any case, they are not due to "random" changes in the software.
The software behavior is deterministic. However, it is misleading to say that the software
is either correct or it is incorrect. In fact, the "correctness" of the software is context-
dependent. It is correct for some situations and it is incorrect for other situations. The
key to assessing the risk associated with the use of a particular piece of software is to
identify which situations are "incorrect" for the software, and then evaluate the
probability of being in one of those situations.
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ERROR-FORCING CONTEXT
The concept of an "error-forcing context" has been recently proposed for human
reliability analysis in nuclear power plant PRAs. An error-forcing context represents the
combined effect of human factors and plant conditions that create a situation in which
unsafe acts are likely. The idea of error-forcing context is based on the theory that unsafe
acts occur (for the most part) as a result of combinations of influences associated with the
plant conditions and associated human factors issues that trigger error mechanisms in the
plant personnel. In addition to plant conditions, such as sensor information, the context
can include such things as working conditions, adequacy of man-machine interface,
availability of procedures and time available for action. Many error mechanisms occur
when operators apply normally useful cognitive processes that, in the particular context,
are "defeated" or "fooled" by a particular combination of plant conditions and result in
human error.
This understanding has led to the belief that it is necessary to analyze both the
human-centered factors (e.g., things such as human-machine interface design, procedure
content and format, training, etc.) and the conditions of the plant that precipitated the
inappropriate action (such as misleading indications, equipment unavailabilities, and
other unusual configurations or operational circumstances). This is in contrast to
traditional human error analysis practice, which considers primarily the human-centered
causes, with only a cursory acknowledgment of plant influences through such simplistic
measures as the time available for action. The human-centered factors and the influence
of plant conditions are not independent of one another. Rather, in many major accidents,
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a set of particularly unusual or abnormal system conditions create the need for operator
actions, and these unusual system conditions lead to unsafe acts on the part of operators.
Simply stated, unsafe acts are more likely to result from unusual contexts than from a
"random" human error. Analyses of nuclear power plant accidents and near misses
support this perspective, indicating that the influence of abnormal contexts appears to
dominate over random human errors.
This state of affairs is entirely analogous to software. Software does not fail
"randomly." Instead, it fails as a result of encountering some context (i.e., a particular set
of inputs, in combination with a particular operating environment and application) for
which it was not properly designed. The error mechanism involved is not one in which
the software does something inexplicably "wrong." On the contrary, it does exactly what
it was designed to do. It executes precisely the algorithm that was programmed for that
situation, unceasingly and unerringly. The problem is the context itself, one which was
unexpected or untested by the system developer, and as a result, is one for which the
algorithm implemented in the software (which is presumably "correct" in other
situations) turns out to be inappropriate. The software is "defeated" or "fooled" by the
unexpected context. In fact, the term "error-forcing context" is even more appropriate for
software than it is for humans. Because software is deterministic, encountering an error-
forcing context is guaranteed to result in a failure. Human behavior, on the other hand, is
not quite so limited, in which case it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak in terms
of an error-prompting context.
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Another very simple example of an error-forcing context for software, in addition
to the air traffic control example cited above, is an incident in which an aircraft was
damaged when, in response to a test pilot's command, the computer raised the landing
gear while the plane was standing on the runway. In the right context, (i.e., when the
plane is in the air), this would have been the correct action for the software to perform.
However, it is not the appropriate action when the plane is on the ground. The
developers failed to disable the function when the plane is on the ground, and the result is
the existence of an error-forcing context.
Of course, the above example is trivially obvious. However, in general, an error-
forcing context can be more subtle, requiring the combination of a number of unusual or
unexpected conditions. An incident occurred very recently at the Catawba Nuclear
Station on May 7, 1998, in which the Unit I auxiliary feedwater system was rendered
inoperable due to a problem with a valve controller. The Unit I power level was being
reduced to 30% rated power in response to an instrument air leak on a main feedwater
regulating valve. When condensate system flow was reduced as part of the power
reduction, a recirculation control valve was opened to maintain minimum condensate
booster pump flow, allowing heated water to flow to the Upper Surge Tanks (UST),
which provide one of the condensate suction supplies to the Auxiliary Feedwater System
(AFW). The controller for the recirculation valve was incorrectly set at 14,400 gpm
instead of the required 5,000 gpm. This allowed excessive heating of the UST to 234 'F,
which is in excess of the FSAR design limit of 138 *F for AFW pump suction.
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The incorrect setpoint was related to the fact that the valve can operate in either
automatic or manual mode, and when it is placed in manual the setpoint automatically
switches to its default value of 14,400 gpm. About a month prior to the event, the valve
had been removed from service (placed in manual and closed), and the setpoint was not
readjusted when the valve was placed back in service and returned to automatic mode.
During full power operation, header flow is greater than 14,400 gpm, so the valve
remains closed. The operators were not aware that the setpoint was incorrect.
This event is a good illustration of the importance of context because of the
ambiguity surrounding the root cause of the failure. Was it an error in either the
requirements or code of the valve controller software that caused the setpoint to change
upon switching operational modes, or was it a lack of adequate procedural guidance and
operator training on the proper operation of the valve? Given the fact that, until this
event, operators did not know about the effect of changing modes on the controller
setpoint, an argument could conceivably be made for either case. Ultimately, however, it
is irrelevant. There may be other contexts in which it is desirable for the valve controller
to reset after being switched to manual mode. Whether the software is "correct" or not
depends only upon the context.
Thus, even if the software is nominally "correct," there may be certain error-
forcing contexts in which the system will not perform as desired. Likewise, if the
software does indeed contain a fault, an error in the system will still only result under a
specific set of circumstances. From this perspective, there is little to distinguish between
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software that is "correct" and software that is "incorrect." It makes sense, therefore, to
concentrate on identifying error-forcing contexts and assessing their likelihood, rather
than looking at the software in isolation and trying to determine its probability of
"failure."
METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLEMENTING CONTEXT-BASED APPROACH
The identification of error-forcing contexts requires a methodology that is able to
do the following:
1) Represent all of those states of the system which are deemed to be hazardous
(the states that result from a system failure event);
2) Model the functional and dynamic behavior of the software in terms of
transitions between states of the system;
3) Given a system failure event, identify the system states that precede it (the
error forcing contexts).
There are a number of methods that might be used to perform these tasks, most notably
fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP).
Some of these techniques have been applied to software in the past. The approach used
here is a combination of fault tree and event tree analysis with the Dynamic Flowgraph
Methodology (DFM), which is essentially a more sophisticated version of HAZOP, and
allows the integrated analysis of both hardware and software.
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To identify the error-revealing contexts associated with a system, the relevant
hazardous system states (failures) are first specified by an event tree. The system failure
states in the event tree are typically identified using fault trees which "hang" from the
event tree branches. Event trees are commonly used in the nuclear reactor safety
community for accident progression modeling. Their role is to provide boundary
conditions for the fault tree analyses.
For systems that involve software, the fault trees can be developed and evaluated
using DFM, which is a digraph-based method for modeling and analyzing the behavior
and interaction of software and hardware within an embedded system. A DFM model
represents both the logical and temporal characteristics of a system (the software, the
hardware, and their interactions with each other and the environment) and is used to build
fault trees that identify critical events and sequences. DFM provides an analytical
framework for systematically identifying the principal failure modes of an embedded
system, whether they are due to unanticipated inputs, hardware failures, adverse
environmental conditions, or implementation errors. Software is represented in the DFM
model by transition boxes, which represent functional relationships between system
parameters (both software and hardware), and which are associated with a time lag.
"Firing" of the transition boxes provides the means for modeling the dynamic behavior of
the system as it advances from one state to the next as a result of software action.
A DFM analysis is similar to a HAZOP analysis except for two important
differences. DFM is an automated technique, rather than a manual process, and its
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deductive analysis procedure generates fault trees and prime implicants that identify the
basic events which can lead to a specified top event (hazard state). A prime implicant is
the multiple-valued logic equivalent of a minimal cut set, which is a minimal set of basic
events of a binary fault tree that are sufficient to cause the top event. A prime implicant
is any conjunction of primary events that is sufficient to cause the top event, but does not
contain any shorter conjunction of the same events that is sufficient to cause the top
event. The prime implicants of any fault tree are unique and finite. Also, because of the
dynamic nature of the DFM model, the prime implicants of the resulting fault trees are
time-dependent, specifying both the state of the system required to produce the top event,
as well as the time at which it must occur.
The prime implicants of the DFM fault trees specify the conditions that are
capable of producing the failure event. The prime implicants consist only of system
states (i.e., the values of software inputs, hardware configurations, and process variable
values), there are no events referring to the "success" or "failure" of the software. Taken
as a whole, the fault tree prime implicants and the event tree branches from which they
"hang" specify the error-forcing context (encompassing both the operating environment
and the software input) in which the system is vulnerable to software errors.
Performing the fault tree analysis as part of an accident sequence analysis, where
the fault tree hangs from the event tree branch that represents the failure of the
corresponding system, the event tree specifies the scenario and balance of plant
conditions under which the top event occurs. This information can then be used to
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generate probability distributions for the conditions specified by the fault tree prime
implicants. Note that the prime implicants do not contain events that say "software
failure," rather, they identify states of physical system parameters and sequences of
events for which the software has been incorrectly designed. By estimating their
likelihood, we are estimating the probability of failure due to the occurrence of an "error-
forcing" context. Also, note that the prime implicants refer to more than just the states of
the input to the software, they also refer to the states of parameters in the physical system.
The fault tree prime implicants specify all of the conditions (the error-forcing context)
under which the system is vulnerable to a software error (as well as hardware failures).
The event tree also allows one to establish an upper bound on the allowable
probability of failure for each branch in the tree. The further to the right on the tree that
the event in question appears (meaning that it must occur in combination with a number
of other failures in order to lead to system failure), the higher, in general, that upper
bound will be, meaning that for some applications, the "ultra-high" reliability
requirements commonly believed to be necessary for safety-critical software may not be
necessary after all.
SAFETY REQUIREMENT VALIDATION
Demonstrating to our complete satisfaction that we have adequate requirements is
generally believed to be impossible. Because we do not have any way of knowing
whether we have identified all the possible threats to, or failure modes of, the system, we
can never be sure that the requirements are complete. Techniques do exist which can be
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brought to bear on the problem of requirements analysis. Most of these, however, are
concerned only with checking for internal consistency, or are based on heuristic criteria
for general systems. They do not address the completeness issue for specific contexts.
Reasoning about the completeness of requirements, at least from a safety
perspective, is the purpose of hazard analysis. Hazard analysis is intended to identify all
hazards to the system (or at least as many as possible) and feed the results back into the
design to either eliminate the hazards altogether or mitigate their impact. Procurement
and licensing authorities in many industries mandate that some form of hazard analysis
program be in place during the safety-critical system design process. However, because
the widespread application of digital technology in safety-related contexts is still a fairly
recent development, the techniques that are available for assessing the software's
contribution to system hazards are still relatively primitive. Currently, due to the lack of
widely accepted methods and tools, software is frequently overlooked during system
hazard analyses.
Several software hazard analysis approaches have been proposed in the literature,
but these have dealt strictly with software, in relative isolation from the rest of the
system. The purpose of a software hazard analysis is to consider how both the operation
and the "failure" (i.e., deviation from the specifications) of the software can affect system
safety. However, the safety impact of the software cannot be easily evaluated without
expressly taking into account the context in which it is operating. In other words, the
operating environment may determine whether a particular software action is "safe,"
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regardless of whether it represents a deviation from the specifications. For systems that
can operate in more than one way (perhaps under different hardware configurations as
well as in different operating regimes or different applications), the threats to the system
and its failure modes (as well as their consequences) may be different in each. To reason
effectively about the completeness of the safety requirements of a digital system, it is
necessary to model the software in combination with the rest of the system, in order to
understand its behavior in different contexts (e.g., in the presence of hardware failures,
different operating conditions, etc.).
Moreover, because of the fact that one of the principal advantages of using digital
technology is its flexibility, the software developed for such systems tends to undergo
continuous changes to accommodate new hardware, fix latent errors, or add new
functionality to existing systems. The hazard analysis must be updated as the system
evolves, but it is often very difficult to understand complex software and to analyze the
impact of changes to it correctly and efficiently. Many serious accidents and losses can
be traced to the fact that a system did not operate as intended because of changes that
were not fully coordinated or fully analyzed to determine their effects.
Digital system hazard analysis is really a system engineering problem, not just
software engineering. It requires the ability to model the software's interaction with the
system under different hardware configurations and operating environments. Current
methods in industrial practice do not address this issue in a systematic way. The
relatively rapid pace of changes to the software design also complicates matters.
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Managing multiple versions of software systems and assuring that changes do not
degrade system reliability and safety is a difficult problem and poses a significant
challenge to the quality and efficiency of the system engineering process.
The approach developed here uses DFM to perform automated hazard analyses of
object-oriented system requirements specification models. The objective is to provide a
method for performing structured system hazard analyses that can be easily integrated
into existing system engineering environments. A principal impediment to the
acceptance of formalized analysis techniques in industry has been the difficulty in
integrating them with current practices.
Incorporating automated hazard analysis capabilities in the system specification
process will have several advantages. First, changes in requirements can be
automatically analyzed for safety. Errors will be caught earlier and will be less costly to
fix. Second, results from the analysis of higher level specifications can feed directly into
lower level safety requirements that are traceable to the specific hazards being mitigated.
An important problem in the evolution of complex systems is that the rationale behind
certain design decisions is often not reflected in the specifications. Finally, the validation
effort will be hierarchical and distributed throughout the development process instead of
being concentrated at the end. In theory, each successive level of the specification and
design will only require showing that newly added detail does not violate the'safety-
related assumptions made in the analysis at the previous step. Hierarchical validation is
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not a new idea, but the issue of what can be inferred at each stage and how that
information is to be used at the next development step has not been clearly resolved.
DFM-BASED ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM OBJECT MODELS
The system engineering process uses a number of models to represent both the
structure and behavior of a system, e.g., data flow diagrams, piping and instrumentation
(P&ID) diagrams, etc. These models specify the system architecture, inputs and outputs,
behavior of the components (including the interactions between them and their effect on
the overall system state), and the purpose or goals of the system as a whole (making it a
coherent entity as opposed to simply a collection of parts). The current state of the art in
system engineering uses object-oriented modeling techniques to express these system
specification models. Object-oriented techniques employ a data-centric approach that
focuses solely on relationships between objects and the sorts of messages that the objects
can pass between them. They provide a language-independent medium for specifying,
designing and analyzing general systems.
This sort of approach is very useful for the definition of requirements because it
provides a common framework for both the user and the developer to understand the
system design in a natural and intuitive way. Before the advent of object-oriented
analysis and design (OOA&D) methodologies, system analysts had to translate their
understanding of the problem space into some other structured language, possibly altering
information in the translation. OOA&D allows the analyst to express the design directly,
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without translation. By preserving the users understanding of the problem, OOA&D
eliminates a major source of errors in the design phase.
A system engineering environment supported by object-oriented system
development tools and databases is capable of defining large, complex systems,
allocating requirements among the system's constituents, simulating the system and
analyzing its behavior, and maintaining traceability from the concept phase through to
implementation. The process is well suited for exercising control over system
development and verifying that the finished product meets its requirements.
A technique that can add to this capability by providing tools for structured
hazard analyses and validation of safety requirements would be a useful addition to the
system engineering process. It may even assist software engineers in designing effective
fault-tolerance mechanisms. Detecting unanticipated faults during execution has turned
out to be a very difficult problem. It has been found that programmers have had
difficulty writing effective assertions for detecting errors in executing software. Using
the results from a system hazard analysis might help in determining which assertions are
required, and where, to detect the most important errors. Such a technique could identify
effective and useful assertions to detect general violations of system goals and
constraints.
A complete object-oriented system specification typically consists of two models,
a structure model and a behavior model. The structure model describes the physical
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architecture of the system, and defines the parts, or components, from which it is built.
The behavior model defines the responses of the system to external excitations. It is
intended to capture in rigorous and executable form the information that is expressed in
text in operations concepts and requirement statements. It also includes a data model that
specifies the input and output of each function.
Inasmuch as a DFM model is essentially nothing more than a functional flow
block diagram (FFBD), there is a natural correspondence between a DFM model and the
behavior object model used to specify the system's functional and temporal requirements.
In fact, the information contained in the behavior model is precisely what is needed to
create the system DFM model. The function objects themselves correspond to transition
boxes in the DFM model, and the input and output data objects correspond to DFM
process variable nodes and condition nodes.
Given the one-to-one correspondence between objects in the behavior model and
in the DFM model, it is only necessary to define appropriate attributes for the objects in
the behavior model to allow them to function as their DFM counterparts. For instance,
process variable nodes in the DFM model are characterized by the ranges of values that
they are allowed to assume. These ranges are, in turn, discretized into a finite number of
states. In the behavior model, the attributes of the input and output data objects should
include both the ranges of allowed values, as well as associated state boundaries.
Attributes of the function objects in the behavior model, which correspond to transition
boxes in the DFM model, should include the function's duration (the length of time
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between the occurrence of the input and output conditions), as well as decision table
representations of the associated input-output relationships, linked to the state
representations of the input and output variables.
By assigning to the objects in the behavior model the attributes that correspond to
their DFM counterparts, the behavior model can serve as the DFM model directly,
eliminating the need to introduce an additional graphical modeling package to the system
engineering environment. Additionally, because the DFM models must also include
causal and conditioning interactions between the system components, the physical world,
and the environment, this should lead to more complete behavioral specification models
and a better understanding on the part of system designers of how the overall system
behaves.
REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM EXAMPLE
To illustrate the DFM-based hazard analysis of an object-oriented requirements
model, a space-based nuclear reactor control system is considered. The requirements
model for this system is adapted from an experimental research program conducted at
MIT to develop control laws facilitating rapid increases of neutronic power in spacecraft
reactors. The control laws have been utilized under closed-loop digital control conditions
in performance trials on the 5-MWt MIT Research Reactor and the Annular Core
Research Reactor operated by Sandia National Laboratories.
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A complete object-oriented system specification model is developed and
augmented to include behavior associated with the possible failure modes of the system
hardware components. This allows the analysis to cover all possible combinations of
hardware states to account for operating conditions and applications that are unusual or
unintended. Ideally, the analysis should include the possible failure modes for all
hardware components in the system. The potentially large number of prime implicants
that results can then be screened according to severity and likelihood. However, in this
example, for the purpose of simplicity, only three components were considered, the
temperature sensor, the power sensor and the rod drive motor. For both the temperature
sensor and the power sensor, two failure modes were considered: loss of signal, and off-
scale low. The failure mode considered for the rod drive was a stalled motor.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
The primary method of conducting a DFM hazard analysis is to choose a top
event that represents a condition in the overall system that is known to be unsafe or
otherwise undesirable, and let the automated DFM analysis procedure identify any and all
combinations of individual component and physical parameter states that will make this
top event possible. For the case of the example reactor control system, the primary
condition of interest is the integrity of the nuclear fuel. The supervisory control routine
in the system software monitors the reactor's fuel temperature and if the temperature
reaches or exceeds 1400 'C, it generates a signal to insert the control rods at maximum
speed.
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The results of the DFM analysis revealed that there are seven prime implicants for
the top event in which the system fails to scram. Unsurprisingly, due to the simplicity of
the supervisory control routine, only hardware failures can lead to the top event; there are
no software "failures" that can contribute to a failure to scram. In fact, the first two
prime implicants are not failures at all, they simply reflect the physical impossibility of
inserting the rods when they are already fully inserted. The remaining prime implicants
involve either a failed temperature sensor (TS) or a stalled rod drive motor (Ms).
While this set of prime implicants does not reveal any unexpected system failure
modes, it is nevertheless useful. It documents the complete set of possible causes of a
failure to scram in a form in which they can be easily screened according to likelihood
and used to prioritize potential modifications to the design. While both the temperature
sensor and the rod drive motor are sources of potential single-point failures of the system,
one of these failures may be significantly more likely than the others and may warrant the
allocation of additional resources to investigate ways to either eliminate or mitigate the
hazard. Finally, these results can be used to validate the system safety requirements by
confirming the absence of unknown system failure modes under a specific set of
explicitly documented assumptions, namely, the types and effects of failure modes
assumed for the components, and the specified behavior of the system.
HAZARD MITIGATION
One of the functions in the reactor control system specification model calculates
both the asymptotic startup rate and the instantaneous startup rate, and the larger of the
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two is used in the supervisory control routine. The instantaneous startup rate is
calculated from the current and previous observed power levels and the duration of the
computation cycle. The asymptotic startup rate is calculated from the asymptotic reactor
period, r, which depends on the reactivity present in the system, p(t), and the effective
rate of production of delayed neutrons (the decay parameter), XL(t).
The decision table for the 'Calculate asymptotic startup rate' function (which
could be developed directly from the physical equations but was, in this instance,
developed from the actual system FORTRAN code) revealed the presence of an overflow
error when p(t) _ P. This apparent oversight is understandable due to the fact that p(t) is
not intended to be able to equal P. In fact, the condition p(t) = P is known as 'prompt-
criticality', in which the number of prompt neutrons in the system (those produced
directly by fission rather than by the decay of fission products) is enough to sustain the
chain reaction by themselves, resulting in an uncontrollable reaction.
A question of interest, then, in terms of validating the safety requirements of the
system, is whether there are any scenarios in which DELK (the calculated estimate of the
reactivity) can reach 1000 mbeta without the system attaining prompt-criticality. In other
words, can the computer overestimate the reactivity enough to trigger an overflow error
in the asymptotic startup rate computation and crash the system, even while the reaction
itself remains controllable?
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One of the requirements added to the supervisory control subroutine in the lower-
level specification of the system is to monitor the value of DELK and drive in the control
rods (without scramming the system) if it should exceed a predefined maximum value.
In the latter runs of the control experiments, this maximum value was set at 900 mbeta.
Thus, for the overflow error to occur, DELK would have to jump from less than 900
mbeta to 1000 in the span of one computation cycle. The DFM analysis for this top event
resulted in more than 100 prime implicants.
Having identified the possibility of a potential overflow error, why not simply
'fix' the code rather than conduct a subsequent analysis to discover whether the error is
'reachable'? The answer to this question is that it is not clear to what extent the code is
indeed 'broken'. Remember that, under ordinary circumstances, the reactivity should not
be able to reach 1000 mbeta in the first place, in which case there is really no possibility
of an error. Furthermore, without a clear understanding of what circumstances might
cause the reactivity to reach 1000 mbeta, how is the designer to know what the
appropriate 'fix' of the software would be?
The correctness of any software is context-dependent. Code that is "correct" in
some contexts may be "incorrect" in others, and vice versa. The prime implicants of the
DFM analysis identify what the incorrect contexts are. This is important information
since the nature and the likelihood of a particular context may dictate the appropriate
strategy for correcting "errors."
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IContext-Based Risk Assessment
I-1. INTRODUCTION
Due to its usefulness in evaluating safety, identifying design deficiencies, and
improving interactions with regulatory agencies, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is
playing an increasing role in the design, operation, and management of safety-critical
systems in the nuclear power, chemical process, and aerospace industries. 1-2 However, as
the use of digital computers for instrumentation and control (I&C) of such systems has
increased, there has been a growing debate over the issue of whether PRA techniques can
be applied to digital systems.3-4
PRA is typically performed using fault tree analysis, often in combination with
other methods such as event trees, reliability block diagrams, and Markov models. The
purpose of these techniques is, almost universally, to calculate the probability of
occurrence of various system-level events, based on the probabilities of occurrence of
basic events. Naturally, these basic events are usually individual component failures. It
therefore comes as no surprise that, when considering the application of PRA to digital
systems, attention turns almost immediately to the question of software failure
probabilities. A considerable amount of effort has been devoted over the years to
developing various models for estimating software failure probabilities, and there is
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controversy within the software engineering community as to which of these models is
most appropriate and, indeed, whether any of them are even meaningful at all.4
Unfortunately, all of the attention being focused on the issue of software failure
probabilities is, in effect, putting the cart before the horse. Failure probabilities in a PRA
context are only meaningful when they are linked to well-defined failure modes. Due to
the complexity commonly associated with digital I&C systems, there is the potential for a
number of software related failure modes, most of which are application specific and
unknown. Trying to estimate the probability that the software will fail without first
understanding in what ways the software may fail, as well as what effects its failure will
have on the system, does not make sense. In fact, it is precisely this lack of knowledge of
the potential software failure modes that lies at the root of the controversy surrounding
the estimation of software failure probabilities. In order to calculate the likelihood of any
event (software failure or otherwise), the event in question must be well defined.
The majority of unanticipated software failure modes fall under the umbrella of
what are commonly referred to as "systems aspects," i.e., issues that transcend the
functions of individual components and involve interactions between components within
the system as well as the interaction of the system with the environment. Systems aspects
have been the focus of a great deal of concern over the use of digital I&C in safety-
critical applications. For instance, in the aerospace industry, attention to systems aspects
has identified a number of safety-related issues involving human-machine interaction,
task allocation and levels of automation, such as operator confusion caused by automatic
changes in operating modes.4 Issues such as these must be well understood before
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considerations of software "failures" and their impacts on the system can have any real
meaning.
Currently, there are no risk assessment models that are capable of characterizing
software "failures" in an application-independent way. Indeed, it is not always clear
what a software failure is. Therefore, we need to take a different approach in which the
software is no longer a source of uncertainty. In most cases, software behavior is
deterministic. The source of uncertainty is really in the physical situation with which the
system is presented, i.e., the context, which forces the software to produce an undesired
result. We need more detailed, deterministic models of the software's interaction with
the system so that we can treat it properly as part of the PRA logic models.
This chapter describes an approach that, instead of treating the software as a
component that fails randomly, recognizes the fact that its behavior is deterministic.
Whether or not it "fails" is determined by the particular situation at hand, i.e., the context.
The idea is to identify in which situations the software will fail, and then deal with those
situations. In Section 1-2, I argue that software reliability is an ill-defined metric for the
purpose of risk assessment, and that the concept of a software "failure," considered apart
from the particular context in which it occurs, has no meaning. In Section 1-3, I suggest a
new "context-based" approach to software risk assessment, which explicitly accounts for
the context dependence of software behavior. Section 1-4 outlines a methodology for
implementing the context-based approach, and Section 1-5 presents an illustrative
example. Section 1-6 contains some conclusions.
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1-2. UNSUITABILITY OF THE CONCEPT OF SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
Simply stated, software reliability assessment and software risk assessment are
entirely unrelated. Reliability assessment is concerned with the probability that the
execution of the code will deviate from its specifications, whereas risk assessment is
concerned with the probability that a software action will lead to the occurrence of a
hazardous condition.
Software reliability has been defined as "the probability offailure-free software
operation for a specified period of time in a specified environment."5 For the purpose of
risk assessment, this definition is of no practical use for two reasons. The first has to do
with the fact that this is simply the standard definition for the reliability of any system
component, cast specifically in terms of the software. Insofar as it is system aspects
where the effects of software are most strongly felt, it seems misguided to treat the
software as a component-level entity. Indeed, it is misleading to think of the software as
simply a "component" of the system, in the sense in which pumps and valves are
considered to be components, i.e., as physical devices which perform a specific function
and whose performance may vary over time. In fact, software is quite the opposite. In
general, the software may perform many functions, and it will perform each of them
without variation. Given a particular set of inputs, it will always produce the same
output. When we speak of software "failures," we are actually talking about unintended
functionality that is always present in the system. In a very real sense, the software is
more a reflection of the design of the system than it is a component of the system. As
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such, it is more appropriate to think in terms of failures of the system rather than failures
of the software.
The second reason is the fact that what is meant by "failure-free operation" is ill
defined. It is not clear whether software can indeed "fail," not simply because it is
incapable of ceasing to perform a function which it used to provide, but, more
fundamentally, because there is no appropriate criteria for judging its "correctness." It is
not sufficient to simply compare the output of the software against the software
specifications. It is well known that a large number of software errors can be traced back
to errors in the requirements specification. 6 Thus, the ultimate arbiter of whether a
specific software action constitutes a "failure" of the software can be nothing other than
the observation of an undesired event in the system that occurs as a result.
For example, consider an incident which occurred when, to save development
costs, Great Britain decided to adopt air traffic control software which had been in use in
the USA. 7 Because the software had been designed for use in the United States, it had no
provision to take into account the 0' longitude line. As a result, when it was installed
into British air traffic control systems, it folded its map of Great Britain in half about the
Greenwich Meridian.
Was this a software failure? The software did what it had been designed to do, so
in that sense, it shouldn't be considered a failure. However, in the context of the system
in which it was operating, it clearly performed the wrong action. Certainly, a failure did
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occur, but not on the part of the software alone. It was the application of the (nominally
correct) software in that particular context that resulted in a failure of the system. This
example illustrates the point that software actions can contribute to system failures, but
the concept of a software failure has, by itself, little meaning. It is only the application of
the software in a particular context that determines whether it is correct or incorrect.
Additionally, software can have many functions, each contributing to the
operation of the system in very different ways. The failures of different functions will
not, in general, have equivalent effects on the system. For instance, some failures may
result in a catastrophic failure of the system, whereas others may only result in degraded
performance. The definition of software reliability does not discriminate between
different types of failures. However, in PRA, because we are concerned with the
consequences of failure with respect to the system, we must be able to account for the
differences. The first thing that is needed, then, in developing an approach for
performing PRA for systems involving software, is to eschew attempts to evaluate the
reliability of the software, and instead focus on the context of the system in which the
software is applied.
1-3. CONTEXT-BASED APPROACH TO SOFTWARE RISK ASSESSMENT
System failures resulting from software are due to design errors, i.e., incorrect or
incomplete requirements, inappropriate algorithms, and/or coding errors. In some cases,
they may also be due to inappropriate use of the software in an application for which it
was not designed. In any case, they are not due to "random" changes in the software.
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The software behavior is deterministic. However, it is misleading to say that the software
is either correct or it is incorrect. In fact, the "correctness" of the software is context-
dependent. It is correct for some situations and it is incorrect for other situations. The
key to assessing the risk associated with the use of a particular piece of software is to
identify which situations are "incorrect" for the software, and then evaluate the
probability of being in one of those situations.
This is similar to the concept of "error-forcing context" recently proposed for
human reliability analysis in nuclear power plant PRAs.8  An error-forcing context
represents the combined effect of human factors and plant conditions that create a
situation in which unsafe acts are likely. The idea of error-forcing context is based on the
theory that unsafe acts occur (for the most part) as a result of combinations of influences
associated with the plant conditions and associated human factors issues that trigger error
mechanisms in the plant personnel. In addition to plant conditions, such as sensor
information, the context can include such things as working conditions, adequacy of man-
machine interface, availability of procedures and time available for action. 9-10 Many
error mechanisms occur when operators apply normally useful cognitive processes that,
in the particular context, are "defeated" or "fooled" by a particular combination of plant
conditions and result in human error.
This understanding has led to the belief that it is necessary to analyze both the
human-centered factors (e.g., things such as human-machine interface design, procedure
content and format, training, etc.) and the conditions of the plant that precipitated the
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inappropriate action (such as misleading indications, equipment unavailabilities, and
other unusual configurations or operational circumstances). This is in contrast to
traditional human error analysis practice, which considers primarily the human-centered
causes, with only a cursory acknowledgment of plant influences through such simplistic
measures as the time available for action. The human-centered factors and the influence
of plant conditions are not independent of one another. Rather, in many major accidents,
a set of particularly unusual or abnormal system conditions create the need for operator
actions, and these unusual system conditions lead to unsafe acts on the part of operators.
Simply stated, unsafe acts are more likely to result from unusual contexts than from a
"random" human error. Analyses of nuclear power plant accidents and near misses
support this perspective, indicating that the influence of abnormal contexts appears to
dominate over random human errors.8
This state of affairs is entirely analogous to software. Software does not fail
"randomly." Instead, it fails as a result of encountering some context (i.e., a particular set
of inputs, in combination with a particular operating environment and application) for
which it was not properly designed. The error mechanism involved is not one in which
the software does something inexplicably "wrong." On the contrary, it does exactly what
it was designed to do. It executes precisely the algorithm that was programmed for that
situation, unceasingly and unerringly. The problem is the context itself, one which was
unexpected or untested by the system developer, and as a result, is one for which the
algorithm implemented in the software (which is presumably "correct" in other
situations) turns out to be inappropriate. The software is "defeated" or "fooled" by the
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unexpected context. In fact, the term "error-forcing context" is even more appropriate for
software than it is for humans. Because software is deterministic, encountering an error-
forcing context is guaranteed to result in a failure. Human behavior, on the other hand, is
not quite so limited, in which case it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak in terms
of an error-prompting context.
Another very simple example of an error-forcing context for software, in addition
to the air traffic control example cited above, is an incident in which an aircraft was
damaged when, in response to a test pilot's command, the computer raised the landing
gear while the plane was standing on the runway.7 In the right context, (i.e., when the
plane is in the air), this would have been the correct action for the software to perform.
However, it is not the appropriate action when the plane is on the ground. The
developers failed to disable the function when the plane is on the ground, and the result is
the existence of an error-forcing context.
The above example is, of course, so simple that it appears obvious. However, in
general, an error-forcing context can be more exotic, requiring the combination of a
number of unusual or unexpected conditions. An incident occurred at the Canadian
Bruce-4 nuclear reactor in January 1990 in which a small loss of coolant accident resulted
from a programming error in the software used to control the reactor refueling machine.
Because of this error, the control computer, when suspending execution of the main
refueling machine positioning control subroutine in order to execute a fault-handling
subroutine triggered by a minor fault condition detected elsewhere in the plant, marked
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the wrong return address in its memory. As a result, execution resumed at the wrong
segment of the main subroutine. The refueling machine, which at the time was locked
onto one of the reactor's pressure tube fuel channels, released its brake and dropped its
refueling assembly by about three feet, damaging both the refueling assembly and the
fuel channel.1
This failure did not occur simply by virtue of the fact that the wrong address was
placed on the stack. The failure also required the additional condition of the refueling
machine being locked onto a channel at the time. If, instead, the refueling machine had
been idle when the fault-handling interrupt was received (and assuming that the same
return address was specified erroneously), no failure would have been observed. This is a
case where the execution of a segment of code which violates its specification may or
may not result in a failure, depending on the state of the system at the time (the error
always exists, but the failure requires the occurrence of an error-forcing condition in the
system).
To correctly assess the potential impact of such failures, it is necessary to identify
both the unusual or unexpected conditions in which failure is more likely (i.e., those
conditions outside the range considered during design and testing of the software), as
well as the deficiencies in the software's design and implementation that affect their
applicability to these "off-nominal" conditions. In other words, we need to identify the
"error-forcing context," or the confluence of unexpected system conditions and latent
software faults that result in failure. This result by itself would be very useful to
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designers. If one wishes to go further and provide a system risk assessment that is
consistent with operational experience, the task of quantification must be based upon the
likelihood of such error-forcing contexts, rather than upon a prediction of "random"
software failure. Quantification of failure probabilities based upon error-forcing contexts
for software represents a fundamental shift away from software reliability modeling.
In quantifying the system failure probability, we must concern ourselves with
evaluating the likelihood of a well-defined event. The question is what is a well-defined
event involving software "failure?" Simply, it is the occurrence of a hazardous condition
in the system in which the software is embedded. Also, because the software action itself
is deterministic, we will find that the probability of a given system failure event must be
equal to the probability of the corresponding error-forcing context. If we are able to
identify the system's error-forcing contexts and express them as well-defined events
(both of which are discussed in the next section), then we can quantify the probability of
system failure.
Note that, in this formulation, the risk quantification problem has been
transformed to a more complicated, but more rational, form. We are no longer depending
on the value of a single parameter (the probability of software failure). Instead, we are
looking for the probabilities of finding certain system parameters (both in the input to the
software and in the operating environment) in states that will lead to system failure
through inappropriate software action. For example, in the case of the Bruce reactor
incident, we would be concerned with evaluating the probability of finding the refueling
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machine locked onto a channel while the computer is responding to a fault elsewhere in
the plant.
In general, this state information may also involve time. For instance, one of the
space shuttle simulations ran into trouble during a simulated abort procedure. 7 The crew
initiated an abort sequence, and then was advised by "ground control" that the abort was
no longer necessary, so they "aborted" the abort. After completing another simulated
orbit, they decided to go through with the abort procedure after all, and the flight
computer, which did not anticipate the possibility of two abort commands in the same
flight, got caught in a two-instruction loop. In this case, the error-forcing context is
actually a particular sequence of events occurring in time, or a trajectory.
1-4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONTEXT-BASED APPROACH
To identify the error-forcing contexts, a methodology is needed which must be
able to do the following:
1) Represent all of those states of the system which are deemed to be hazardous
(the states that result from a system failure event);
2) Model the functional and dynamic behavior of the software in terms of
transitions between states of the system;
3) Given a system failure event, identify the system states that precede it (the
error forcing contexts).
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There are a number of methods that might be used to perform these tasks, most notably
fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, and hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP).
Some of these techniques have been applied to software in the past.12 13 The approach
used here is a combination of fault tree and event tree analysis with the Dynamic
Flowgraph Methodology 4-11 (DFM), which is essentially a more sophisticated version of
HAZOP, and allows the integrated analysis of both hardware and software.
To identify the error-revealing contexts associated with a system, the relevant
hazardous system states (failures) are specified by an event tree. The system failure
states in the event tree are typically identified using fault trees which "hang" from the
event tree branches. Event trees are commonly used in the nuclear reactor safety
community for accident progression modeling. Their role is to provide boundary
conditions for the fault tree analyses.
For systems that involve software, the fault trees can be developed and evaluated
using DFM, which is a digraph-based method for modeling and analyzing the behavior
and interaction of software and hardware within an embedded system. A DFM model
represents both the logical and temporal characteristics of a system (the software, the
hardware, and their interactions with each other and the environment) and is used to build
fault trees that identify critical events and sequences. DFM provides an analytical
framework for systematically identifying the principal failure modes of an embedded
system, whether they are due to unanticipated inputs, hardware failures, adverse
environmental conditions, or implementation errors. Software is represented in the DFM
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model by transition boxes, which represent functional relationships between system
parameters (both software and hardware), and which are associated with a time lag.
"Firing" of the transition boxes provides the means for modeling the dynamic behavior of
the system as it advances from one state to the next as a result of software action.
A DFM analysis is almost identical to a HAZOP analysis except for two
important differences. DFM is an automated technique, rather than a manual process,
and its deductive analysis procedure generates fault trees and prime implicants16 -17 which
identify the basic events which can lead to a specified top event (hazard state). A prime
implicant is the multiple-valued logic equivalent of a minimal cut set, which is a minimal
set of basic events of a binary fault tree that are sufficient to cause the top event. A prime
implicant is any conjunction of primary events that is sufficient to cause the top event,
but does not contain any shorter conjunction of the same events that is sufficient to cause
the top event. The prime implicants of any fault tree are unique and finite. Also, because
of the dynamic nature of the DFM model, the prime implicants of the resulting fault trees
are time-dependent, specifying both the state of the system required to produce the top
event, as well as the time at which it must occur.
The prime implicants of the DFM fault trees specify the conditions that are
capable of producing the failure event. As will be illustrated in the example in the
following section, the prime implicants consist only of system states (i.e., the values of
software inputs, hardware configurations, and process variable values), there are no
events referring to the "success" or "failure" of the software. Taken as a whole, the fault
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tree prime implicants and the event tree branches from which they "hang" specify the
error-forcing context (encompassing both the operating environment and the software
input) in which the system is vulnerable to software errors.
1-5. EXAMPLE
1-5. 1 Main Feedwater System
Consider the event tree shown in Figure I-1.18 This is the event tree
corresponding to the initiating event "very small loss of coolant accident (LOCA)" for
the Surry Nuclear Station, Unit 1. This is from one of the plant analyses conducted as
part of the NUREG-1 150 effort by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Across the top
of the figure, the initiating event (very small LOCA) and the plant systems and actions
that might affect the subsequent course of events are listed in order of the time sequence
in which they are expected to influence events in the reactor. The tree illustrates the
different possible sequences of events, depending on the success or failure of the systems
at the top, and indicates their consequences in terms of the reactor core integrity (the core
status column at the right of the figure). Each branch point in the tree distinguishes
between the success or failure of the system above it. Taking the upper branch
corresponds to success of the system, while dropping to the lower branch indicates
failure.
Rather than looking in detail at every system included in the tree, let us just
consider one. MFW corresponds to the main feedwater system. From the location of the
'MFW' branch on the tree, we can see that, at the time this system is called upon in this
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particular accident scenario, one of the systems before it has failed (AFW, the auxiliary
feedwater system), but the other three have been successful. These events serve to
characterize the plant conditions at the time of loss of main feedwater, and comprise the
context in which a fault tree analysis of the MFW event would be conducted for this
particular accident scenario. If the main feedwater system in question involves software,
we can then evaluate the impact that any software failure modes will have on this
particular accident scenario by determining the likelihood of this set of events and the
likelihood that the system parameters will be found in the ranges specified by the fault
tree prime implicants.
To illustrate, consider the portion of a Main Feedwater System (MFWS) analyzed
using DFM in Guarro, et al.16 and Yau, et al.' 7 The MFWS is designed to deliver water
to the steam generators (SG) during power operations and after reactor trip. The main
feed valve is controlled by the SG level control system. The function of the SG level
control system is to maintain the water level at a pre-defined set point (68% narrow range
level under normal operating conditions). The system consists of sensors that measure
steam generator level, steam flow and feed flow, digital-to-analog and analog-to-digital
converters, digital control software that executes on a clock cycle of 0.1s, and actuators
that regulate the position of the main feed valve. The system is implemented as a three-
element control system, where measurements of the steam generator level, the steam flow
and the feed flow are taken every tenth of a second as sensor inputs to the software. The
software then uses these inputs to generate a target position for the main feed valve. This
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command is the output to the valve actuators. A schematic of the SG control system is
shown in Figure 1-2.
Figure 1-2
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Schematic of the Steam Generator Level Control System' 6-1
Three sets of control logic are implemented by the steam generator level control
system; they are Proportional Integral and Derivative (PID) logic, High Level Override
(HLO) and Reactor Trip Override (RTO). Reactor Trip Override logic is used when the
digital control software receives a reactor trip signal, in which case the target main feed
valve position is then set to 5%. High Level Override logic is employed when the steam
generator reading is greater than 89%, in which case the target main feed valve position is
set to fully closed. The HLO control action is irreversible; this means that once an HLO
signal is triggered, the system will not return to the normal PID control action unless the
system is reinitialized. Proportional Integral and Derivative logic is implemented in all
cases not covered by the other two sets of control logic.
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1-5.2 Prime Implicants
The system was analyzed twice, with two different faults intentionally being
injected into the system. For the first case, an error was introduced into the design
specification of the control software. Instead of subtracting the derivative-lag signal of
the steam flow-feed flow mismatch from the steam generator level, the faulted
specification called for the addition of these two terms. The DFM model was constructed
without assuming any prior knowledge of the software specification error, and the top
event specified for analysis was defined as the steam generator "overflowing." The
analysis was carried out for one step backward in the reference time frame, and 10 prime
implicants were identified. A typical prime implicant is the one shown in Table I-1.
Table I-1 Prime Implicant 1.1
*Main feed valve good @ t = 0 AND
*Main feed pump good @ t = 0 AND
High Level Override inactive @ t = -1 AND
Reactor Trip Override inactive @ t = -1 AND
Main feed valve between 60% - 80% @ t = -1 AND
Steam flow between 30% - 60% @ t = -1 AND
SG level at level 8 @ t = -1 AND
*Steam flow sensor good @ t = -1 AND
Level sensor stuck low @ t = -1
The prime implicant reveals that the steam generator level sensor stuck at the low
reading, combined with the level being very high, will cause the steam generator to
overflow. The low reading provided by the level sensor will cause the control software to
act as if there is not enough water in the steam generator and command the main feed
valve to open, causing the SG to overflow. The asterisks in the table indicate necessary
non-failure conditions in the prime implicant that result from the multiple-valued logic
representation of the system model. For instance, the main feed pump being normal is
59
part of the necessary condition in the prime implicant since a failed pump cannot sustain
the feed flow into the SG that is necessary to cause overflow.
If a prime implicant does not contain basic component failure modes that can
cause the top event directly, this usually means that a software error is identified. The
event sequence leading from the prime implicant to the top event needs to be analyzed to
locate the software error. The prime implicant in Table 1-2, unlike that in Table I-1, does
not contain any basic component failure modes, but consists of non-failure hardware
component conditions and software input conditions. This prime implicant points to the
possibility of a software fault, but it is not directly obvious where the fault is and how the
overflow condition is brought about. After reconstructing the sequence of events from
the prime implicant to the top event, it can be determined that this prime implicant does
indeed correspond to the inappropriate addition of the derivative-lag to the SG level.
Table 1-2 Prime Implicant 1.2
*Main feed valve good @ t = 0 AND
*Main feed pump good @ t = 0 AND
High Level Override inactive @ t = -1 AND
Reactor Trip Override inactive @ t = -1 AND
Main feed valve between 60% - 80% @ t = -1 AND
Feed flow between 60% - 80% @ t = -1 AND
Steam flow between 30% - 60% @ t = -1 AND
SG level at level 8 @ t = -1 AND
*Feed flow sensor good @ t = -1 AND
*Steam flow sensor good @ t = -1 AND
*Level sensor good @ t = -1
Note that none of the basic events in prime implicant 1.2 refer explicitly to a
software "failure." Instead, the basic events refer only to the values of software inputs
and the states of hardware components. These basic events specify an error-forcing
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context, the conditions which must occur (and the times at which they must occur) in
order for the pre-existing software fault to be "activated."
For the second faulted-case analysis, it was assumed that an error had been
introduced into the control software code. The assumption was that, instead of triggering
the High Level Override (HLO) signal at 89% level, this programming error causes the
HLO signal to be activated at 69% level. As the level set point is at 68%, a slight
increase in SG level from the set point will cause the software to command the closing of
the main feed valve to 5%.
A fault tree was developed for the top event "steam generator level dropped to 0%
narrow range," using the DFM model of the faulted system. One prime implicant was
identified, which is given in Table 1-3.
Table I- 3 Prime Implicant 2.1
High Level Override inactive @ t = -5 AND
Steam flow between 80% and 100% @ t = -5 AND
SG level between 65% and 71% @ t = -5 AND
SG pressure between 960 - 1185 psi @ t = -5
The prime implicant does not contain any basic component failure events, but it
encompasses input conditions that can trigger the error in the software. It is important to
point out that, in general, the identification of a prime implicant does not imply that the
occurrence of the prime implicant will necessarily lead to the top event. It simply points
out the nexus of system conditions that must be present in order for the top event to
occur. In other words, it is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the top event.
This is a result of the fact that conditions in the prime implicant are expressed as ranges
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of continuous variables. The actual error-forcing condition may exist only within a
subset of the range given by the prime implicant, whereas all other points within the
range may not lead to the top event. For example, in prime implicant 2.1, the error is
really only triggered if the steam generator level is above 69% (below 69%, the HLO
override signal is not activated). However, because of the discretization scheme chosen
during construction of the model, all steam generator levels between 65% and 71% are
represented as the same state. Thus, even within the conditions specified by the prime
implicants, there is still some uncertainty about where the actual error-forcing condition
lies, if it in fact exists. This uncertainty can be reduced by either performing another
analysis, with a finer discretization structure employed within the states specified by the
prime implicants, or by testing the software in the neighborhood of the conditions
specified by the prime implicant.
1-6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has described an approach to software risk assessment which
explicitly recognizes that software behavior is deterministic. The source of the apparent
"randomness" of software "failure" behavior is, instead, a result of both the input to the
software as well as the application and environment in which it is operating (i.e., the
context). In some contexts, the software is correct, but in others (i.e., the "error-forcing
contexts"), it is not. One way of identifying these error-forcing contexts is by finding the
prime implicants of system DFM models, subject to the boundary conditions specified by
the associated event tree.
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Having found prime implicants, one is faced with the question of what to do about
them. Generally, when a fault is discovered in a piece of software, the usual remedy is to
correct it. However, the cost of correcting software can be very large due to the fact that
fixes may also introduce new errors and the verification and validation process must be
started over again. If it should turn out that the prime implicant is sufficiently unlikely,
then one might come to the conclusion that the software fault can be tolerated, or that the
cost of fixing it is not justified by the decrease in risk that would result.
In order to support this kind of cost-benefit analysis for software, it is necessary to
know both the probabilities of the prime implicants and the consequences of each fault
tree top event. Performing the fault tree analysis as part of an accident sequence analysis,
where the fault tree hangs from the event tree branch that represents the failure of the
corresponding system, the event tree specifies the scenario and balance of plant
conditions under which the top event occurs. This information can then be used to
generate probability distributions for the conditions specified by the fault tree prime
implicants. Note that the prime implicants do not contain events that say "software
failure," rather, they identify states of physical system parameters and sequences of
events for which the software has been incorrectly designed. By estimating their
likelihood, we are estimating the probability of failure due to the occurrence of an "error-
forcing" context. Also, note that the prime implicants refer to more than just the states of
the input to the software, they also refer to the states of parameters in the physical system.
The fault tree prime implicants specify all of the conditions (the error-forcing context)
under which the system is vulnerable to a software error (as well as hardware failures).
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The event tree also allows one to establish an upper bound on the allowable
probability of failure for each branch in the tree. The further to the right on the tree that
the event in question appears (meaning that it must occur in combination with a number
of other failures in order to lead to system failure), the higher, in general, that upper
bound will be, meaning that for some applications, the "ultra-high" reliability
requirements commonly believed to be necessary for safety-critical software may not be
necessary after all. For example, consider the event H2 at the right of the event tree in
Fig. 1-1, which corresponds to failure of the charging pump system in high pressure
recirculation mode (and, further, assume that there may be some software that is
responsible for operating this system). Failure of this system during a very small LOCA,
combined with failure of the operator to depressurize the reactor coolant system (accident
sequence 5) leads to a core melt, while success of the system is "OK." Clearly, this is a
safety-critical system. However, failure of this system in isolation will not lead to
damage of the core. A number of other systems must fail in addition to the charging
pump system. If the coincident failure of those other systems is sufficiently unlikely,
then a reasonably large probability of failure of the charging pump system can probably
be tolerated. Sequence 5 contains the smallest number of failures involving H2 that will
lead to core damage, so let us take a closer look at it. According to Ref. 18, the
frequency of the initiating event S3 is 1.2 x 10-2/yr, and the probability of failure of the
operator to depressurize is less than 7.6 x 10-2. Thus, if the maximum acceptable
frequency of occurrence for this sequence is even as low as 10-6/yr, that means that the
maximum acceptable probability of H2 is only as low as 10-3, and furthermore, only a
fraction thereof would be attributable to the controlling software, meaning that a decision
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to leave the error instead of "fixing" it may be justified. Also, for errors in this region, it
may be practical to demonstrate an acceptable probability of occurrence by means of
testing the fact.that there are well-defined boundary conditions on the operational profile,
and that the target failure probability is not infeasibly small, may lead to a manageable set
of test cases.
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II
Context-Based Hazard Analysis
II-1. INTRODUCTION
The use of digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems is increasing in a
wide range of applications, including fossil-fueled power generation, electric power
distribution, chemical processing, aerospace, and some nuclear power plant applications
(e.g., reactor protection systems, plant monitoring and display systems, and plant control
systems)'. While digital I&C systems provide important benefits, such as increased
functionality and more powerful protection mechanisms, they also introduce potential
new failure modes that can affect safety. Unlike electro-mechanical systems, whose
failure modes are fairly well understood and which can often be built to fail in a
particular way, software errors are very unpredictable. There is virtually no nontrivial
software that will function as expected under all conditions2 . Consequently, there is a
great deal of attention now being focused on the software development and validation
process in an attempt to reduce the impact of unanticipated failure modes in safety critical
systems.
There are a number of verification and validation techniques that can be applied
throughout the software development process. Most are informal, involving design
reviews, walkthroughs and checklists, but there are some formal techniques that involve
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mathematical modeling and analysis. The most common type of formal analysis used in
computer science uses state machine models. A state machine models the states of a
system and the transitions between them, and the analysis generally employs some kind
of search algorithm to determine whether any hazardous states are reachable. There are
several different types of state machine modeling languages, such as queue networks and
Petri nets3-4
For large or complex systems, the number of states that must be specified in the
model becomes impractical, but this problem can be alleviated somewhat through the use
of a higher-level modeling language that allows the definition of higher-level abstractions
from which the entire state-space can be generated5 . The advantage of the state machine
modeling approach is the fact that analyses can be carried out at any point in the system
design lifecycle, and that, because they are operating on well-defined models of the
system, the analysis procedures can be automated. Furthermore, the state machine model
itself can often be executed using a simulator to generate test data for later
implementations of the system design.
Another type of approach, commonly referred to as 'formal methods', uses
mathematical proofs to show that logic models of the system satisfy the safety
requirements'7 '8 . Many different modeling languages have been proposed for this
purpose. Unfortunately, most have been applied only to very small examples and it is not
clear how practical they would be for realistic systems. Furthermore, these types of
models are generally very difficult to work with without specialized mathematical
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training. While this does not necessarily hinder the analyses themselves, it can seriously
limit their usefulness to designers as an aid for understanding the problem space and
identifying solutions.
While state machines and formal methods may employ very different languages,
the underlying approach is fundamentally the same in both. A model of the software is
constructed, based on predicate calculus or graphical notation or a combination of both,
and the inference rules of the particular analysis method in question are used to show
whether the program satisfies its requirements. A well-chosen model and analysis
procedure can logically demonstrate that a program conforms to its requirements under
all anticipated sequences of inputs, and, thus, can be very effective in the software
development process in terms of verifying that the intended product is being developed.
The problem is in determining whether the intended product is really the right one. In
other words, are the requirements adequate?
Demonstrating to our complete satisfaction that we have adequate requirements is
generally believed to be impossible9 . Because we do not have any way of knowing
whether we have identified all the possible threats to, or failure modes of, the system, we
can never be sure that the requirements are complete. There are some techniques that can
be brought to bear on the problem of requirements analysis, however, most of these are
concerned only with checking for internal consistency'0 , or are based on heuristic criteria
for general systems". They do not address the completeness issue for specific contexts.
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Reasoning about the completeness of requirements, at least from a safety
perspective, is the purpose of hazard analysis. Hazard analysis is intended to identify all
hazards to the system (or at least as many as possible) and feed the results back into the
design to either eliminate the hazards altogether or mitigate their impact. Procurement
and licensing authorities in many industries mandate that some form of hazard analysis
program be in place during the safety-critical system design process. However, because
the widespread application of digital technology in safety-related contexts is still a fairly
recent development, the techniques that are available for assessing the software's
contribution to system hazards are still relatively primitive. Currently, due to the lack of
widely accepted methods and tools, software is frequently overlooked during system
12hazard analyses.
Several software hazard analysis approaches have been proposed in the
literature' 2" 3 , but these have dealt strictly with software, in relative isolation from the rest
of the system. The purpose of a software hazard analysis is to consider how both the
operation and the "failure" (i.e., deviation from the specifications) of the software can
affect system safety. However, the safety impact of the software cannot be easily
evaluated without expressly taking into account the context in which it is operating 4 . In
other words, the operating environment may determine whether a particular software
action is "safe," regardless of whether it represents a deviation from the specifications.
For systems that can operate in more than one way (perhaps under different hardware
configurations as well as in different operating regimes or different applications), the
threats to the system and its failure modes (as well as their consequences) may be
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different in each. To reason effectively about the completeness of the safety
requirements of a digital system, it is necessary to model the software in combination
with the rest of the system, in order to understand its behavior in different contexts (e.g.,
in the presence of hardware failures, different operating conditions, etc.).
Moreover, because of the fact that one of the principal advantages of using digital
technology is its flexibility, the software developed for such systems tends to undergo
continuous changes to accommodate new hardware, fix latent errors, or add new
functionality to existing systems. The hazard analysis must be updated as the system
evolves, but it is often very difficult to understand complex software and to analyze the
impact of changes to it correctly and efficiently. Many serious accidents and losses can
be traced to the fact that a system did not operate as intended because of changes that
were not fully coordinated or fully analyzed to determine their effects2.
Digital system hazard analysis is really a system engineering problem, not just
software engineering. It requires the ability to model the software's interaction with the
system under different hardware configurations and operating environments. Current
methods in industrial practice do not address this issue in a systematic way. The
relatively rapid pace of changes to the software design also complicates matters.
Configuration control requires rigorous review and formal approval of software changes.
Managing multiple versions of software systems and assuring that changes do not
degrade system reliability and safety is a difficult problem and poses a significant
challenge to the quality and efficiency of the system engineering process.
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This chapter describes an approach for performing automated hazard analyses
using object-oriented system requirements specification models. The objective is to
provide a method for performing structured system hazard analyses that can be easily
integrated into existing system engineering environments. A principal impediment to the
acceptance of formalized analysis techniques in industry has been the difficulty in
integrating them with current practices1. Incorporating automated hazard analysis
capabilities in the system specification process will have several advantages. First,
changes in requirements can be automatically analyzed for safety. Errors will be caught
earlier and will be less costly to fix. Second, results from the analysis of higher level
specifications can feed directly into lower level safety requirements that are traceable to
the specific hazards being mitigated. An important problem in the evolution of complex
systems is that the rationale behind certain design decisions is often not reflected in the
specifications 16. Finally, the validation effort will be hierarchical and distributed
throughout the development process instead of being concentrated at the end. In theory,
each successive level of the specification and design will only require showing that newly
added detail does not violate the safety-related assumptions made in the analysis at the
previous step. Hierarchical validation is not a new idea, but the issue of what can be
inferred at each stage and how that information is to be used at the next development step
has not been clearly resolved.
The approach in this paper is based on the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology
(DFM)17 ,18, a digraph-based approach for modeling and analyzing the behavior and
interaction of software and hardware within an embedded system. Although DFM is
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based on digraphs, it really has more in common with the state machine approach.
Instead of using static models with continuous partial derivatives modeling the
relationships between process variables, the system state is dynamic and state transitions
are specified using tabular representations of disjunctive normal form predicate logic
(i.e., "decision tables"). The difference is that, in addition to the software, DFM also
models the system hardware (including failure behavior) and operating environment.
Section 11-2 briefly discusses the system engineering process in the context of the
special problems facing the validation of safety requirements in digital I&C systems.
Section 11-3 describes DFM and the procedures used to analyze DFM system models, and
briefly discusses DFM's relationship to other well known hazard analysis techniques.
Section 11-4 suggests how the DFM logic and analysis output can be linked to system
object models and used to conduct automated hazard analyses, and illustrates the
approach through the use of an example. Section 11-5 outlines directions for future work.
11-2. SYSTEM ENGINEERING ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH DIGITAL I&C
The difficulties associated with the validation of digital I&C systems stem from
their complexity and from the fact that their design and implementation must be
considered from two different perspectives. In addition to the functionality of the I&C
systems themselves (i.e., the selection of design features intended to meet high-level
requirements), the integration of these systems into the overall plant and their impact on
the mechanical and electrical systems, thermal and fluid processes, operational
procedures, etc., must also be carefully considered. The impact of a particular design
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alternative on both the I&C system functionality and the overall operation of the plant
may lead to conflicts that are not immediately obvious. For instance, a problem currently
facing the aerospace industry is that of pilot confusion caused by automatic changes in
operating modes19, 20,2 1. The increasing sophistication of flight deck systems has allowed
the automation of many of the tasks previously performed by pilots. One of the primary
motivations for this was to reduce the number of incidents of flight crew error.
Unfortunately, while some flight crew errors that had been a problem in the past have
been significantly reduced, new types of errors have begun to occur due to diminished
mode awareness on the part of the pilots. Interactively addressing the system design
from both perspectives (individual system functionality and overall plant operation) is
critical to ensuring adequate integration and to achieving safe, reliable and efficient plant
operation.
Conflicts between individual system functionality and overall plant operation can
be very difficult to detect because they are generally not the result of logically
inconsistent requirements. They tend to deal with issues that transcend the particular
components comprising the system and possibly even the function that the system
performs, and as a result, are more characteristic of incomplete requirements. There have
been a number of incidents in which the various parts of a system appeared to have been
designed correctly, yet the ensemble or overall system did not perform satisfactorily'. For
example, both the Sizewell-B and Chooz-B nuclear power plants had to change their
common original system supplier in the middle of the design efforts. The problem
stemmed from the underspecification of the Chooz-B system, and the complexity of the
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design. The original supplier found itself developing hardware and software in parallel
with ever escalating requirements. Technical problems resulted from a lack of adequate
capacity to process the mass of acquired reactor data with the original architecture 2 .
While successfully managing the development of new digital I&C applications is
already a daunting task, the problem is compounded when dealing with retrofits or
modifications. For new plants, a large system is conceived and designed as such. The
designers have relative freedom in configuring the system architecture and creating the
various subsystems, which can be implemented on a plant-wide, fully integrated basis. A
large pool of available resources and the presence of a dedicated design team usually
match the size of the design task. Extensive testing of the subsystems and of the
integrated system is also likely to be possible.
For retrofits or modifications, however, typically there will be a narrower focus
and fewer resources available. The system-wide effects of the particular application are
presumed to be relatively limited in scope, and in any case the designer is limited by the
requirement of integrating the retrofit subsystem into an existing plant. In addition, the
customized nature of retrofits can make it difficult to carry out a series of changes in a
consistent manner, unless there is an integrated, plant-wide plan.
An example of this problem is provided by the aircraft collision avoidance
system, TCAS. About four years after the original TCAS specification was written, it
was discovered that it did not adequately cover requirements involving the case where the
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pilot of an intruding aircraft did not follow his or her TCAS advisory and thus TCAS
must change the advisory to its own pilot. The change in basic requirements caused
extensive changes in the TCAS design, some of which introduced additional subtle
problems and errors that took years to discover and rectify.
Anticipating exactly what changes will occur and designing to minimize the
effects of those changes is difficult, and the consequences of being wrong can be
significant. Techniques are needed which can help to manage complexity, keep up with
changes, and identify conflicts. With the increased complexity of current generation
systems in terms of the number of components and number of functions performed, this
is a difficult and complex problem.
Managing complex systems is the domain of systems engineering. Systems
engineering is a discipline that grew out of the rapid expansion of technology during and
after World War II, when engineers were faced with designing and building more
complex systems than had ever been previously attempted. New approaches were needed
to develop systems that were2 4
" Large in terms of the number of components, functions performed, and cost;
" Complex in the sense that a change in one variable could affect many other
variables, often in a nonlinear fashion;
" Semi-automatic, where machines performed some functions while humans
performed others via a human-machine interface; and
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* Unpredictable in terms of the input to the system, the rate at which inputs
occurred, and other environmental disturbances.
The goal of systems engineering is to optimize the design of the overall system as
opposed to optimizing its components. It largely involves little more than simple
common sense engineering, but it applies a formal discipline and associated methods and
tools that focus on the overall management of the engineering process. Emphasis is
placed on defining goals and effectiveness measures; developing alternatives; modeling
systems for analysis; establishing and applying decision criteria; and controlling and
managing implementation and operation.
The system engineering process uses a number of models to represent both the
structure and behavior of a system, e.g., data flow diagrams, piping and instrumentation
(P&ID) diagrams, etc. These models specify the system architecture, inputs and outputs,
behavior of the components (including the interactions between them and their effect on
the overall system state), and the purpose or goals of the system as a whole (making it a
coherent entity as opposed to simply a collection of parts). The current state of the art in
system engineering uses object-oriented modeling techniques to express these system
specification models25 . Object-oriented techniques employ a data-centric approach that
focuses solely on relationships between objects and the sorts of messages that the objects
can pass between them. They provide a language-independent medium for specifying,
designing and analyzing general systems.
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This sort of approach is very useful for the definition of requirements because it
provides a common framework for both the user and the developer to understand the
system design in a natural and intuitive way. Before the advent of object-oriented
analysis and design (OOA&D) methodologies, system analysts had to translate their
understanding of the problem space into some other structured language, possibly altering
information in the translation. OOA&D allows the analyst to express the design directly,
without translation. By preserving the users understanding of the problem, OOA&D
eliminates a major source of errors in the design phase.
A system engineering environment supported by object-oriented system
development tools and databases is capable of defining large, complex systems,
allocating requirements among the system's constituents, simulating the system and
analyzing its behavior, and maintaining traceability from the concept phase through to
implementation. The process is well suited for exercising control over system
development and verifying that the finished product meets its requirements.
A technique that can add to this capability by providing tools for structured
hazard analyses and validation of safety requirements would be a useful addition to the
system engineering process. It may even assist software engineers in designing effective
fault-tolerance mechanisms. Detecting unanticipated faults during execution has turned
out to be a very difficult problem. It has been found that programmers have had
difficulty writing effective assertions for detecting errors in executing software. 26 Using
the results from a system hazard analysis might help in determining which assertions are
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required, and where, to detect the most important errors. Such a technique could identify
effective and useful assertions to detect general violations of system goals and
constraints.
11-3. THE DYNAMIC FLOWGRAPH METHODOLOGY
The Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM)' 7 ', is a digraph-based technique
for modeling and analyzing the behavior of software driven embedded systems. The
methodology employs a modeling framework that represents the logical, physical and
temporal attributes of a system, encompassing both the software and hardware, and their
interactions with each other and the environment. These models are operated upon using
automated deductive or inductive algorithms that identify the combinations and
sequences of basic component states that can produce certain system-level states, or,
conversely, the various possible sequences of system-level states that are reachable from
a particular basic component state. From a systems analysis perspective, DFM provides
the same analytical capabilities as do fault tree analysis (FTA), failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA), and hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP). The principal
difference is that once a DFM model of a system has been developed, the model contains
all of the information necessary for the automated execution of these analyses for any
system condition of interest. This can be compared, for example, with FTA, in which
each system top event requires a separate manual analysis.
DFM models are time-dependent and employ multi-state logic. They are capable
of representing all of the states of the system which are deemed to be hazardous, and of
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modeling the functional and dynamic behavior of the system in terms of transitions
between states. DFM provides an analytical framework for systematically identifying the
principal failure modes of an embedded system, whether they are caused by unanticipated
inputs, hardware failures, adverse environmental conditions, or implementation errors.
11-3.1 DFM Modeling Framework
A DFM model makes use of certain basic modeling elements to represent the
logical and temporal relations that exist in the system and the associated software. It
incorporates a "time-transition network" that describes the sequence in which software
subroutines are executed and control actions are carried out, a "causality network" that
describes the functional relationships between key hardware and software parameters,
and a "conditioning network" which models discrete software behavior due to conditional
switching actions and discontinuous hardware performance due to component failures.
Process variable nodes represent physical and software variables that are required
to capture the essential functional behavior, continuous or discrete, of the digital control
system. A variable represented by a process variable node is discretized into a finite
number of states. The reason for the discretization is to simplify the description of the
relations between variables. The choice of states for a process variable node is often
dictated by the logic of the system. For example, it is natural to set a state boundary at a
value that acts as a trigger point for a switching action or a "red line" value that indicates
the system is progressing towards failure. The number of states for each variable must be
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chosen on the basis of the balance between the resolution of the model and the
complexity introduced by higher numbers of variable states.
Consider, for example, Figure II-1, which shows a simple gas-storage system with
its associated pressure control system. The process variable node TP represents the
pressure in the gas tank. This parameter is discretized into 5 states, and can vary from
very low to very high. This discretization scheme reflects the knowledge that state 1
signifies very low pressure and the tank is almost empty. State 2, state 3 and state 4
represent low pressure, normal pressure and high pressure respectively, while state 5
corresponds to dangerously high pressure, which can cause the tank to burst. In addition,
the state boundary between 2 and 3 is set to correspond to the trigger point where gas
inflow is activated to replenish the tank. Similarly, the boundary between states 3 and 4
corresponds to the set-point for opening the relief valve to decrease the pressure in the
tank.
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Figure II-1 A Simple Digital Control System and its DFM Model
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Causality edges connect process variable nodes to indicate the existence of a
cause-and-effect relationship between the variables described by the nodes. For example,
the causality edges (a), (b) and (c) in Figure 11-1(b) show that the value of the process
variable NGF (the net gas flow in to the tank) is directly related to the values of the
process variables IGF (gas inflow into the tank) and OGF (gas outflow through the valve
at the top of the tank). The precise nature of the functional relationship (or the transfer
function) is described by a transfer box that is always directly associated with each
causality edge.
A decision table is associated with each transfer box and is used to quantify the
relationships between its input and output process variable nodes. This table is a
mapping between the possible combinations of the states of the input process variable
nodes and the corresponding states of the output process variable node. Because it
involves the mapping of continuous domains onto discrete ones, the input-output
relationship described by the decision table is qualitative. As a result, the state of the
output variable resulting from a particular combination of input variable states may not
be unique (the resulting range of possible outputs may overlap two or more states). Thus,
the decision table is not simply a multi-dimensional matrix with a unique value of the
output state at each matrix entry. Rather, the table takes a two-dimensional form in
which there is a column for each input variable and a column for the output variable, and
the rows enumerate the possible ways that the inputs can be combined to produce the
corresponding output. For each output variable state, the rows of the decision table are a
disjunction of conjunctions of states of the inputs that can cause it.
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Decision tables can be constructed from empirical knowledge of the system, from
physical equations that govern the system behavior, or from available software code
and/or pseudo.code. Building decision tables with empirical knowledge and/or pseudo
code provides a means of modeling the intended behavior of a system, and thus allows
analyses to be performed on the specifications or the design concept, even before the
system exists. Conversely, building the decision tables by using physical equations
and/or by path testing of the individual software modules will result in a model that
reflects the actual behavior of the system, allowing the analysis of the implemented
system. The completeness of the decision tables is crucial for the analysis because it
directly correlates to the fidelity of the model (its ability to predict system behavior).
Hence, to keep the decision tables from growing too large, a judicious selection of the
number of states into which each node is discretized should be made, without at the same
time losing too much detail in the behavior of the system.
Unlike causality edges, condition edges are used primarily to represent true
discrete behavior in the system. They link condition nodes to transfer boxes, indicating
the possibility of using a different transfer function to map input variable to output
variable states. In Figure 11-1(b), the condition node VS specifies whether the valve is in
its normal state or in one of two failure modes. Depending on the value of VS, the output
node OGF (gas outflow through the valve) can be proportional to the input VX (valve
position), or OGF can be stuck at minimum or maximum values regardless of the value of
VX.
83
Condition nodes, like process variable nodes, represent physical or software
parameters. However, condition nodes are used in DFM to more explicitly identify
component failure states, changes in process operation regimes and modes, and software
switching actions. Condition nodes represent variables that can affect the logic
superstructure of the system by modifying the causal relations between the process
variable nodes. Any condition node whose states are not determined by other upstream
process variable nodes is treated in DFM as a "random variable", i.e., a variable that may
be in any of its possible states. In this case, a distribution of the relative frequency of the
associated states could be assumed for purposes of probabilistic quantification. For
example, node VS in Figure 11-1(b) is a condition node that is not affected by any
upstream process, as the failure of the valve is assumed to be a random event and is not
explicitly modeled. It should be noted that the effect of a condition node on an output
variable is modeled through a decision table, as is the case for a process variable node.
The reason for having the added modeling elements of condition nodes and condition
edges is to offer a clear distinction between continuous and discontinuous behavior in a
system.
Transition boxes are similar to transfer boxes in that they connect process variable
nodes to indicate cause-and-effect relationships. Condition nodes can also be associated
with transition boxes to represent discontinuous behavior between the input and output
process variable nodes. Decision tables are again used to describe the relationships
between the input and output process variable nodes. However, transition boxes differ
from transfer boxes in that a time lag or time transition is assumed to occur between the
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time when the input variable states are true and the time when the output variable state
associated with those inputs is reached. This time delay is a characteristic of the
transition that is being modeled and is treated as an attribute of the transition box. For
example, in Figure II-1, the transition box TTl indicates that a new value of TP (an
updated value of the tank pressure) depends on the value of NGF (the net gas flow into
the tank) and the old value of TP (the tank pressure at the previous clock cycle).
Transition boxes are routinely used to model the execution of software routines and the
handling of interrupts, which often play an important role in the execution flow of digital
control system software. Transition boxes can, of course, also be used to model hardware
time transitions.
11-3.2 DFM Model Analysis
The analysis of a DFM system model is generally conducted by tracing sequences
of events backward through the model structure from effects to causes (i.e., deductively),
although it is also possible to trace forward from causes to effects (i.e., inductively). In a
deductive analysis, the goal is to identify the paths and the order in which combinations
of hardware and/or software conditions can propagate through the system to produce
system events of interest. This kind of DFM analysis shares many of the conceptual
features of fault tree analysis. A fault tree is a graphical model that represents the
combinations of individual component failures that can lead to the occurrence of an
overall system failure (referred to as the top event). In conventional binary fault tree
analysis, once a fault tree has been developed, Boolean algebra can be used to reduce the
tree to a logically equivalent mathematical form in terms of the tree's minimal cut sets.
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A cut set is defined as a set of events that, if they all occur, will lead to the top event. A
minimal cut set is a cut set that does not contain any other cut set as a subset. The
removal of any event from a minimal cut set would cause it to no longer be a cut set.
A fundamental limitation to conventional fault tree analysis is that the above
approach can only be applied to systems in which the primary events are binary. Because
DFM models represent physical variables (e.g., pressure, temperature, voltage, etc.),
binary logic (in which only two states may be used to characterize each variable space) is,
in general, not sufficient for an adequate representation of the behavior of the system.
DFM models thus employ multi-valued logic (MVL), wherein each variable space may
be discretized into an arbitrary number of states. A DFM fault tree, therefore, would
contain non-binary primary events (or certain equivalent binary expressions containing
groups of mutually exclusive binary primary events that represent the assertion that a
given multi-valued variable is in a particular state).
The MVL analogues of the minimal cut sets encountered in binary fault trees are
known as prime implicants. A prime implicant is any monomial (conjunction of
primary events) that is sufficient to cause the top event, but does not contain any shorter
conjunction of the same events that is sufficient to cause the top event. The prime
implicants of a function are unique and finite; however, finding them is a more
challenging task than finding binary logic minimal cut sets.
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DFM uses decision tables to map the combinatorial states of transfer box inputs to
their outputs. Decision tables allow each variable to be represented by any number of
states, and they have been applied in fault tree analysis in the past to model component
behavior. Given the state of a transfer box output node, the decision table gives the
complete sets of inputs that could have caused it. Since a decision table is, itself,
essentially a disjunction of conjunctions of states, it is possible to generate prime
implicants from the table. Methods have been developed for obtaining system prime
implicants from component decision tables.27 In DFM, the procedure for generating
prime implicants has been extended to carry out deductive analyses across time
transitions, so that dynamic representations of systems can be analyzed.
When referring to prime implicants in the context of a DFM analysis, an
important observation is that the presence of the time element in the DFM modeling
framework introduces the possibility of prime implicants that would not be possible in
ordinary time-invariant logic. In the latter, for instance, a prime implicant of the form:
<variable A = 2 AND variable A = 3>
would not be possible, and, if found in the course of a time-invariant analysis, would
have to be eliminated through the application of logical consistency rules. In the
application of DFM to time-dependent systems however, if a time-transition has been
encountered and the prime implicant is "time-stamped" to indicate:
<variable A = 2 @ time t = TI AND variable A = 3 @ time t = T2>,
then the logical inconsistency no longer exists, and the prime implicant can be considered
possible (unless of course it violates a "dynamic consistency rule", which still applies in
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time-dependent logic). All prime implicants identified in a DFM analysis are
conjunctions of primary events with associated time stamps, and they are simply referred
to as "timed prime implicants" (TPI's).
DFM represents a significant advancement beyond conventional fault tree
analysis. In particular, a conventional fault-tree produces cut-sets for one, and only one,
binary top event, with no associated time dependent information. The DFM
representation is one or two orders of magnitude more powerful, because it produces
multi-valued logic and time-dependent prime implicants for a very large number of
possible top-events. A DFM top-event can be chosen to be any state among all the
possible states of any of the variables, or even any combination of states of separate
variables. This is in addition to the fact that, once a DFM system model has been
constructed, it can be used repeatedly to investigate many different top events.
11-4. DFM-BASED ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM OBJECT MODELS
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how DFM analysis procedures can be
used to perform automated hazard analyses of object-oriented system requirements
models. A complete object-oriented system specification typically consists of two
models, a structure model and a behavior model25 . The structure model describes the
physical architecture of the system, and defines the parts, or components, from which it is
built. The behavior model defines the responses of the system to external excitations. It
is intended to capture in rigorous and executable form the information that is expressed in
text in operations concepts and requirement statements. At the high-level design stage,
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the behavior model defines the intrinsic behavior of the system. This is the behavior as
allowed by nature, i.e., it incorporates those sequences and alternatives necessitated by
the nature of the problem, but preserves possible concurrencies. At lower levels of
design, the intrinsic behavior is transformed to design behavior by serializing
concurrencies or pipelining sequences to reflect design decisions. The design behavior
results in the same set of responses to external excitation as the intrinsic behavior, while
the individual functions are mapped onto the system components in the structure model.
It also includes a data model that specifies the input and output of each function.
Inasmuch as a DFM model is essentially nothing more than a functional flow
block diagram (FFBD), there is a natural correspondence between a DFM model and the
behavior object model used to specify the system's functional and temporal requirements.
In fact, the information contained in the behavior model is precisely what is needed to
create the system DFM model. The function objects themselves correspond to transition
boxes in the DFM model, and the input and output data objects correspond to DFM
process variable nodes and condition nodes.
Given the one-to-one correspondence between objects in the behavior model and
in the DFM model, it is only necessary to define appropriate attributes for the objects in
the behavior model to allow them to function as their DFM counterparts. For instance,
process variable nodes in the DFM model are characterized by the ranges of values that
they are allowed to assume. These ranges are, in turn, discretized into a finite number of
states. In the behavior model, the attributes of the input and output data objects should
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include both the ranges of allowed values, as well as associated state boundaries.
Attributes of the function objects in the behavior model, which correspond to transition
boxes in the DFM model, should include the function's duration (the length of time
between the occurrence of the input and output conditions), as well as decision table
representations of the associated input-output relationships, linked to the state
representations of the input and output variables.
By assigning to the objects in the behavior model the attributes that correspond to
their DFM counterparts, the behavior model can serve as the DFM model directly,
eliminating the need to introduce an additional graphical modeling package to the system
engineering environment. Additionally, because the DFM models must also include
causal and conditioning interactions between the system components, the physical world,
and the environment, this should lead to more complete behavioral specification models
and a better understanding on the part of system designers of how the overall system
behaves.
11-4.1 System Requirements Hazard Analysis - Example
As an illustration of the DFM-based hazard analysis of an object-oriented
requirements model, consider the space-based nuclear reactor control system described
below. The requirements model for this system is adapted from an experimental research
program conducted at MIT to develop control laws facilitating rapid increases of
neutronic power in spacecraft reactors operating in an SDI environment. The control
laws have been utilized under closed-loop digital control conditions in performance trials
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on the 5-MWt MIT Research Reactor and the Annular Core Research Reactor operated
by Sandia National Laboratories.
Figure 11-2 shows a simple, high-level object model that illustrates the relation of
the system
Nuclear Control Human
Reactor System Operator
Power Level Raise power SpecifyMax. Power Lower power target powerStartup Rate Maintain CommandMax. Startup Rate power start/stopFuel Temp. Perform safety
Max. Temp. check
Figure 11-2 System-Environment Relationship
to its external environment. External to the "Control System" object are the "Nuclear
Reactor" object and the "Operator" object. The Nuclear Reactor has six attributes: a
power level, a maximum allowed power level, a startup rate (measure of the rate of
change in power), a maximum allowable startup rate, a fuel temperature, and a maximum
allowed fuel temperature. The Operator has two functions: to specify a target power
level, and to issue start and stop commands. The Control System itself has four high-
level functions: to raise, lower and/or maintain the power level, and to monitor the reactor
attributes to ensure that all safety constraints are observed. The operations concept and
high-level requirements of the system can be described in text as follows:
91
Operations concept
The nuclear reactor supplies onboard power to a spacecraft operating in an
SDI environment. Because this application demands large power
requirements and short response times, the control system must be able to
safely raise the reactor's power level by up to six orders of magnitude in 5
seconds. The control laws implemented by the control system will
determine the rate of change of reactivity which is required to cause the
reactor's neutronic power to conform to a specified trajectory.
External system behavior
Name of the external system causing an excitation of the system
* Operator
The excitation behavior
" The operator will issue a "start" command to bring the reactor
to power
* The operator will specify the target power level
" The operator can issue a "stop" command to shut the reactor
down
Inputs to the system
" Target power level
* "Start" command
" "Stop" command
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Functional requirements of system
" The system shall raise/lower/maintain the reactor power level
according to operator supplied target
" The system shall shut down the reactor if the power, startup
rate, or temperature exceed their maximum values
Output from the system
0 Control rod movement
Name of the external system receiving the output from the system
0 Nuclear reactor
Temporal performance requirements
* Upon receipt of a start command and target power level, the system
shall reach the target power requirement within 5 seconds.
Nontemporal performance requirements
* The target power level shall not be exceeded by more than 5%.
A high level view of the function of the control system is shown in the functional
flow block diagram (FFBD) of Figure 11-3. After the system is initialized, it enters a
control loop in which the reactor data is sampled, the required rod motion is calculated,
and the appropriate command is sent to the rod drive motors. Specifying the inputs and
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outputs of each function, as shown in Figure 11-4, results in a top-level behavior model
for the system.
if no stop command
Initialize system V Retrieve and I Compute required Send command to
process data rod motion rod drive motors
if stop
command
Figure 11-3 Top-level FFBD for control system
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Figure 11-4 Top-level behavior model for control system
94
Each of the high level functions in the model can be broken down into lower level
functions as depicted in Figures 11-5 - II-7, resulting in the FFBD shown in Figure 11-8.
Adding the inputs and outputs of these lower level functions results in the second-level
behavior model in Figure II-9.
This model, in conjunction with the structure model of Figure II-10, which
specifies the components that comprise the system and allocates the system functions to
the components that will perform them, constitutes a complete object-oriented system
specification model. Naturally, as the design process progresses, each model would
continue to be further developed to an even lower level of detail. Nevertheless, as far as
the level of detail appropriate for the conceptual definition of the system is concerned,
these models serve to specify the system architecture, the inputs and outputs, the behavior
of the components, and the purpose of the system as a whole.
Initialize
Receive
start command
Receive
And target power
Initialize data
Figure 11-5 Lower-level decomposition of 'Initialize System'
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Figure 11-6 Lower-level decomposition of 'Retrieve and process data'
Compute required
rod motion
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if shutdown
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override no rod direction rod speed Or
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Figure II-7a Lower-level decomposition of 'Compute required rod motion'
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Figure II-7b Lower-level decomposition of 'Compute required rod motion'
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Figure 11-8 Lower-level FFBD for control system
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Figure 11-9 Second-level behavior model for control system
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Neutron detector
Get power level
Rod Drive System
Variable speed motors
Analog position sensing
system
Get rod position
Figure 11-10 Parts list for control system
Although the models of Figures 11-9 and 11-10 are complete enough for the
purposes of a system specification model, they do not yet contain enough information to
conduct a DFM analysis. Because a DFM model must also include the interaction of the
system with its environment, it is necessary to add this information to the behavior model
as well. In the case of this example, this means adding the nuclear reaction process,
which accepts the output of the system in terms of the control rod motion and provides
input in terms of the power level and fuel temperature. Adding a function object
representing this physical process to the behavior model of Figure 11-9, and linking it to
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the appropriate input and output quantities, results in the augmented behavior model of
Figure II- 11. The addition of this function to the behavior model "completes the loop" on
the control system, allowing the DFM algorithm to track the propagation of disturbances
through the software and into the physical world, and vice versa. It also helps to establish
the context in which the system operates, and makes it possible to investigate the
behavior of the controller in the presence of unusual or unexpected conditions on the
physical side of the system.
The decision table underlying the nuclear reaction function specifies the states of
the power level, fuel temperature and rod position as a function of the state of the rod
motion. The decision table for this particular example was generated using a generic
reactor simulation code employing physical parameters that match those of the reactor at
Sandia National Laboratories on which the control experiments were performed. In cases
where the external system hardware does not yet exist or is being developed concurrently,
the decision tables can be developed from the physical laws that govern the process
and/or the specified behavior of the external system.
It should be pointed out that the power level and fuel temperature output from the
nuclear reaction process are functions of more than just the control rod motion. They
also depend on the initial values of those variables. The same is true of the rod position,
which is related to the rod motion by the equation RO = Ri + (dR/dt)At. Functional
dependence on a variable's previous value can be made explicit in the behavior model by
adding a node for the variable's previous value connected to the node for its current value
101
Nuclear
Reaction
,I0 Process 
- -.- - -~ - - ~
GetrRod-RodshuddRwd
position from Fuel\
N Check for stnp ~
dStartup ate And
levol frommenceman
ssr 
shtdwnChec powerGet Ir A
syst ck orcko
fromuren Censors Ch c fu lrdd rci n m s ed O op rv
N
N
N
N
N
.,
Required
Figure II-11 Augmented behavior model for control system
Initialize data
Receive
And start command -
wer
0
through an 'identity' function associated with the appropriate time delay. This is not
necessary, however, as long as the dependence is accounted for in the decision table by
adding a column for the variable's previous state. During the analysis, the DFM
algorithm will automatically "prune" the table by eliminating sequences in which the
variable's previous state is physically inconsistent with its current state.
To complete the definition of the possible operating contexts for the system, it is
necessary to augment the decision tables in the behavior model to include behavior
associated with the possible failure modes of the system hardware components. This will
allow the analysis to cover all possible combinations of hardware states to account for
operating conditions and applications that are unusual or unintended. The hardware
components whose failures need to be modeled can be found from the parts list in the
structure model for the system. Ideally, the analysis should include the possible failure
modes for all hardware components in the system. The potentially large number of prime
implicants that results can be screened according to severity and likelihood. However, in
this example, for the purpose of simplicity, we will only consider three components, the
temperature sensor, the power sensor and the rod drive motor. For both the temperature
sensor and the power sensor, two failure modes were considered: loss of signal, and off-
scale low. The failure mode considered for the rod drive was a stalled motor.
To incorporate the effect of a failed component in the behavior model, the
decision tables for the functions that the component performs are augmented by adding a
column for the state of the component, and adding rows that reflect the input-output
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two do not occur simultaneously. The time difference has been normalized so that the
duration of one computation cycle equals one time step.
The results of the DFM analysis, which are shown in Table II-1, reveal that for
this top event there are seven prime implicants, i.e., there are seven 'ways' in which the
system can fail to scram. Unsurprisingly, due to the simplicity of the supervisory control
routine, only hardware failures can lead to the top event; there are no software "failures"
that can contribute to a failure to scram. In fact, the first two prime implicants are not
failures at all, they simply reflect the physical impossibility of inserting the rods when
they are already fully inserted (R = full in). The remaining prime implicants
involve either a failed temperature sensor (TS) or a stalled rod drive motor (MS). Prime
implicant 3 corresponds to the temperature sensor failing off-scale low, allowing the
temperature to be in the 'hot' range without the computer "knowing" it, and prime
implicants 4 and 5 indicate a loss of signal from the temperature sensor, making the
computer "think" that the temperature is always zero.
While this set of prime implicants does not reveal any unexpected system failure
modes, it is nevertheless useful. It documents the complete set of possible causes of a
failure to scram in a form in which they can be easily screened according to likelihood
and used to prioritize potential modifications to the design. While both the temperature
sensor and the rod drive motor are sources of potential single-point failures of the system,
one of these failures may be significantly more likely than the others and may warrant the
allocation of additional resources to investigate ways to either eliminate or mitigate the
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Table II-1 Prime Implicants for 'Failure to Scram'
For the top event:
At time 0
At time -1
DR = NOT(in max)
T = hot OR melt
There are 7 prime implicants
Prime Implicant
At time -1
At time -1
Prime Implicant
At time -1
At time -1
Prime Implicant
At time -1
At time -1
Prime Implicant
At time -1
At time -1
Prime Implicant
At time -1
At time -1
Prime Implicant
At time -1
At time -1
Prime Implicant
At time -1
At time -1
#1
,
,
#2
#3
,I
,I
#4
#5
#6
#7
,I
,I
R = full
T = hot
R = full
T = melt
TS = low
T = hot
TS = null
T = hot
TS = null
T = melt
MS = stalled
T = hot (
ANDin
(1400, 1800 C)
in
(> 1800 C)
AND
AND
(1400, 1800 C)
AND
(1400, 1800 C)
AND
(> 1800 C)
AND
1400, 1800 C)
ANDMS = stalled
T = melt (> 1800 C)
hazard. Indeed, in the actual control system experiments on which this example is based,
the experimenters did investigate the magnitude of step changes in motor frequency that
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are most likely to cause a stall, and limited the authority of the controller as a result 28.
Obviously, a DFM analysis is not required to point out the importance of a stalled motor,
but it can facilitate comparisons between components (particularly when the components
appear in prime implicants of more than one top event) and help direct the allocation of
resources more efficiently. Also, the prime implicants may be used in a quantitative risk
assessment of the system1 4,29. Because they deal only with the states of physical
parameters and hardware components, probability distributions can be developed without
the need to resort to controversial software reliability models that may be easily
misapplied. Finally, these results can be used to validate the system safety requirements
by confirming the absence of unknown system failure modes under a specific set of
explicitly documented assumptions, namely, the types and effects of failure modes
assumed for the components, and the specified behavior of the system.
11-4.1.2 HAZARD MITIGATION
For this example we must look at a still lower level specification of the system.
Consider the decomposition of the 'Calculate startup rate' function of Figure Il-11, which
is shown in Figure 11-12. The function calculates both the asymptotic startup rate and the
instantaneous startup rate, and the larger of the two is used in the supervisory control
routine. The instantaneous startup rate is calculated from the current and previous
observed power levels and the duration of the computation cycle. The asymptotic startup
rate is calculated from the asymptotic reactor period, r, which depends on the reactivity
present in the system, p(t), and the effective rate of production of delayed neutrons (the
decay parameter), k8(t), according to the following equation:
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Figure l-12 Lower-level decomposition of 'Calculate startup rate'
P - p(t )
A, = ,(I-1
where is the delayed neutron fraction. The startup rate, SUR, is then calculated using
the equation
SUR =,(II-2)
A z-
where A is the prompt neutron lifetime.
The decision table for the 'Calculate asymptotic startup rate' function (which
could be developed directly from the physical equations or from pseudo-code but was, in
this instance, developed from the actual system FORTRAN code) reveals the presence of
an overflow error when p(t) ~ P. The code for this function is reproduced in Table 11-2,
where the variable DELK corresponds to p(t), DCS corresponds to k,(t), and TASYM
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corresponds to -r. DCS is in units of sec~' and DELK is in units of 'millibeta', so that
when p(t) = P, DELK = 1000.
Table 11-2 FORTRAN code for 'Calculate asymptotic startup rate'
TASYM = 10000.
IF(ABS(DELK) .LT. 1.25) GO TO 400
TASYM = (1000. - DELK)/(DCS*DELK)
400 CONTINUE
SLIM = 26.06/TASYM
It is evident from the code that there was an implicit requirement to set TASYM
equal to 10,000 seconds to prevent an overflow when DELK is small (DCS is small but
nonzero at all times). However, there was no comparable requirement to prevent an
overflow in SLIM (the asymptotic startup rate) when TASYM is small. This apparent
oversight is understandable due to the fact that DELK is not intended to reach 1000. In
fact, the condition p(t) = P is known as 'prompt-criticality', in which the number of
prompt neutrons in the system (those produced directly by fission rather than by the
decay of fission products) is enough to sustain the chain reaction by themselves, resulting
in an uncontrollable reaction.
A question of interest, then, in terms of validating the safety requirements of the
system, is whether there are any scenarios in which DELK can reach 1000 mbeta without
the system attaining prompt-criticality. In other words, can the computer overestimate
the reactivity enough to trigger an overflow error in the asymptotic startup rate
computation and crash the system, even while the reaction itself remains controllable?
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One of the requirements added to the supervisory control subroutine in this
lower-level specification of the system is to monitor the value of DELK and drive in the
control rods (without scramming the system) if it should exceed a predefined maximum
value. In the latter runs of the control experiments, this maximum value was specified as
900 mbeta2 8 . Thus, for the overflow error to occur, DELK would have to jump from less
than 900 mbeta to 1000 in the span of one computation cycle. A data object for DELK
was added to the system behavior model (as output of the 'Calculate reactivity' function
of Figure 11-12) and discretized into seven states. The seventh state corresponds to values
of DELK greater than or equal to 1000, and the sixth state corresponds to values less than
1000 but greater than the limit of 900. The model was then analyzed for the top event:
At time 0 , DK = 7
AND
At time -1 , DK = 5
where DK is the state of DELK.
The DFM analysis for this top event resulted in more than 100 prime implicants.
Rather than attempt an accounting of each prime implicant, let us consider one of them in
detail. One of the prime implicants leading to the overflow error top event is the
following:
At time -2 , P = 4 (> 400 kW) AND
At time -2 , T = cool (< 400 C) AND
At time -1 , T = cool (< 400 C) AND
At time -1 , PS = normal AND
At time 0 , PS = null
This prime implicant can be understood with the help of Figure 11-14, which is from
Reference 28. It shows a plot of power and reactivity vs. time during one of the runs of
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the control experiments conducted at Sandia National Laboratory in December 1987.
During this run, the power is being increased by three orders of magnitude in a span of
6.8 seconds.
600 1200
Experimental Data
Pover Annular Core Research Reactor
ACRO07 -12/03/87
500 - 1000
Negative Rate of
Change of Reactivity-+
4QQ -Terminates Transient -800
Effect of Temperature E
Reactivity Feedback
;30060
0
Rapid Rate of Reactivity 0
200 Insertion Initiates Transient 400 a
W_
Specifications
100 -. Power Rising - Power Increase: 0.57-500 kW 200
Exponentially on - Specified Period, 1 a
Specified I a Period - Standard HIT-SNL Law
0 0 ' 1 ' '
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Time (s)
Figure 11-13 Power increase of three decades on one second period [28]
At 6.5 seconds into the experiment, the reactivity is close to the 900 mbeta limit,
and the power is close to reaching its target of 500 kW. At this time, the high power
level is causing the fuel temperature to increase significantly because of the fact that the
reactor is not equipped for forced circulation heat removal. This, in turn, causes Doppler
broadening of the resonance absorption peaks in the U-238 fuel (the relative motion of
the U-238 nuclei results in fewer neutrons being absorbed in the fuel), resulting in
negative reactivity insertion. The reactivity calculation in the software includes
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temperature feedback effects, so as the fuel temperature increases, the controller will
compensate by slowly withdrawing the control rods.
The prime implicant can come into play as a result of the way in which the
controller estimates the fuel temperature. The channel that was available to the
experiment for temperature measurements did not have a response time that was capable
of providing accurate measurements during fast transients. Accordingly, the temperature
used in the reactivity calculation was based on an analytic model. The fuel temperature
was calculated using the following lumped parameter model:
T ue .=Tj-i+ Ti -t,, -[P(t) -h - Apj, Twae,. ](Mi C) (11-3)
where:
T;Ue, is the current estimate of the fuel temperature (K),
Tu-'l is the previous estimate of the fuel temperature (K),
Tgain is an adjustable gain used to allow sensitivity studies of the model,
tsa, is the sample time (s),
P(t) is the instantaneous reactor power (W),
h is the heat transfer coefficient of the fuel rods to the pool water (W/m2-K),
Afuel is the heat transfer area of the fuel (m 2),
Twaler is the bulk water temperature (K),
M ,ue, is the mass of the fuel (kg), and
C, is the specific heat of the fuel material (J/kg-K)
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The code then compared this calculated fuel temperature to the measured value, and the
larger of the two was used in the control law calculations. Thus, near the end of the
transient, when the power is increasing rapidly and the calculated fuel temperature is
outpacing the measured temperature, the system is vulnerable to a loss of signal of the
power sensor (PS, in the above prime implicant). If this happens, the fuel temperature
estimate will actually decrease slightly, and this, in combination with the slight
withdrawal of the rods during the previous computation cycle, can be enough to cause an
erroneous reactivity calculation of 1000 mbeta or more, enabling the potential overflow
error.
It is reasonable to ask the question of whether such a 'reachability' analysis of this
event is really necessary. Having identified the possibility of a potential overflow error,
why not simply 'fix' the code? The answer to this question is that it is not clear to what
extent the code is indeed 'broken'. Remember that, under ordinary circumstances, the
reactivity should not be able to reach 1000 mbeta in the first place, in which case there is
really no possibility of an error. Furthermore, without a clear understanding of what
circumstances might cause the reactivity to reach 1000 mbeta, how is the designer to
know what the appropriate 'fix' of the software would be?
The correctness of any software is context-dependent. Code that is "correct" in
some contexts may be "incorrect" in others, and vice versa. The prime implicants of the
DFM analysis identify what the incorrect contexts are. This is important information
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since the nature and the likelihood of a particular context may dictate the appropriate
strategy for correcting "errors."
11-4.2 Caveats
Due to the combinatorics that result from large models (i.e., models involving a
large number of parameters that are, in turn, discretized into a large number of states), the
DFM analysis of a single top event can produce prime implicants numbering in the
thousands. These numbers can often be reduced somewhat by grouping them into
families of similar prime implicants and/or extending the tracking process further back in
time to collapse familial groups into a single prime implicant. Nevertheless, in such a
situation it is clear that not all of the prime implicants can be studied in detail.
Furthermore, not all of the prime implicants will necessarily lead to the top event. The
set of prime implicants forms a necessary, but not sufficient, set of conditions to cause
the top event.
To illustrate this, consider again the prime implicants of the 'failure to scram' top
event shown in Table 11-1. As mentioned previously, the first two prime implicants
reflect the impossibility of inserting the rods when they are already fully inserted. If the
analysis were to be continued further back in time, however, the following two prime
implicants would be added to the list:
At time -2 , R = half in AND
At time -2 , T = hot (1400, 1800 C)
and
At time -2 , R = half in AND
At time -2 , T = melt (> 1800 C)
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These prime implicants involve the rod position moving from the state half in (which
is the state adjacent to full in) to fully inserted in the span of a single time step.
Physically, this is not possible because of the limitation on the speed of the rod drive.
However, it is certainly possible for the rods to move from the lower range of the half
in state to the upper range of the full in state in one time step. The problem is that
all points within the full in state are treated the same by DFM.
Thus, in most cases, it is likely that the prime implicants will need to be screened
according their likelihood before being analyzed in detail. This should not be prohibitive,
however, since even when software "failures" are involved, the prime implicants, which
only point out the context in which they may occur, refer only to physical parameters and
component states. Therefore, the assessment of their relative likelihood should be
straightforward.
11-5. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has described and demonstrated an approach for validating the safety
requirements of digital I&C systems which uses the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology
(DFM) to conduct hazard analyses of object-oriented system specification models. The
approach allows system requirements to be automatically analyzed for safety, improving
efficiency in the identification and resolution of problems. Also, because the approach is
hierarchical, results from the analysis of high-level specifications can be used to guide
lower-level design decisions to either eliminate or mitigate hazards.
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One of the most useful features of the approach is the fact that it explicitly
documents the safety-related assumptions made during the validation effort. Each set of
prime implicants is linked to a model that explicitly specifies the system behavior and
associated component failure modes. Future work should address the issue of how to
verify that lower-level design detail does not violate any of the conditions imposed by the
model assumptions and associated analyses made at the previous step in the design
process.
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Appendix A
Current State of the Art in Digital I&C System
Software Assurance
Currently, the assurance of digital control system software is not handled much
differently from that of any other type of software for real-time applications (such as
communications software). Three principal types of software assurance philosophies can
be recognized in the published literature, which are briefly described and discussed
below.
A.1 TESTING AND SOFTWARE RELIABILITY
Assurance by testing is the most common approach to software assurance.
Testing is often performed by feeding random inputs into the software and observing the
produced output to discover incorrect behavior. Software reliability models have been
proposed to aid the testing strategies', although the applicability to software of reliability
models extrapolated from the hardware reliability realm is seriously questioned, even
from within the software reliability community itself2.
The most common justification for the use of software reliability models is the
argument that, even though software behavior is deterministic, the sequences of input that
it sees are not. The basic idea is that the input domain can be partitioned into two classes,
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one composed of inputs that result in failures, and the rest composed of inputs that do not.
Just like, when reaching into an urn containing black and white balls, there is a certain
probability of pulling out a ball of a specific color, during execution of the software, there
is a certain probability of getting one of the "good" inputs, and a certain probability of
getting a "bad" input which causes a failure. The number of failures, Sn, observed during
n executions of the software is then given by the binomial distribution:
P(S, = k) = -n) .pk .(1 p)-k. (A-1)
This distribution gives us the probability that k inputs out of n are "bad" and will result in
a failure.
For cases in which the time to failure is of interest, rather than the probability of
failure on demand, using the Poisson approximation to the binomial results in an
exponential distribution for the time to failure (assuming that the probability of failure
per input is stationary; i.e., the parameter p in Eq. A-I does not change over time). The
use of such exponential models has led to the notion of a "failure rate" for software, and
in fact, many proposed software reliability models have centered on the behavior of the
failure rate as their motivating argument. Using models such as these, one estimates the
time to failure or the probability of failure on demand, based on the statistical evidence of
the software's testing history.
The trouble with this type of approach is that it depends on a set of implicit
assumptions that, in most cases, are unrealistic. For example, it has been shown that the
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"urn" model systematically underestimates the software failure. This is because of the
fact that all tests of the software do not necessarily have the same evidential value.
Consider software S with an input domain divided into two subdomains, A and B.
Suppose that A and B exercise two separate areas of code, SA and SB, respectively, which
together comprise S. According to the urn model, tests in A and B are assumed to have
the same evidential value for estimation of the probability of failure for inputs in A.
However, for this particular example, this assumption is clearly unreasonable, because a
test in B does not exercise SA, while a test in A does. It follows that any model which
assumes the test successes in B are relevant to estimating the failure probability of A will
result in an estimated failure probability for A which is low. Likewise, the estimated
failure probability for B will be low, leading to a low estimate of the overall failure
probability. The essence of the argument is that the model lowers the estimated failure
probability based on some evidence that is irrelevant. This bias can be removed by
partitioning the input domain into a number of smaller "urns," or bins, and treating each
one independently. However, the resulting degree of conservatism can be too great,
leading to a requirement for an unnecessary and infeasible number of tests.
Another fundamental assumption, which may not be justified in practice, is
independence of the inputs. The above models require that each execution, or "run," of
the software be independent of the others, i.e., the failure or success of one input cannot
force the same behavior for another. Correlated inputs are analogous to cheating on the
testing effort by counting the same data point more than once. However, for systems in
which the output depends on both the input and the internal state of the software (such as
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in real-time control systems), the accumulation of state information over the length of the
run explicitly compromises run independence. For example, an interactive program can,
as a side-effect of responding to an ill-formed command, go into a state in which some
subsequent commands fail. In such a case, the probability of failure of the software is not
stationary, and it depends explicitly on the history of the input sequence.
Traditional software reliability models depend on a number of questionable
assumptions (not the least of which is the fact that they all depend on the identification of
an operational profile from which the test cases must be selected). Not surprisingly, it is
almost universally recognized that these techniques are not capable of demonstrating the
levels of reliability required for safety-critical systems. Nevertheless, it is not an option
to exempt software from quantitative reliability requirements. The objective of the
research presented in this thesis has been to develop an approach whose basis does
involve probabilities, but in which it is recognized that software does not "fail" randomly.
A.2 FORMAL VERIFICATION
Formal verification is another approach to software assurance that applies logic
and mathematical theorems to prove that certain abstract representations of software, in
the form of logic statements and assertions, are consistent with the specifications
expressing the desired software behavior. Recent work has been directed at developing
varieties of this type of technique specifically for the handling of timing and concurrency
problems3 . However, the abstract nature of the formalism adopted in formal verification
makes this approach rather difficult to use properly by practitioners with non-specialized
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mathematical backgrounds. Furthermore, the issue of modeling and representation of
hardware/software interaction (let alone the human element), which is an important issue
in digital control system assurance analysis, does not appear to have surfaced as one of
the current objectives of formal verification research.
A.3 STATE MACHINE METHODS
The third type of approach to software assurance is one that analyzes the timing
and logic characteristics of software executions by means of discrete state simulation
models commonly referred to as state machines, such as queue networks and Petri-nets.
Simulated executions are analyzed to discover undesirable execution paths. Although
this approach can be extended to model combined hardware/software behavior (since the
hardware behavior can in principle be approximated in terms of transitions within a set of
predefined discrete states), difficulties arise from the "march-forward" nature (in time
and causality) of this type of analysis, which forces the analyst to assume knowledge of
the initial conditions from which a system simulation can be started. In large systems,
many combinations of initial states may exist and the solution space may become
unmanageable. A different approach, which reverses the search logic by using fault trees
to trace backward from undesirable outcomes to possible cause conditions, offers an
interesting solution to this problem, but encounters difficulties due to limitations in its
ability to represent dynamic effects, and to the fact that a separate model needs to be
constructed for each software state whose initiating causes are to be identified.5
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Appendix B
Software Issues in the Nuclear Industry
The emergence of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as a systematic analytical
framework for the quantitative assessment of risks from nuclear power plants (NPPs) has
led to calls for an increasing use of its methods and results in regulation. Risk-informed
regulation is widely recognized as an important step toward the restoration of the U.S.
nuclear industry's economic competitiveness. The reason for this is the belief that the
industry is currently over-burdened by a regulatory environment that relies primarily on
prescriptive requirements whose objectives are often unclear and leave little or no room
to consider alternative strategies, no place for engineering calculations, and no flexibility
to adapt to unusual situations.
In response, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) formed the Regulatory
Review Group (RRG) that was tasked with conducting a detailed review with special
attention "placed on the feasibility of substituting unnecessary prescriptive requirements
and guidance with performance-based requirements and guidance founded on risk
insights." While generally favorable toward the use of PRA in regulation, the RRG
identified two general areas where the state of the art is weak. First, "methods for
evaluating the reliability of solid-state control and protection devices are not yet available
for routine application, particularly with respect to the adequacy of the software
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associated with the solid-state device." Second, "the state of the at is still relatively weak
in the ability to address cognitive and comprehension errors..."
These issues are of particular concern in the instrumentation and control (I&C)
systems of new advanced reactor designs, where the increased obsolescence of the analog
systems in currently operating plants is forcing the move to digital technology in order to
provide the additional capability of enhanced features, such as automatic continuous on-
line testing, self diagnostic aids, use of signal multiplexing and fiber optic technology for
isolation. For current nuclear power plants, digital technology has been primarily
regarded only as an instrument for support and enhancement of human capability in
diagnostics, control, maintenance, surveillance and communications. As the analog
equipment in older plants is becoming obsolete and is replaced by digital technology, the
interaction of software/hardware/humanware is becoming an issue of great importance to
the risk assessments of the plants.
A sobering reminder of how serious problems with digital process control
software can be in terms of critical system safety was given by an incident that occurred
at the Canadian Bruce-4 CANDU reactor in January 1990, as the result of a programming
error in the software used to control a reactor refueling machine. The control computer
had suspended execution of the main refueling machine positioning control subroutine
while executing a fault-handling subroutine triggered by a minor fault condition detected
elsewhere during the refueling process. Because of this error, the computer returned to
execution in the wrong segment of the main subroutine. As a result, the refueling
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machine, which was connected to one of the fuel channels of the pressure-tube reactor at
the time, released its brake and dropped its refueling assembly by about three feet,
producing serious damage to the refueling assembly itself and to the fuel channel, causing
a loss of coolant from the fuel channel.
In addition to the nuclear plant incident cited above, serious failures have indeed
occurred, with consequences ranging from the very large financial losses produced by the
half-collapse of a continental U.S. telephone network to lives lost because of the radiation
overdoses meted out by the faulty control system of a medical cancer therapy machine.
B.1 REGULATORY ISSUES
The initiatory research conducted for this thesis was a review of the recent efforts
on the part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to develop regulatory
guidelines related to the use of safety-critical software in the nuclear industry. The NRC
has already reviewed a number of digital I&C "retrofits" and is in the process of
reviewing designs of advanced plants. The review process has been somewhat ad hoc for
each application due to a lack of agreed-upon applicable criteria. Recently, the NRC has
solicited input from a number of sources in an attempt to develop a consensus for a
regulatory program. These sources included the Boeing aircraft company, the MITRE
Corporation, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the National Academy of
Sciences.
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An overriding concern of the NRC's is the vulnerability of computer-based
systems to common mode failures. Among the findings from the NRC Office of
Research's meeting with Boeing personnel was the fact that, based on Boeing's design
and development experience, the vast majority of errors are introduced very early in the
development process, usually in the definition of requirements. It is for this reason that
Boeing rejects the practice of "N-version programming;" N-version programming cannot
effectively eliminate common mode failures since the common starting point for the N
different versions is the requirements set, where most errors originate.
The Boeing staff also stated their belief that it is not possible to measure software
reliability quantitatively. Boeing's approach to quality assurance is based on an
adherence to standards and a highly structured software development process. The NRC
seems to have adopted a similar position. Regulatory Guide 1.152, "Criteria for Digital
Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," recently issued by the NRC,
states that "the Staff does not endorse the concept of quantitative reliability goals as a
sole means of meeting the Commission's regulations for reliability of the digital
computers used in safety systems. The NRC staffs acceptance of the reliability of the
computer system is based on deterministic criteria rather than quantitative reliability
goals."
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's input to the update of the
Instrumentation and Control Systems section of the Standard Review Plan has focused
almost entirely on establishing criteria for the software development process. The
130
primary objectives of the criteria they've proposed are to verify that an applicant has an
adequate software development plan, with a well defined life cycle, and to verify that
sufficient documentation is produced to support review of the process as well as the
product.
This concentration of focus on the software development process is a result of the
fact that effective methods for assessing the safety and reliability of the software itself do
not yet exist. The MITRE Corporation recently completed a study, in support of the
NRC, to examine the technical basis for candidate guidelines that could be considered in
reviewing and evaluating high integrity computer software used in the safety systems of
nuclear power plants. The technical basis for each candidate guideline topic was assessed
relative to the following five criteria:
1) The topic has been clearly coupled with safe operations;
2) The scope of the topic is clearly defined;
3) A substantive body of knowledge exists, and the preponderance of the
evidence supports a technical conclusion;
4) A repeatable method to correlate relevant characteristics with performance
exists;
5) A threshold for acceptance can be established.
Of the 201 candidate guidelines considered, only 84 met all of the technical basis
assessment criteria. The primary reason for this was the lack of a satisfactory threshold
of acceptance (Criterion 5) for more than half of the candidate guidelines. Most of the
candidate guidelines (188) had adequate supporting evidence (Criterion 3), but the
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method of implementation (Criterion 4) was inadequate for about a quarter of the
guidelines.
To address the gap between available review methods and their associated
technical basis, the MITRE Corporation identified a total of 61 research needs, which
they ranked in order of importance. The highest priority research need they identified
referred to a need to develop regulatory review criteria based on domain analysis of
nuclear power plant software systems; in other words, the need to develop review
methods which are capable of coping with the interplay between the software and the
system context within which it operates. This issue has been the largest problem area for
nuclear power plant safety software and for software engineering in general. Again, the
problem stems from the difficulty associated with specifying, understanding, and
verifying software requirements (not just the process of developing those requirements).
The importance of this issue was echoed in a report issued by the National
Academy of Sciences as the result of the first phase of a study to examine the use of
digital instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants. In that study, which
was commissioned by the NRC, it was concluded that neither of the approaches of design
process control or end-product verification was fully satisfactory in assessing and
ensuring software quality. One of the issues cited in the study as a key technical barrier
to achieving that goal is in understanding the complexities of software/system
interactions. Key system aspects which contribute to this problem include multiplexing,
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memory sharing, communication protocols, environmental concerns (e.g.,
electromagnetic interference, climate control), etc.
B.2 PROCESS VS. PRODUCT
There are two complementary objectives which must be achieved in order to
verify the safety of digital software used in nuclear power plants. The first is to verify the
performance of functions required for safety (i.e., making sure the software does what it
is supposed to do). This involves meeting requirements for safety-related systems. The
second is to verify the absence of unintended functions which impact safety (i.e., making
sure the software does not do what it isn't supposed to do). This requires taking into
account the performance of the entire plant, including unspecified behavior.
The fact that most software errors tend to stem from faulty requirements indicates
that the current state of the art of software assessment and verification seems to be
adequate for meeting the first of the above objectives, but not the second. This is not too
surprising due to the fact that the current state of the art of verification relies heavily on
testing. It is a well known fact that it is impossible to test software for the absence of
incorrectness. Therefore, it is necessary to address the issue of how to verify the absence
of unintended functionality at the level of requirements.
The approach developed in this thesis combines the focus on the process and the
product, providing a combination of quality control and quality assurance. The approach
begins with the development of a DFM model of the system at the requirements level
133
which can then serve as a kind of formal specification for the system, to be used both for
validation and for the verification of refinements in the design and implementation of the
system throughout its lifecycle. While it would require that additional effort and
resources be expended at the front end of the development process, this should ultimately
prove to be more cost effective, since errors introduced in the specification of a system
are far more costly to go back and fix than those made later in the project. Furthermore,
specification-level validation activities should be easier to implement due to the relative
absence of detail.
After validating the specification model, a battery of validation techniques, such
as consistency and type checking, animation, and fault tree analysis, formal methods (i.e.,
state exploration, theorem proving, etc.), would then be applied to verify that lower level
refinements in the design are implemented correctly and preserve the state behavior of
the original specification model. At the system integration stage, the physical system
hardware and interfaces can be tested to verify design assumptions, timing relationships,
etc., and the results can be fed back to the fault tree analysis from the validation step as
basic event probabilities, thus providing the potential for calculating quantitative
availability estimates of the system.
For this approach to be successful, there are two crucial issues which must be
resolved regarding the use of a DFM model as a formal specification. First, the DFM
model must have the descriptive power to be able to represent in sufficient detail all of
the control and data structures needed to specify the system in an unambiguous manner.
134
Second, the DFM model must be able to support the reasoning necessary to demonstrate
conclusively that a system which is implemented correctly from the specification will
indeed be safe. The resolution of both of these issues turn on the question of DFM's
suitability as a formal specification language.
B.3 SPECIFICATION LANGUAGES
There are two main types of formal specification languages, characterized
primarily by the types of applications for which they are used. If a program-level
description of the system is the objective, then the formal language used should be close
to, though more abstract than, the programming language, with operations changing
values "stored" in an implicit system "state," with data structures described fairly
concretely, and with control described in operational terms. Formal languages with these
characteristics are generally described as "model-oriented," meaning that desired
properties or behaviors are specified by giving a mathematical model that has those
properties.
As an example of a model-oriented specification for a data structure, consider a
"pushdown stack" which is modeled as a pair consisting of a natural number (the pointer)
and a function (the stack) from the natural numbers to the type of value being stacked.
(This is equivalent to an array whose contents are those of the pushdown stack,
occupying positions 1 - "pointer;" an empty stack is indicated by "pointer" = 0). The
"top" of the stack is the value of the function at the argument indicated by the pointer; the
stack is "popped" by decrementing the pointer, and a value x is "pushed" onto the stack
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by incrementing the pointer and modifying the function so that it takes the value x at the
argument indicated by the pointer.
Representative notation for a typical model-oriented specification of the
pushdown stack would be the following, where a prime indicates the value of a variable
in the "new" state following the operation and an unprimed name indicates the value in
the "old" state prior to the operation. The ( operator indicates modification of the
function (also called "overriding").
top is stack(pointer), provided pointer > 0
pop is pointer' = pointer - 1, provided pointer > 0
push is pointer' = pointer + 1 r- stack' = stack ) {pointer' -> x}
To describe control, model-oriented specification languages for sequential
programs generally follow sequential composition and if-then-else selection. Explicit
specification of loops is generally not necessary since their effects can usually be
specified more abstractly using quantification. For example, a loop would typically be
used to search for the least value stored in a pushdown stack, but this value can be
formally specified as the value x such that 1) for all natural numbers up to the value of
the pointer, the value of the stack at that point is no less than x, and 2) there exists a
natural number less than or equal to the value of the pointer such that the value of the
stack at that point equals x. Typical notation for the specification of this is the following:
(Vp: 1 p pointer 9 stack(p) > x) rn (-p: I p pointer e stack(p) = x)
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A disadvantage of model-oriented specification languages is that they can be
overly prescriptive, i.e., suggesting how something is to be implemented rather than just
specifying the properties it is supposed to have. For example, even though the
specification of the "least" function above did not specify an algorithm, it is expressed in
terms of the pointer and array model, so it could be fairly difficult to use this
specification to establish correctness of an implementation that used a different type of
data structure instead.
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Appendix C
The Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology
C.1 OVERVIEW
The DFM approach is based on representing the system under analysis with a
"digraph" (directed graph) model. The digraph model explicitly identifies the cause-and-
effect and timing relationships between the parameters and states that are best suited to
describe the system behavior. Once such a model has been produced, automated
deductive or inductive algorithms built into the methodology can be applied. The
deductive procedures are applied to identify how system states -- which may represent
specific success or failure conditions of interest -- can be produced by combinations and
sequences of basic component states. Conversely, inductive procedures can be applied to
the same model to determine how a particular combination of basic component states can
produce various possible event sequences and subsequent system-level states. Thus,
DFM can provide the multi-state and time-dependent equivalent of both fault tree
analysis (FTA) and failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), with the advantage that a
single DFM system model contains all the information necessary for the automated
execution of these analyses for practically any system condition of interest. This can be
compared, for example, with the execution of FTA, in which each system "top event"
requires a separate manual analysis and the construction of a separate fault tree model. A
similar comparison can be made between FMEA and DFM. In performing a failure
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modes and effects analysis, the causality relationship in the system has to be revisited for
each analysis to deduce the effects of different failure modes. In the DFM framework, on
the other hand, once a model has been developed, the automatic inductive analysis
algorithm can produce an entire array of separate automated analyses, to show how any
initially hypothesized component failure may progress through the system, without
further reasoning inputs from the analyst. Moreover, this inductive algorithm can even
automatically handle cases in which the failure modes may branch into different areas of
the system, with separate effects that recombine later in interactions further downstream
in the flow of system cause and effect.
The application of DFM is typically a two-step process:
Step 1: Build a model of the system for which an inductive or deductive analysis
is required. For applications in a human failure context, the model should
encompass both the team of operators and the system being operated.
Step 2: Using the model constructed in Step 1, either:
* perform a deductive analysis to search for system and process failure
states, in combination with human actions and/or states, that may
occur as a result of the propagation through the system of
perturbations produced by basic "root cause" events (an abnormal
system condition); or
0 perform an inductive analysis to generate the sequence of events that
will result from a specific set of initial and boundary conditions.
As mentioned above, the first step consists of building a model of the system that
includes both a representation of the team of operators and a representation of the
physical system and/or process being operated. The model expresses the functional and
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cause-effect relationships among the system physical and human variables, as well as the
time dependent aspects of the system behavior. The second step uses the model
developed in the first step to either:
* identify logical combinations of "root cause" events (expressed in terms of
system conditions, process states and human actions and/or states) that cause
certain specific system states of interest for which the analysis has been targeted,
and the time sequences according to which these conditions come about; this type
of analysis is referred to as a deductive analysis; or
* identify the effects (expressed in terms of the values of system and/or component
states and/or process parameters), over a number of time steps, that result from a
specific set of initial conditions and boundary conditions; this type of analysis is
referred to as an inductive analysis.
In a deductive analysis, the system states for which the root causes are sought can
be desirable or undesirable, depending on the objective of the analysis. The root causes
are identified by backtracking through the DFM model of the system in a systematic,
specified manner, and by expressing the conditions that cause the system events of
interest in the form of timed prime implicants. The intermediate conditions identified
along the backtracking process are summarized as intermediate transition tables. These
intermediate transition tables can be represented also in the form of timed fault trees. The
information contained in the fault trees that describe the conditions that can lead to
system states of interest can be used to uncover undesirable or unanticipated
human/system interactions.
An inductive analysis, on the other hand, starts from an initial condition and
traces the DFM model forward in causality to identify the sequence of events that follows
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from the initial condition. This sequence is expressed in terms of the values of the DFM
variables in each succeeding time step that follows the initial time step. The direct cause
and effect relationships between the values of these DFM variables are summarized in the
form of transition tables, which can be translated into a graphical format such as an event
sequence diagram. Boundary conditions can be imposed on the inductive analysis to
restrict the search space in order to prevent a combinatorial explosion of events. The
initial condition and the boundary conditions can be defined to represent the normal or
degraded system states. With the normal states, an inductive analysis can be carried out
to verify that the system can indeed accomplish the design goals (verification analysis).
With degraded system states, inductive analyses can be used to find out the effects of
different combinations of failure modes, such as single failures or double failures, on the
control functions being implemented in the system (automated FMEA).
It should be noted that, once a DFM system model is constructed, it can be used to
analyze many different top events and many different combinations of sub-system
failures; that is, the same model can be used repeatedly to check many different system
conditions/states of interest. Thus, the time and resource investment associated with the
construction of a DFM model has a high return, since, once this model has been built, the
automated analysis engine can generate as many fault trees, event sequence diagrams, or
test vectors as needed.
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C.2 FRAMEWORK FOR MODEL CONSTRUCTION
A DFM model expresses the logical and dynamic behavior of a generic system.
A DFM model is an integration of a "time-transition network", a "causality network" and
a "conditioning network", which is built by using detailed multi-state representations of
the cause-and-effect and time-varying relationships that exist among the key system and
human parameters. To illustrate to the reader how DFM modeling and analysis steps can
be executed in a typical application, and anchor the DFM modeling concept and building
blocks with an example, we present them in the following within the context of a simple
system.
Figure C-1 shows the schematic of a gas-storage system with its associated
pressure control system, which we can assume, for the sake of discussion, to be
implemented by a single human operator (note that, for the introductory nature of the
discussion of DFM features that is sought in this chapter, it would make no real
difference if we assumed the control system to be implemented by hardwired logic).
Figure C-I also shows the DFM model of the integrated system.
The DFM model network is constructed from the DFM modeling elements.
These modeling elements, as well as the manner in which they are assembled to form a
DFM model, are discussed below.
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Figure C-1 A simple system and its DFM model
C.2.1 DFM MODELING ELEMENTS
A DFM model makes use of certain basic modeling elements to represent the
temporal relations and the logical relations that exist in the system and the associated
software. More specifically, a DFM model integrates a "time-transition network" that
describes the sequence in which human actions are carried out and the process evolves, a
"causality network" that shows the functional relationships among key system states and
process parameters, and a "conditioning network" which models discontinuous hardware
performance due to component states and human perfromance parameters due to root
causes of behavior. The building blocks of these three intertwined DFM subnetworks are
process variable nodes, condition nodes, causality edges, condition edges, and
transfer/transition boxes with their associated decision tables. These basic modeling
elements are shown in Figure C-2.
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Figure C-2 The basic DFM modeling elements
C.2. 1.1 Process Variable Nodes
Process variable nodes represent physical and software variables necessary to
capture the essential functional behavior, continuous or discrete, of the system and
process. For example, the process variable node TP in Figure C-1 represents the pressure
in the gas tank.
A variable represented by a process variable node is discretized into a finite
number of states. The reason for the discretization is to simplify the description of the
relations between different variables. The choice of the states for a process variable node
is often dictated by the logic of the system. For instance, it is natural to set a state
boundary at a value that acts as a trigger point for a switching action or a value that
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indicates the system is progressing towards failure. The number of states for each
variable must be chosen on the basis of the balance between the fidelity of the model and
the complexity introduced by higher numbers of variable states.
For example, the process variable node TP in Figure C-1 represents the tank
pressure and it can vary from very low to very high. In our example, TP is discretized
into 5 states, and the discretization scheme of this process variable node is shown in
Table C-1. In this scheme state 1 signifies very low pressure (the tank is almost empty).
State 2, state 3 and state 4 represent low pressure, normal pressure and high pressure
respectively, while state 5 corresponds to dangerously high pressure, which can cause the
tank to burst. The state boundary between 2 and 3 is set to correspond to the trigger point
where gas inflow is activated to replenish the tank. Similarly, the boundary between
states 3 and 4 corresponds to the set-point for opening the relief valve to reduce the
pressure in the tank.
Table C-1 Discretization scheme for the process variable node TP
State Description
1 Tank pressure is very low
2 Tank pressure is low
3 Tank pressure is normal
4 Tank pressure is high
5 Tank pressure is very high
C.2.1.2 Causality Edges
Causality edges are used to connect process variable nodes to indicate the
existence of a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the variables described by the
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nodes. For example, the causality edges (a), (b) and (c) in Figure C-1(b) show that the
value of the process variable NGF (net gas flow into the tank) is directly related to the
values of the process variables IGF (gas inflow into the tank) and OGF (gas outflow
through the valve at the top of the tank). The precise nature of the functional relationship
(i.e., the discrete state "transfer function") is described by a "transfer box" that is always
directly associated with each causality edge.
C.2.1.3 Transfer Boxes and Associated Decision Tables
A transfer box represents a transfer function between process variable nodes. The
quantification of the transfer function, i.e., the correlation between the states of the input
process variable nodes and those of the output process variable nodes, is actually
described by decision tables associated with each transfer box.
Each transfer box decision table quantifies the relationships between the transfer
box input and output process variable nodes. This table is a mapping between the
possible combinations of the states of the input process variable nodes and the possible
states of the output process variable nodes. Decision tables are extension of truth tables
in that they allow each variable to be represented by any number of states. Decision
tables have been used by other researchers to model components of engineering systems
and construct binary fault trees.
For simplicity and convenience of representation, all decision tables can be
represented in a two-dimensional form. In this form, there is a column for each input
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variable and a column for each output variable of interest. For example, in Figure C-i (b),
transfer box T3 links the input nodes IGF and OGF to the output node NGF. IGF is
discretized into 2 states (0,1), as is the other input node OGF (0,1), while the output node
NGF is discretized into 3 states (-1,0,+1). Hence in the decision table, there are 3
columns (1 for each of the two inputs and 1 for the output). The decision table in Table
C-2 shows the output states produced from different combinations of the states of the
inputs.
Table C-2 Decision table for the transfer box T3 in Figure C-I
IGF OGF NGF
0 0 0
0 1 -1
1 0 +1
1 1 0
C.2.1.4 Condition Edges
Unlike causality edges, condition edges are mostly used to represent true discrete
behavior in the system. They link parameter nodes to transfer boxes, indicating the
possibility of using a different transfer function to map input variable states into output
variable states. For example, as shown in Figure C-1(b), the output OGF (gas outflow
through the valve) can be proportional to the input VX (valve position), or be stuck at the
minimum or maximum value regardless of VX, depending on the value of the parameter
VS (unfaulted/faulted state of the valve).
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C.2.1.5 Condition Nodes
Condition nodes, like process variable nodes, represent physical or human
parameters. However, condition nodes are used in DFM to explicitly identify component
failure states, changes of process operation regimes and modes, and root causes of human
behavior. Condition nodes represent variables that can affect the system by modifying
the causal relations between the basic process variable nodes. Some condition nodes may
also be process variable nodes themselves, linked by causality edges to other upstream
process variable nodes, but condition nodes whose states are not determined by other
upstream process variable nodes are treated in DFM as "random variables", i.e., as
variables that can be assumed to be in any of their possible states. In the latter case, a
distribution of "relative frequency" of the associated states could also be assumed, for
purposes of probabilistic quantification. For example, node VS in Figure C-1(b) is a
condition node that is not affected by any upstream process, as the failure of the valve is
assumed to be a random event and is not explicitly modeled. It should be noted that the
effect of a condition node on an output variable is modeled through a decision table, as is
the case for a process variable node. The reason for having the added modeling elements
of condition nodes and condition edges is to offer a clear distinction between normal,
off-normal or "modified" behavior and/or operation of a system.
C.2.1.6 Transition Boxes and Associated Decision Tables
Transition boxes are similar to transfer boxes in that they connect process variable
nodes to indicate cause-and-effect relationships. Condition nodes can also be associated
with transition boxes to represent modified behavior and relationships between the input
149
and output process variable nodes. Decision tables are again used to describe the
relationships between the input and output process variable nodes. However, transition
boxes differ from transfer boxes in the essential aspect that a time lag or time transition is
assumed to occur between the time when the input variable states become true and the
time when the output variable state(s) associated with the inputs is(are) reached. This
time delay is a characteristic of the transition that is being modeled and is treated as an
attribute of the transition box. For example, in Figure C-1, the transition box TT1
indicates that a new value of TP (an updated value of the tank pressure) depends on the
value of NGF (the net gas flow into the tank) and the old value of TP (the tank pressure at
the previous clock cycle). Transition boxes are routinely used in DFM to model the
execution of software routines and the handling of interrupts, which often play an
important role in the execution flow of digital control system software. They can, of
course, also be used to model hardware time transitions.
C.2.2 MODEL CONSTRUCTION AND INTEGRATION
To construct a DFM model for a digital control system, the first step is to select
the physical components and the software functions that are to be included in the model.
Following that, the physical parameters and software variables that capture the essential
behavior of these components and software functions are identified and represented as
process variable nodes. These process variable nodes are then linked together by
causality edges through transfer boxes or transition boxes to form an integrated
"causality" and "time-transition" network. Discrete behaviors such as component
failures and logic switching actions are then identified and represented as condition
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nodes, which are tied to transfer boxes and transition boxes expressly to show how a
"conditioning network" of discrete actions and events actually interacts with and affects
the integrated "causality" and "time-transition" network. The parameters represented by
the process variable nodes and condition nodes are discretized into meaningful states, and
decision tables are constructed to relate these states. The decision tables can be
constructed by empirical knowledge of the system, from physical equations that govern
the system behavior, and from available operating procedures and knowledge (or
assumptions) about human behavior. The completed DFM model then reflects the
essential causal, temporal, and logical behavior of the entire human/physical system.
C.3 FRAMEWORK FOR MODEL ANALYSIS
The analysis of a DFM system model constructed according to the rules described
above (Step 1) can be conducted by tracing sequences of events either backward from
effects to causes (i.e., "deductively"), or forward from causes to effects (i.e.,
"inductively") through the model structure. This section presents the theoretical basis on
which the DFM deductive and inductive analysis procedures are developed.
C.3.1 INTRODUCTION TO FAULT TREES AND CUT SETS
In a deductive analysis, the goal is, starting from a defined system condition, to
work backward in cause and effect flow to identify the paths and reverse sequence of
events and conditions by which the system condition of interest (which in the DFM
framework can itself be defined as a combination of events) may be produced, eventually
identifying in this fashion what sets of "basic" system events, i.e. what combinations of
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basic hardware and/or software conditions may be at the root of the hypothesized system
condition.. This kind of DFM analysis thus shares many of the conceptual features of
fault tree analysis. A fault tree is a graphical model that represents the combinations of
individual component failures that can lead to an overall system failure (referred to as the
top event). In conventional binary fault tree analysis, once a fault tree has been
developed, application of Boolean algebra can reduce the tree to a logically equivalent
mathematical form in terms of the tree's minimal cut sets. A cut set is defined as a set of
events that, if they all occur, will lead to the top event. A minimal cut set is a cut set that
does not contain any other cut set as a subset. The removal of any event from a minimal
cut set would cause it to no longer be a cut set.
To illustrate the above in formal notation, let Xt0op be an indicator variable for the
top event. An indicator variable can take the value of either 0 or 1 (0 if the top event is
false, and 1 if it is true). Similarly, let XiO be an indicator variable for the i-th primary
event in the j-th minimal cut set. Then the indicator variable for the j-th minimal cut set,
MCSj, is a monomial that can be expressed as the conjunction of the indicator variables
of its primary events:
MCSj = X (j(C-1)
1=1
where n is the number of primary events in the j-th minimal cut set. The indicator
variable for the top event can then be expressed in disjunctive form as:
X,, = I-f(1- MCS) (C-2)i=1
152
If the variables that appear in a binary fault tree are appropriately defined, the formula
that expresses the top event as a function of the basic events (equation C-2) exhibits
coherent behavior. In particular, when a basic event variable changes from the value 0 to
the value 1 (i.e., according to convention, from the unfaulted to the faulted state) the top
event variable can remain at the value 0, or change from 0 to 1 (if it was at 0 before the
basic event change), or remain at the value 1 (if it was already at 1 before the basic event
change), but never go from 1 back to 0.
C.3.2 MULTI-VALUED LOGIC TREES AND PRIME IMPLICANTS
A fundamental limitation to conventional fault tree analysis is that the above
method can only be applied to systems in which the primary events, Xi , are binary.
Because DFM models represent physical variables (e.g., pressure, temperature, voltage,
etc.), binary logic (in which only two states may be used to characterize each variable
space) is, in general, not sufficient for an adequate representation of the behavior of the
system. DFM models thus employ multi-valued logic (MVL), wherein each variable
space may be discretized into an arbitrary number of states. A DFM "fault tree",
therefore, would contain non-binary primary events (or certain equivalent binary
expressions containing groups of mutually exclusive binary primary events which signify
whether a given multi-valued variable is in a particular state). Although a definition of a
coherent MVL tree can be given, most MVL trees of practical interest (and their
equivalent binary expressions), including DFM-derived fault trees, are non-coherent. An
intuitive, rather than formal, way of understanding this is by noting that DFM variable
states are not ordered in such a way that higher states always indicate "increasingly-
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faulted" conditions and lower states always indicate "increasingly-nominal" conditions.
Thus, as a basic variable changes from a lower to a higher state, the system-state
indicator variable of choice for the particular analysis of interest may be going in the
opposite direction, i.e., from a higher to a lower state.
The top event of a MVL fault tree can still be expressed in disjunctive form (the
form of a disjunction of conjunctions of primary events), but the MVL analogue of the
minimal cut sets encountered in binary fault trees are known as prime implicants. A
prime implicant is any monomial (conjunction of primary events) that is sufficient to
cause the top event, but does not contain any shorter conjunction of events that is
sufficient to cause the top event. The prime implicants of a function are unique and
finite; however, finding them is a more challenging task than finding binary logic
minimal cut sets.
DFM uses decision tables to map the combinatorial states of transfer box inputs to
their outputs. Decision tables allow each variable to be represented by any number of
states, and they have been applied in fault tree analysis in the past to model component
behavior. Given the state of a transfer box output node, the decision table gives the
complete sets of inputs that could have caused it. Since a decision table is, itself,
essentially a disjunction of conjunctions of states, it is possible to generate prime
implicants from the table. Methods have been developed for obtaining system prime
implicants from component decision tables. The fundamental approach is to combine the
individual component decision tables into a single critical transition table and perform a
154
series of absorption and merging operations on the rows of the table to reduce it to the
complete set of prime implicants. In DFM, the procedure for generating prime implicants
has been extended to carry out deductive analysis across time transitions, so that dynamic
representations of systems can be analyzed.
When referring to prime implicants in the context of a DFM analysis, another
important observation is that the presence of the time element in the DFM modeling
framework introduces the possibility of prime implicants that would not be possible in
ordinary time-invariant logic. In the latter, for instance, a prime implicant of the form:
variable A = 2 A variable A = 3
would not be possible, and, if found in the course of a time-invariant analysis, would
have to be eliminated by application of explicit "physical consistency rules". In the
application of DFM to time-dependent systems however, if a time-transition has been
encountered and the prime implicant is thus "time-stamped" to indicate:
(variable A = 2 @ time t = TI) A (variable A = 3 @ time t = T2),
then the logical inconsistency no longer exists, and the prime implicant can be considered
possible (unless of course it violates a "dynamic consistency rule", which still applies in
time-dependent logic. All prime implicants identified in a DFM analysis are
conjunctions of primary events with associated time stamps, and they are simply referred
to as "timed prime implicants" (TPI's).
DFM, therefore, represents a significant advancement beyond coriventional fault
tree analysis. In particular, a conventional fault-tree produces cut-sets for one, and only
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one, binary top event, with no associated time dependent information. The DFM
representation is considerably more powerful, because it produces multi-valued logic and
time-dependent prime implicants for a very large number of possible top-events. A DFM
top-event can, in fact, be chosen to be any state among all the possible states of any of the
variables, or even any combination of states of separate variables across time boundaries.
As we have mentioned earlier, once a DFM system model has been constructed, it can be
used repeatedly to investigate many different top events.
The algorithms for the identification of TPI's can produce different types of
information, depending on the level of detail included in the original DFM model. More
specifically, if the system is only modeled to the module level, so that each software
subroutine or module is represented in DFM as a relatively high-level "transfer box"
between "global" system-level principal input and output variables, then by definition
the top-event prime implicants will only be expressed in terms of the states of such
system-level variables (i.e., not in terms of local software variables that are "internal" to
each software module). Another option in the type of information sought is whether the
DFM backtracking is conducted module by module and component by component, so
that, when the process is completed, information equivalent to an actual "timed fault
tree" (TFT) is produced as output of the analysis, along with its TPI's. It should be noted
that the backtracking process is conducted step by step within the DFM algorithmic
procedure. Therefore decision-table-format information, equivalent in substance to a
timed fault tree, is produced as an intermediate result on the way to identifying the top-
event TPI's. The timed fault tree, when read from the basic events to the top, provides
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the "explanation" and illustration of how, starting from the basic events contained in the
prime implicants at the bottom of the tree, the system evolves through a sequence of
states which finally lead to the top-event identified at the top of the tree. Note that the
actual progression of cause and effect in the process is exactly in reverse order with
respect to the order in which the DFM model analysis unravels the event-sequence,
backward in causality and time, from the ultimate system-level effect down to the basic
events that are at its origin.
C.3.3 DEDUCTIVE ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
The following subsections discuss the analytical procedures employed in a
deductive analysis.
C.3.3.1 Intermediate Transition Table and Timed Fault Tree (TFT) Construction
In the deductive analysis of a DFM system model, a particular system condition
of interest (desirable or undesirable) is first identified. This system condition is
expressed in terms of the state(s) of one or more process variable nodes, which are thus
taken to be the fault tree "top event(s)". The DFM model is then analyzed by
backtracking, via a computerized analytical procedure, through the network of nodes,
edges and transfer boxes, and through the time transition network which keeps track of
timing effects. This "automated back-tracking procedure" is continued for a few steps
back in time, producing along the way the intermediate transition tables associated with
the particular top-event of interest, to find the possible "cause(s)" of that top event. The
causes are expressed in terms of the combinations of the basic system variable states
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which may produce the top event. The order in which the transfer boxes are visited in
reverse is dictated by the logical sequence of the boxes in the DFM model, as well as by
the sequence of transitions (corresponding to the order of execution of the software
modules or physical events associated with time delays) in the time-transition network.
The information discovered at each step of the backtracking process is represented in the
form of a series of intermediate transition tables, which are logically equivalent to gates
in a timed fault tree.
To illustrate this analytical process, as it would be implemented in a manual
execution, consider the analysis of the tank pressure control system shown in Figure C-1.
A top event has been defined as a situation in which the pressure in the tank reaches a
dangerously high level. This top event is first translated into the state of the process
variable node { TP = 5 @ t = 0 } and is represented in the transition table format in Table
C-3(a). The transition table shows that the TOP is true if TP is in state 5 at time 0. This
table can be translated into timed fault tree gates as shown in Figure C-3(a). This event is
to be expanded by backtracking through the model. From the DFM model in Figure C-1,
TP at t = 0 is calculated from TP at t = -1 and NGF at t = -1 through the transfer function
associated with the transition box TT1. The decision table for transition box TT 1 is then
consulted to identify combinations of TP and NGF at a previous time step that can cause
TP = 5 at the current time step. In this case, the two events {TP = 5 @ t = -1} OR {(TP =
4 @ t = -1) AND (NGF = +1 @ t = -1)} are found to be the causes, and they are entered
into a new intermediate transition table as in Table C-3(b). The equivalent timed fault
tree is shown in Figure C-3(b). Note that a dotted line separates the top event and the
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events at the second level to indicate the presence of a time transition between the events
at the two different levels. Next we backtrack through transfer box T3, in the DFM
model in Figure C-1, to find the combinations of IGF and OGF which can cause NGF =
+1. One combination is identified and is shown in Table C-3(c) and in Figure C-3(c) as
an AND gate joining the particular states of IGF and OGF. Backtracking through the
transfer boxes TI and T2 will give us the causes for IGF = I and OGF = 0, respectively.
The backtracking steps are repeated to produce intermediate transition tables that are
translated into the timed fault tree shown in Figure C-4.
Table C-3(a) Example of intermediate transition table construction
TP @t = 0 TOP
5 T I
Table C-3(b) Example of intermediate transition table construction
NGF@t=-i TP@t=-i TOP
+1 4 T
- 5 T
Table C-3(c) Example of intermediate transition table construction
OGF @t = -1 IGF @t = -1 TP @t = -1 TOP
0 1 4 T
- 5 T
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TOP
TP=5
TOP
=0 TP=51
~-- ~ ~- - - - ~ ~ ~ -
TP=-5 TP 4 1 NGF =+1
TOP
TP = 5
t=O
TP=5 TP=4 NGF =(+1
IGF=I OGF=o
(C)(a)
Figure C-3 Example of timed fault tree construction
In many digital control systems, there are feedback or feedforward characteristics.
This can cause a node to be traced back to itself in the fault tree construction.
Consistency rules must be applied when these situations are encountered. Inconsistent
branches are then pruned from the timed fault tree. Two major classes of consistency
rules have been identified, they are "physical" consistency rules and "dynamic"
consistency rules.
C.3.3.2 Physical Consistency Rules
Physical consistency rules are applied to eliminate physically impossible
conditions from the timed fault trees. An example of this would be a system parameter
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(b)
I
taking on two different values at the same time step in the timed fault tree. This class of
consistency rule is similar to the consistency rules applied in conventional static fault tree
analysis. If the same variable appears twice, but in different states, in the same time step
and under the same AND gate, then everything beneath the first AND gate above the
second occurrence of the event must be pruned from the tree due to physical
inconsistency. This is illustrated in Figure C-5(a). If pruning this AND gate causes
events above to become impossible, then these events must be pruned as well. Such is
the situation illustrated in Figure C-5(b).
TOP
t=o TP=5
t=-1
TP=5 TP=4 GF=+1
MvO=0 SS=-1 0=-I
Figure C-4 Timed fault tree for very high tank pressure
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Valve
Position = 2
Prune due to inconsistency
in Valve Position
(a)
TOP
Vave
:......-...................... .....Valve
........... . .....
Prune due to inconsisten<
in Valve Position
TOP
Vove
This event becomes
- impossible after the
.: inconsistent branch
is removed
(b)
Figure C-5 Illustration of physical inconsistency
C.3.3.3 Dynamic Consistency Rules
Dynamic consistency rules, likewise, are applied to the timed fault trees to
eliminate branches that violate the constraints on the dynamic behavior of the system
under consideration. These rules are developed from the analyst's knowledge and
assumptions about the system's dynamic behavior. Dynamic consistency rules are
expressed in terms of allowable variations of parameter values across different time steps.
Some possible forms of dynamic consistency rules are:
1. The state of a parameter cannot change in a certain direction between two time
steps.
2. A parameter cannot change by more than a certain amount of states between time
steps.
3. Several parameters must vary in a specific way between two time steps.
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Rules of the first type can be defined from the analyst's knowledge about the dynamic
constraints of the system. For instance, in modeling a drain tank system, the level in the
tank cannot increase with time if inventory is constantly being used up and is not being
replenished. Rules of this type can also come from modeling assumptions. For example,
if the analyst assumes the equipment in the tank system can only fail permanently, then a
failed valve cannot return to the normal state in a later time step.
Rules of the second and third types come from knowledge of the system. For
instance, a rule of the second type can state that the position of the valve cannot vary by
more than two states in one time step, as it takes a finite amount of time for the valve to
open or close. Similarly, an example of a rule of the third type can be the constraint that
the valve position and flowrate must vary in a proportional manner as required by
physical law.
Caution must be applied when defining dynamic consistency rules for a DFM
failure analysis, in that the analyst must be sure that, by "enforcing" a rule, an abnormal
but possible type of behavior is not ruled out. For example, in the tank pressure example
used throughout this discussion, one may define the dynamic rule that the tank pressure
cannot go from "normal" to "very low" in one time step, if it assumed that the gas
outflow can only occur through the relief valve. However, this dynamic rule no longer
makes sense, if an explosion and semi-instantaneous decompression of the tank is one of
the possible scenarios that the analyst is interested in investigating.
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Dynamically inconsistent branches are pruned in a manner similar to physically
inconsistent branches. If a dynamically inconsistent event occurs in a timed fault tree,
this event, including all of the sub-branches connected to it via the first parent AND gate,
must be pruned. This is illustrated in Figure C-6. As with physical consistency rules,
further pruning may be necessary if branches that are eliminated can cause other events to
become impossible.
General Dynamic Consistency Rule:
Valve Position cannot change by more
than 2 states in a single time step
TOP
Time = t
Time =t- I
Prune due to dynamic
inconsistency in Valve Position
Figure C-6 Illustration of dynamic inconsistency
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It should be noted that the presence of "Don't Care" states can complicate the
implementation of these dynamic consistency rules. In checking for dynamic
consistency, the "Don't Care" state for a parameter might need to be replaced by a subset
of the states for that parameter. A variable taking on the "Don't Care" state means that
the variable can be in any one of its states. However, the presence of dynamic constraints
for that variable reduces the domain of the allowable states. Hence, if a "Don't Care"
state is encountered for such a variable, that "Don't Care" state must be replaced by the
corresponding states allowed by the dynamic constraints.
C.3.3.4 Timed Prime Implicant (TPI) Identification
As discussed above, TPI's may be identified directly from a system DFM model.
In the DFM analytical algorithm, decision tables encountered during the backtracking
process are expanded and joined, one by one, to form a single critical transition table,
which directly contains all of the system parameter states that are produced along the
sequence leading to the top event. As mentioned earlier, the process of expanding and
joining the decision tables in the backtracking process is logically equivalent to
generating a timed fault tree, except that the events are not presented graphically as a tree
structure, but in tabular form as intermediate transition tables. The critical transition
table, on the other hand, is logically equivalent to the basic events produced in a timed
fault tree. The reader should note that for a multi-state representation, the basic events
identified in a timed fault tree (or the rows in a critical transition table) are the sufficient
conditions for the top event. The complete set of unique timed prime implicants are
produced by performing a series of absorption and merging procedures on the rows of the
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critical transition table, to reduce it to an irredundant form. For example, consider the
decision table in Table C-4, which is the equivalent of a sum-of-products expression for
some function, called TOP. The variables are assumed to be multi-state and their states
are:
Ae { -1, 0, +1 },
Be { N, R, F },
C e {-2, -1, 0, +1 },
DE {H, N, L }.
(These variables and the corresponding decision table do not necessarily reflect any
particular logic, but are merely intended to illustrate Quine's consensus operation.)
Table C-4 Decision table for function TOP
RO A B C D TOP
1 - R -1 N T
2 0 - +1 H T
3 - R 0 - T
4 - - - L T
5 0 R -1 H T
6 - N -2 - T
7 -1 R -1 H T
8 0 R -2 H T
9 1 R -1 H T
10 0 F - H T
In the application of the consensus operation procedure for Table C-4, rows 7 and
9 merge with row 5, yielding a "don't care" (which is represented by a "-") in column 1 of
row 5 and a new decision table (Table C-5).
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Table C-5 Decision table for TOP after merging operation
ROW A B C D TOP
1 - R -1 N T
2 0 - +1 H T
3 -R 0 - T
4 - - -1 L T
5 - R -1 H T
6 -N -2 - T
7 0 R -2 H T
8 0 F - HT
Rows 6-8 of Table C-5 can then undergo a reduction operation, yielding a "don't
care" in column 2 of row 7. Rows 1, 4 and 5 of the table also undergo a reduction-
merging operation, yielding Table C-6.
Table C-6 Irredundant form of decision table for function TOP
ROW A B C D TOP
1 - R -1 - T
2 0 - +1 H T
3 -R 0 - T
4 - -- 1 L T
5 - N -2 - T
6 0 - -2 H T
7 0 F - H T
Rows 1-3 and 6 of Table C-6 yield a consensus term which is given in row 8 of
Table C-7. Table C-7 contains all of the prime implicants of the function since no new
consensus terms can be generated from it and none of its terms can be simplified any
further.
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Of course, physical and dynamic consistency rules must still be applied during the
construction of the critical transition table. The only difference is that, instead of
applying them to individual events in the timed fault tree, they are applied to entire rows
in the critical transition table.
Table C-7 Decision table for function TOP after consensus
ROW A B C D TOP
1 - R -1 - T
2 0 - +1 H T
3 - R 0 - T
4 - - -1 L T
5 - N -2 - T
6 0 - -2 H T
7 0 F - H T
8 0 R - H T
C.3.3.5 Reduction of Prime Implicants
Prime implicants identified in a DFM analysis are expressed in terms of the states
of the DFM model variables. As some variables represent the state of components, the
prime implicants may contain non-failure conditions of these components. For ease of
interpretation, a "reduced form" of the prime implicants can be obtained by deleting from
the list of conditions in the prime implicants, all those conditions which identify the states
of sensors, control valves and stop valves related to the event sequence of interest as
being normal, i.e. none of these components are failed.
In general, in a multi-state, non-coherent system representation such as that used
in DFM, a parameter state can always be classified as "faulted" or "normal" only for the
168
model parameters which are expressly intended to represent hardware failure/non-failure
states. A reduced form of prime implicant can thus be obtained by not including in it the
listing of normal states of this type of parameter. The states of process variables, on the
other hand, are not definable, a priori, as being always "good" or "bad", and
consequently are always listed, even in the reduced prime implicant. This is because a
process parameter state which is "good" in a certain type of situation may become "bad"
when the situation changes. The "goodness" of these process parameters cannot be
determined until the context within which this happens has been identified.
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Appendix D
MIT-SNL Reactor Control System Case Study
The case study of Chapter 11-4.1, the MIT-SNL Period-Generated Minimum Time
Control Law experiment, utilizes a closed-loop digital control system for the time-
optimal adjustment of a reactor's neutronic power. The MIT-SNL control laws determine
the rate of reactivity change that is required to cause a reactor's neutronic power to
conform to a specified trajectory. Using these laws, reactor power can be safely raised by
five to seven orders of magnitude in a matter of a few seconds.
The MIT-SNL laws were developed to facilitate rapid increases of neutronic
power in spacecraft reactors operating in an SDI environment, although the laws are
generic and have other applications, including the rapid recovery of research and test
reactors subsequent to unanticipated shutdowns, power increases following the
achievement of criticality in commercial reactors, power adjustments on commercial
reactors so as to minimize thermal stress, and automated startups. The control laws have
been utilized under closed-loop digital control conditions in performance trials on the 5-
MWt MIT Research Reactor and the Annular Core Research Reactor operated by Sandia
National Laboratories.
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D.1 MIT-SNL CONTROL LAW DESCRIPTION
The MIT-SNL laws are a model-based control method that is based on the
dynamic period equation. The dynamic period equation comes from combining the
space-independent kinetics equations (Eqs. (D-1) and (D-2)) through a process of
differentiation and substitution. The resulting relation, which can be written in either of
two mathematically equivalent forms, gives the instantaneous reactor period as a function
of the reactivity, the rate of change of reactivity, and the rate of redistribution of the
delayed neutron precursors. The space-independent kinetics equations, which describe
neutron and precursor behavior, are
T'(t)=( t T(t) + E., C, (t), (D-1)A
EC, (t ) = 18T(t) - EA, Ci (t ) for i = 1, N, (D-2)A
The instantaneous reactor period is defined as r(t) = 1/ co(t), where
T'(t) co(t)T(t), (D-3)
and where T(t) is the amplitude function, which for purposes of controller design, is
taken as equivalent to the neutronic power. The dynamic period equation is obtained by
substituting Eq, (D-3) into Eq, (D- 1), differentiating the result, and then using both the
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definition of the multi-group decay parameter and Eq. (D-1) to eliminate precursor terms.
The standard version of the resulting equation is
ff- p (t) + A()+ CO() + 2e(tq-__
v(t)= , (0 + e ()
P'V) + Ae( ) Pt W+ cf( - P ()
(D-4)
where the standard, effective multi-group decay parameter is defined as
for i = 1, N. (D-5)
The alternate version of the dynamic period equation is
S - p(t) +[ m
p'(t)+ e (t)p(t)+ j,(2 -2(t))
where the alternate effective multi-group decay parameter is defined as
EJ(t)= ? C,(t)/ Jc,(1)
(D-6)
(D-7)for i = 1, N.
The dynamic period equation preserves the non-linear aspects of a reactor's dynamics, it
is an exact relation which is rigorous within the limitations of space-independent kinetics,
it applies to all reactor operating regimes, and it explicitly shows each of the physical
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Dit) ECi (t) / Ici(t)
processes that can affect the instantaneous reactor period. However, it is a form of space-
independent kinetics, hence its use is restricted to transients in which the shape of the
neutron flux remains unchanged.
Reactor power adjustments are generally achieved by withdrawing a control
device so as to insert positive reactivity and thereby place the reactor on a period.
Having established a period, the power is allowed to rise. Once the power level
approaches the desired value, the control device is gradually returned to its starting
position to reduce the reactivity to zero and to level the power. The crucial aspect of this
process is that the lengthening of the reactor period must be initiated before attaining the
desired power level. Such anticipatory actions are necessary because the rate at which
reactivity can be removed is finite. Thus if changes in the reactor power are to be made
both efficiently and without challenge to the safety system, there must be a method by
which to predict the proper time for initiation of the reactivity removal process. To
accomplish this objective, the MIT-SNL code uses the 'reactivity constraint approach.'
The technique functions by restricting the net reactivity so that it is always possible to
make the reactor period infinite at the desired termination point of a transient by
reversing the direction of motion of whatever control mechanism is associated with the
controller.
For reasons of safety, the net reactivity is always kept less than the effective
delayed neutron fraction. This is done to ensure that delayed neutrons, with their long
half-lives, dominate the behavior of the chain reaction. Also, reactors are operated on
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periods that are long relative to the prompt neutron lifetime. Under these conditions, the
quantity A can be neglected, and examination of the alternate dynamic period equation
shows that the period can be made infinite if the net reactivity is constrained so that the
denominator of this equation can be made equal to zero. That is, the following condition
must be met
[A(t)p(t)+/[2 - (t)]+ p (t)] IP, (D-8)
where the term p(t) is the net reactivity, both that added deliberately by the control
mechanisms and that present indirectly from feedback effects. The quantity pf denotes
the rate of change of reactivity due to thermal-hydraulic feedback effects, and the symbol
P'c I denotes the maximum available rate of change of reactivity that could be obtained
if a control mechanism is moved. As such, Jdc I is always a non-zero finite number
regardless of whether or not the mechanism is actually being moved. If the above
inequality is observed, then upon insertion of the control devices, the quantity 'c will be
negative and the sum of the terms in the denominator of the dynamic period equation will
be zero. As a result, the reactor period will be driven to infinity. Equation (D-8)
essentially states the requirement that delayed neutron effects, which are not subject to
direct control, must be restricted to that which can be offset by an induced change in the
prompt population. If the two rightmost terms on the left hand side of Eq. (D-8) are
deleted, an action which is justified because it is conservative, it becomes
[, (t) P(t)] :! p1,0, (D-9)
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Equation (D-9) is an "absolute reactivity constraint." If observed, it will be
possible to level the reactor power at any time during a transient by reversing the
direction of motion of the control devices. A less stringent constraint can be written
which specifies that there should be sufficient time available to eliminate whatever
reactivity is present beyond the amount that can be immediately negated by reversal of
the direction of motion of the designated control mechanism before the desired power
level is attained. This requirement, a "sufficient reactivity constraint," can be written for
power increases as
PW p~)-|p'|l ,(t)] / | p )ln(P / P(t), (D-10)
where Pf and P(t) are the desired and current power levels, respectively, and z(t) is either
the observed (instantaneous) reactor period or the asymptotic period that corresponds to
the net reactivity, whichever results in a more conservative decision. The quantity on the
left of Eq. (D-10) is the time that will be required to reduce the net reactivity to the
amount that can be offset by continuous insertion of the control mechanism. It is
designated as the "required time." The quantity on the right is a measure of the time
remaining to attain the specified power. It is designated as the "available time." If the
inequality represented by the constraint is satisfied, then control mechanism movement as
specified by an associated control law is permitted. If the constraint is not satisfied, then
the control device is inserted. A major advantage of this approach is that it determines
whether a change should be made to the present control signal in order to avoid an
overshoot at some future time. Also, it does this without the use of predictive models.
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However, Eq. (D-10) is approximate because it assumes that both the reactivity to be
annulled and the instantaneous period remain constant during control mechanism
movement. Thus, for the constraint to be of practical value, it must be evaluated at a
sampling rate of at least once per second.
The sufficient reactivity constraint is implemented in a supervisory algorithm
which monitors the performance of the period-generated control law. Period-generated
control is a method for tracking trajectories that are defined in terms of a demanded rate.
There are four major steps in its implementation. First, an error signal is defined by
comparison of the observed process output with that which was specified. Second, a
demanded inverse period (rate of change of power) is generated in terms of the error
signal. Third, the demanded inverse period is processed through a system model to
obtain the requisite control signal. Finally, the control signal is applied to the actual
system. Period-generated control is model-based and hence can be applied to nonlinear
systems, and the resulting control laws approach time-optimal behavior for rate-
constrained processes.
The application of period-generated control to a nuclear reactor is as follows. It is
desired that the reactor power, n(t), conform to a certain trajectory. Accordingly, some
measure of the rate of change of power is needed, in this case the inverse reactor period,
defined as
n'(0)
C>(t)= ) (D-11)
n(t)
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The first step in applying period-generated control is to define an error signal,
e(t), such that
e(t)= "d ,])) (D-12)
n2(t)
where n(t) is the demanded trajectory, n(t) is the observed trajectory, and j is a positive
integer. A Taylor series expansion of this logarithmic expression reveals the rationale for
selecting this particular arithmetic form for the error signal
e(t) = n(nd (t+ ± At)) - ln(nd ()+ ln(nd ()- ln(n(t))
nnd()+ jAt IL (ln(nd (0~)) -nnd (0)) + ln(nd i) - ln(n(t)) (Dl3
j~t L (n~n dt d(0)(D- 13)
= jAt lnd (t))) + ln(nd ()1 n(t))
= jAtOd(t) + ln(nd ()/ n(t))
where codt) is the inverse period corresponding to the demanded trajectory, ndt). Thus,
the error signal used in period generated control is the sum of a feedforward action from
the demanded inverse period and a proportional action from the quotient of the demanded
and observed system outputs. The former defines the system path, and the latter provides
corrective action against deviations.
The second step in the application of period-generated control is to define an
inverse period command in terms of the error signal. Thus,
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e(t) + (1/ T, ) fe(t)dt + Tde'(t)(
jAt
where the parameters T and Td correspond to the integral and derivative times in a
conventional feedback expression. That is, w,(t) equals wc(t) when the observed power is
on the demanded trajectory. Otherwise, the two differ with coc(t) driving the system to
the demanded trajectory.
The third step is to develop an inverse dynamics model that translates the period
command into the requisite control signal which, for a reactor, is the rate of change of
reactivity. This is readily achieved by rearranging terms in the dynamic period equation
so that the quantity p'(t) becomes the dependent variable. Thus,
p' (t ) = ( P - p(t))w(t) - A, (t)p(t) - A /3 (Ai - X, (t)) (D-15)
- p' (t) + A a'(t) + A+ &o ((t)W(O)
where the alternate form of the dynamic period equation is used because it is the easier of
the two to program on a digital computer. It remains to address the term cd(t) which
represents the system acceleration. It is treated using the relation
'(t)= , - W (D-16)
kAt
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where co,(t) is the commanded inverse period, o(t) is the observed inverse period, At is
the time step, and k is the number of time steps over which it is desired that the system
attain the specified trajectory.
The desired control law is then constructed by substituting wo(t) for O(t) in Eq.
(D-15) and then substituting Eq. (D-16) for o'(t). The term p'(t) is then the control
signal which, on application to the actual process, will cause the system output to track
the demanded trajectory.
D.2 MIT-SNL HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE DESCRIPTION
The SNL Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) was originally equipped with
an eight-step programmable controller that could be used to specify the withdrawal
sequence of the transient rod bank. When ready to operate in this manner, a 'permissive'
signal would be sent from the eight-step controller to the ACRR control console. Receipt
of this signal, together with operator concurrence, would initiate a 120-second timer.
Upon completion of the 120 second countdown, a 'go' signal is sent from the console to
the programmable controller. This would cause actual control of the reactor to be
transferred to the eight-step controller, which in turn provided a pulsating DC signal to
the translator. The output of that unit is the specific sequence of pulses that will cause the
stepper motors to move the transient rods in the desired manner. Performance of the
MIT-SNL experiments entailed the substitution of a digital system for the eight-step
controller. The translator and stepping motors, as well as the 'permissive' and 'go'
signals, were retained as specified in the safety analysis.
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The ACRR is controlled by two fuel-followed safety rods, three poison transient
rods, and six fuel-followed control rods. The transient rods, which are operated as a bank
and are driven by variable speed stepping motors, were used for the conduct of the
experiments. Rod bank position indication was obtained by means of an
electromechanical analog system that was capable of resolving each rod's position to
0.01 inches. A direct current signal conditioned to ± 10 volts was made available to the
computer as an analog input signal. This signal was read by the analog-to-digital
converter which had a 12 bit resolution. It is important to realize that rod position
information was obtained from the stepper motor drives and not from the rods
themselves.
Information on the ACRR's neutronic power level was obtained from three
fission chambers that were located in three different chamber channels within the core
region. The signals from these neutron detectors were transmitted to preamplifiers and
then to log signal conditioning amplifiers which provided 0 to 10 volt conditioned
signals. These were transmitted to the analog-to-digital input ports of the computer. The
three fission chambers were positioned such that at least one detector was on scale in the
source, intermediate, and power ranges. The computer monitored all three chambers
continuously. A range selection algorithm was used to select the proper detector or
combination of detectors depending on the power level.
Fuel temperature was monitored by thermocouples which werd connected to
signal conditioning amplifiers located in the ACRR's control room. The temperature
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range of these thermocouples was 0*C to 1000*C. Although two temperature channels
were instrumented, one fast acting and the other somewhat slower, the fast acting channel
was used exclusively for the ACRR's safety system. The slower acting channel was
made available for the MIT-SNL experiments. Its output was transmitted to one of the
computer's analog-to-digital converters.
The software utilized for the MIT-SNL experiments consisted of a main program
and twelve nested subroutines to solve and implement the MIT-SNL minimum time
control laws. The software was written in FORTRAN 77. Standard and math
FORTRAN libraries, as well as a commercially available library of machine language
routines for real-time operation, were used. The functions of the main program are as
follows:
- Provision of a hardware-software interface
- Data acquisition
- Data scaling and conditioning
- Error detection
- Prioritization of interrupt levels
- Motor speed control
- Man-machine interface.
Execution of the main program begins with the necessary variable and memory
declarations. An input file, which specifies the various control options such as the use of
either the standard or alternate law, is then defined. These options, also referred to as
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external control parameters, direct the execution of the control law software. The
program next clears all bits on the digital-to-digital input/output board and calls the
subroutine INPUT1. This subroutine is programmed to request information concerning
conduct of the transient from the experimenter. The experimenter's responses are entered
interactively via the keyboard. Information so gathered includes the desired sample time
if a value other than the default is to be used, and the target power level. The main
program then defines and calculates the necessary variables for operation of the real-time
clock based on the specified sample time. Parameters such as clock frequency, clock
overflow control, preset counter, and control flags are calculated and checked for
consistency before program initialization is completed. The program pauses at this point
until the experimenter keys in a preselected symbol. A signal is then sent to the ACRR
control console to satisfy the enable-permissive circuit so that the trigger can begin the
120-second countdown. The program then enters a dynamic loop that continuously
monitors bit number 0 of the digital-to-digital input board. Once bit number 0 is set
'high' by the trigger timer, the software breaks out of the dynamic loop and prints a
message on the screen to notify the experimenter that the transient has begun. The
program enters another loop within which the five sensors (transient rod bank position,
temperature and power) are scanned and their values stored in a data buffer array.
Information in the data buffer is shared with other subroutines via common blocks. A
'Get Time' system subroutine is used to obtain an absolute time reading. This absolute
time is compared to the previous reading and the difference is used as the size of the time
step if the experimenter has not previously specified a sample time. If the calculated time
step is less than 10 milliseconds, the program resets the time step size to 10 milliseconds.
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This is done to preclude possible numerical instabilities in other parts of the software.
Time step sizes determined using this method will vary from sample cycle to sample
cycle because they are functions of the time that was actually required for program
execution and execution time will vary depending on the use of write statements and the
number of iterations required to achieve convergence. This method of determining the
sampling interval was therefore designated the 'Variable Time Step' approach.
Continuing with the functional description of the main program, the completion routine
ACRRT1 is called to initiate the utilization of the control law portion of the software.
This is done by calling the subroutine CONPER. The program stays in this loop until the
transient is either completed or else terminated by either the experimenter or by the
program timer, which is in subroutine ACRRT1.
One of the major considerations in the software design was the size of the sample
interval. The code contains provisions for use of either a constant or a variable time step.
The code was originally written to use a constant time step because this mode facilitated
execution of the control law algorithms. Use of a constant time step meant that a
predetermined time interval was assigned for both data acquisition and software
execution. If the performance of those tasks took less than the assigned time, then the
computer would simply pause until the time was up. Conversely, if more time were
needed, an error message to that effect would be printed. The code was optimized to
permit use of as small a sampling interval as possible. This was done by configuring the
software to run in parallel with the data acquisition process. The data acquisition
software was set up as an interrupt-driven process. At the outset of each sampling
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interval, the computer would begin parallel execution of both the data acquisition
routines and the other software. The real-time clock would monitor the interrupt-driven
data acquisition process and initiate an 'interrupt-hold' process when the data collection
process was completed. Parallel processing would then end and the computer's full
resources would be devoted to executing the remaining software. Once that process was
completed, the computer would halt until any remaining time in the specified sampling
interval had elapsed. The interrupt-hold instruction would then be terminated and the
overall process repeated.
The constant time step approach functioned properly as long as the time required
to execute the software remained constant. However, the concepts involved in the MIT-
SNL minimum time laws were new and, as with any experimental program, many
diagnostic statements were included in the software package. These would only be
activated if the unanticipated occurred. A problem arose in that if several diagnostics
were activated during the same sampling interval, the time needed to complete the
execution of the software would exceed the allowed sampling interval. Whenever this
occurred the code would still run to completion but it would no longer be operating in
real time. That is, the actual elapsed time would be perhaps 50 milliseconds while the
sampling interval, which is the amount of time that the code 'thinks' has elapsed, would
be 30 milliseconds. This mismatch in times could result in oscillatory behavior of the
controlled parameter because the required control action is computed some time after the
moment at which it should have been implemented. One solution would have been to
increase the sampling interval to allow for the longest possible execution time. However,
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that approach would unnecessarily slow down the entire run. Another was to employ a
variable time step in which the sample interval for the present time step was assumed to
be that which had been observed for the previous interval. That is, upon completion of
both data acquisition and code execution, the program would compute the elapsed time
and use that quantity as the next time step. The 'constant time step' approach was used
for the first set of runs performed on Sandia's ACRR, and the 'variable time step'
approach was used on subsequent runs. Its advantage was that its use resulted in a
shorter average time step while providing flexibility for the periodic printing of error
messages. Also, on average, the assumption that the current time step was equal to the
previous one was valid.
The completion subroutine ACRRT1 was used to control the mode of time step
determination. It is an interrupt-driven routine external to both the main program and the
other subroutines. ACRRT1 is capable of being executed either in the foreground
sequentially with the other subroutines or in the background simultaneously as the
remaining parts of the program are being executed. The foreground or serial execution
mode is implemented whenever the variable time step mode is used. The background or
parallel execution mode is used whenever the constant time step mode is in effect. As
noted above, the background execution method in conjunction with the constant time step
was found to be more demanding on the system overhead and thus sometimes not able to
maintain real-time execution. The variable time step method was found to be a better
time-keeping method whenever cycle times on the order of a few milliseconds were
required.
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In addition to regulating the use of either a constant or variable time step, the
subroutine ACRRT1 was used to process all sensor readings. The main program,
'MITSNL' scans all sensors and stores the acquired data in a storage buffer array. This
information is then made available to other parts of the program via common blocks. The
subroutine ACRRT1 is written in FORTRAN. It begins with a DO loop which converts
all data in the data collection buffer to real numbers and stores them in a separate array.
There were, as mentioned, three measured quantities. These were the transient rod bank
position, the neutronic power and the fuel temperature.
Once sensor readings have been properly processed, ACRRT1 calls the
subroutine CONPER which initiates solution of the algorithms that describe the MIT-
SNL minimum time laws. No arguments are needed when calling CONPER because all
pertinent parameters are shared with the appropriate subroutines through the use of
common blocks. Return from CONPER is via the subroutine CONTRL which generates
the appropriate signal for the stepper motors. From CONTRL, program execution is
returned to CONPER and thence to ACCRT1. A comparison is then made of the elapsed
time since the start of the transient against the time that was allotted for the entire run. If
the allotted time has been exceeded, the run is terminated. Otherwise, program execution
is returned to MITSNL, the sensors are again scanned and the entire sequence is repeated.
The reactor's neutronic power was determined using the following relationship:
los 1 .JY +10s2 OW 2 +10S3 ,W
P(t) = W + (D-17)
W, +2 +W
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where P(t) is the instantaneous reactor power, and other symbols are defined as:
S1  is the signal from logarithmic amplifier number 1,
W, is the weighting factor assigned to detector number 1,
S2  is the signal from logarithmic amplifier number 2,
W2  is the weighting factor assigned to detector number 2,
S 3  is the signal from logarithmic amplifier number 3,
W3  is the weighting factor assigned to detector number 3.
The weighting factors were a function of the operable range of each sensor and were
selected so as to ensure a bumpless transition between sensors.
The fuel temperature was measured using thermocouples. The channel available
to the MIT-SNL experiments was characterized by time lags of several seconds and
hence of little value during fast transients in which the power level was increased by
many orders of magnitude. Accordingly, it was necessary to incorporate an analytic
model of the fuel temperature. The model chosen was taken from SNL's ACRR
simulator.
The fuel temperature was calculated using the following lumped parameter
model:
Tjui= T;+Tai st, *[P(t) - h * Ajue Twe,]I Kf,,,* c,) (D-18)
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where:
Tfuel is the current estimate of the fuel temperature (K),
T - is the previous estimate of the fuel temperature (K),
Tin is an adjustable gain which can be varied to allow sensitivity studies of the
model,
tsan is the elapsed time (s),
P(t) is the instantaneous reactor power (W),
h is the surface heat transfer coefficient of the fuel rods to the pool water
(W/m2-K),
Ajuei is the heat transfer area of the fuel (m2
Taer is the bulk water temperature (K),
Mful is the mass of the fuel (kg), and
C,, is the specific heat of the fuel material (J/kg-K)
This calculated fuel temperature was then compared within the code to the measured
value and the larger of the two was used in the control law calculations.
The subroutine INPUT1 is used to gather information concerning the transient
from the experimenter interactively through the keyboard. Specifically, INPUT1 is a
FORTRAN subroutine intended to be executed once prior to the beginning of each run.
It reads the program control options which are stored in a file in virtual memory and
accepts keyboard entry of parameters necessary for the initialization of the transient.
189
Next, the scale factors necessary for the rod speed determination are calculated and stored
in the proper common variables. Rod speed is calculated as a fraction with unity
corresponding to the maximum desired stepper motor frequency. That frequency is one
of the control options, hence the need to adjust the scale for rod speed at the outset of
each run. All sensors are scanned once and the values of their associated parameters
determined based on the information that was read and entered from the keyboard. The
calculated neutron power is displayed on the CRT screen and the experimenter is asked to
enter the target power in units of kW. The entered value is then checked against
predetermined target power limits. The code execution halts unless the target power
value falls within these limits. INPUT1 at this point returns control to the main program.
The subroutine CONTRL generates the information that is used to control the
speed of the transient rod bank motors. CONTRL first determines if 'full speed in', 'full
speed out', or 'full stop' signals are required. Any one of these requests would result in
direct output of the specified motor action without any calculation. This feature was
considered highly desirable should fast action be required in order to halt a power
excursion. If none of these actions are appropriate, then the digital word that corresponds
to the desired motor speed is calculated using the following formula:
250000 15.26
= and 011 >(-9
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where
W is the digital word which is transmitted to the controller interface board,
F. is the maximum frequency to be used for the transient, and
Y is the desired rod speed calculated by the control law portion of the
software, expressed as a fraction ranging from -1.0 to 1.0.
The minimum speed at which the motor could be driven was ±15.26 Hz. This was the
reason for the constraint on Y in the above equation.
One built-in feature of this subroutine is the use of a flag to check the validity of
the control signal. The flag is set to unity in the algorithms that are used to solve the
MIT-SNL minimum-time laws. This is done once the desired rod speed Y has been
assigned. The CONTRL subroutine checks this flag at the very beginning of the routine
and prints out an error message on the CRT screen to warn the experimenter if it was not
equal to unity. If it is equal to unity, CONTRL resets it to zero and proceeds with the
calculations. Hence, if the value of the flag is not continually shifted from zero to unity
and back, the control law function is probably not functioning properly. The cycling of
this flag is a safety check that provides protection against any unforeseen hardware or
software failures which might occur during the transient.
CONPER is the principal subroutine. It receives information on power,
temperature, rod bank position, and time from the data acquisition program. On the first
pass through CONPER, all parameters are initialized. On each subsequent pass, these
parameters are updated and the routine skips the initialization section. Following the
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initialization section, a check is made to determine if the targeted power is unchanged. If
it is, execution continues. If not, the code repeats the portion of the initialization
necessary for a new power setting. (The targeted power could be changed in two ways.
The experimenter may type in a new power while the code is operating, or the subroutine
TCYCLE may automatically designate a new targeted power at a prespecified
frequency.) Either the subroutine RAISE or LOWER is then called depending on
whether power is being increased or decreased. These routines return the decision for the
control mechanism motion.
BALAN determines the reactivity via a balance calculation. It allows for changes
in the transient rod bank position and fuel temperature. It does not allow for xenon, but
this should not present a problem if the code is used for short duration transients as
intended. The balance is not reinitialized when the targeted power is changed because
the ACRR will probably not be at steady-state equilibrium, such as during
demonstrations of power cycling.
ESTIM provides estimates of the instantaneous reactor period and startup rate. It
does this through the use of a simple backwards difference using power signals. This
routine also calculates the reactivity. It uses several methods. First, reactivity is
determined from the observed power using inverse kinetics. Second, it is calculated from
the specified power, also using inverse kinetics. Third, these two quantities and the result
of the balance calculation in BALAN are compared and the parity space approach is used
to estimate the actual reactivity. ESTIM is also the calling routine for the code's three
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filters. If no filter is desired, the filtered power is set equal to the measured power.
Otherwise, the filtered power is used in subsequent portions of the code.
CALC calculates the delayed neutron precursor concentrations. The standard and
alternate effective, multi-group decay parameters are then determined from their
definitions.
RAISE is the implementing routine of the controller for power increases. This
algorithm is normally used to supervise an associated control law and intervene should
the possibility of a challenge to the safety system develop. RAISE first checks for
limitations on the power, transient, and the sufficient reactivity constraint. The available
time is calculated using either the instantaneous or asymptotic period, whichever is
shorter. (The asymptotic period will be shorter than the instantaneous period if there has
been a large positive reactivity insertion and the rod bank is driven in.) The outcome of
these checks is a value for the variable SIGI. Next a control law is evaluated. The
control law's output is the variable S. The values of SIGI and S are compared and the
more conservative is implemented. Checks are also made against the 'in' and 'out' limits
of the rod bank.
LOWER is the same as RAISE, except to decrease power.
SURCON determines the control mechanism velocity necessary to first achieve
and then maintain the specified period. There are two options associated with SURCON.
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The first permits use of the minimum time control laws in their form. There is no
feedback on the period or power level. This option gives accurate results only if the
reactor in question well characterized. Feedback occurs whenever the reactivity and
decay parameters are updated. This option is used to investigate both the physics of the
control law and the correctness of the reactor models. The other option entails P-I-D
feedback. The feedback signal is generated in the arithmetic form of a reactor period.
Also, in order to ensure stability, this signal is implemented so that the observed power
will be driven to the specified power that should exist in at least two additional time
steps. Once the specified period has been determined, SURCON computes the required
rate of change of reactivity and then the required control mechanism velocity.
RPROM calculates the prompt terms for the minimum time control laws.
TCHECK is designed to preclude challenges to the safety system. It causes
control mechanism insertion if the power level, fuel temperature, dynamic period, or
elapsed time exceed their allowed values.
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D.3 MIT-SNL DFM MODEL
Figure D-1 MIT-SNL DFM Model
Table D-1 MIT-SNL DFM Input File
The variables are:
TOP , 2 states F T Priority is : 0
RA , 5 states : infast inslow maintain outslow outfast Priority is : 9
SM , 2 states : normal stuck Priority is : 0
DR , 5 states infast inslow maintain outslow outfast Priority is : 10
DTP , 5 states : short medshort medium medlong long Priority is : 0
R , 5 states : fullin halfin midway halfout fullout Priority is : 0
T , 5 states : cool warm warmer hot melt Priority is : 0
P , 6 states : first second third fourth fifth sixth Priority is : 0
DTP2 , 5 states : short medshort medium medlong long Priority is : 0
RP , 5 states : fullin halfin midway halfout fullout Priority is : 0
TP , 5 states : cool warm warmer hot melt Priority is : 0
PP , 6 states : first second third fourth fifth sixth Priority is : 0
DT , 5 states : short medshort medium medlong long Priority is : 0
RM , 5 states : fullin halfin midway halfout fullout Priority is : 1
PM , 6 states : first second third fourth fifth sixth Priority is : 1
TM , 5 states : cool warm warmer hot melt Priority is : 1
RV , 2 states : normal null Priority is : 0
PV , 3 states : normal low null Priority is : 0
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TV , 3 states : normal low null Priority is : 0
PS , 6 states : first second third fourth fifth sixth Priority is
TS , 5 states : cool warm warmer hot melt Priority is : 2
TS2 , 5 states : cool warm warmer hot melt Priority is : 0
5
7
6
6
2
5
2
7
7
2
6
4
states :
states :
states :
states :
states :
states :
states :
6 states
states :
states :
states :
states :
states :
5 states
5 states
5 states
5 states
: 2
fullin halfin midway halfout fullout Priority is : 0
wayneg toneg neg zero pos topos waypos Priority is : 3
first second third fourth fifth sixth Priority is : 0
first second third fourth fifth sixth Priority is : 0
-1 1 Priority is : 1
cool warm warmer hot melt Priority is : 0
o 1 Priority is : 0
first second third fourth fifth sixth Priority is : 0
wayneg toneg neg zero pos topos waypos Priority is : 3
wayneg toneg neg zero pos topos waypos Priority is 4
dkbal dkobs Priority is : 0
way neg neg neg 0 pos 0 pos way pos Priority is 3
way neg neg pos way pos Priority is : 4
: s neg m neg zero m pos s pos Priority is : 5
: s neg m neg zero m pos s pos Priority is : 5
: s neg m neg zero m pos s pos Priority is : 5
: s neg m neg zero m pos s pos Priority is : 5
dkr , 5 states : s neg m neg zero m pos s pos Priority is : 6
IY , 2 states : 0 1 Priority is : 0
IFD , 2 states : pi pid Priority is : 0
Y , 5 states : infast inslow maintain outslow outfast Priority is : 8
TRQ , 5 states : infast inslow maintain outslow outfast Priority is : 7
IB , 3 states : 0 1 plus 1 minus Priority is 0
SR , 3 states : neg zero pos Priority is : 5
SP , 3 states neg zero pos Priority is : 0
IL , 2 states : mitsnl csdl Priority is : 0
S , 3 states : neg zero pos Priority is : 6
SL , 3 states : neg zero pos Priority is : 5
K , 2 states : 0 1 Priority is : 0
S3 , 2 states : 0 1 Priority is : 4
S2 , 2 states : 0 1 Priority is : 3
EP , 2 states : 0 1 Priority is : 0
TX , 2 states : 0 1 Priority is : 0
IS , 2 states : 0 1 Priority is : 0
YP , 5 states : infast inslow maintain outslow outfast Priority is : 0
After simplification, the decision tables are
Table 1
Delay = 0.00
RA SM I DR
in fast normal I in fast
in slow normal in slow
maintain - maintain
- stuck I maintain
out slow normal I out slow
out fast normal I out fast
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RR
DL
PR
ST
IF
TR
IP
PS2
DO
DK
ID
SU
TE
dks 1
dks2
dkal
dka2
Table 2
Delay =
DR
in fast
in slow
maintain
maintain
out slow
out fast
in fast
in slow
maintain
maintain
out slow
out fast
in fast
in slow
maintain
maintain
out slow
out fast
in fast
in slow
maintain
- full
maintain
out slow
out fast
in fast
in slow
maintain
- full
maintain
out slow
out fast
1.00
R T P I P
- - first I first
- - second I first
- - second I first
- - second I first
- - first I second
- - first I second
- - first I second
- - second I second
- - third I second
- - third I second
- - third I second
- - second I third
- - second j third
- - second I third
- - third I third
- - fourth I third
- - fourth I third
- - fourth I third
- - third I fourth
- - third I fourth
- - third I fourth
- - fourth I fourth
- - fifth I fourth
- - fifth I fourth
- - fifth I fourth
out cool fifth I fourth
- - fourth I fifth
- - fourth I fifth
- - fourth I fifth
- - fifth I fifth
- - sixth I fifth
- - sixth I fifth
- - sixth I fifth
out cool sixth I fifth
- - fifth I sixth
- - fifth I sixth
- - fifth I sixth
- - sixth I sixth
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Table 3
Delay = 1.00
DR R I R
- full in I full in
in fast half in full in
in slow half in I full in
maintain half in I full in
maintain full in half in
out slow full in I half in
out fast full in I half in
- half in I half in
in fast midway I half in
in slow midway half in
maintain midway I half in
maintain half in I midway
out slow half in I midway
out fast half in midway
- midway I midway
in fast half out midway
in slow half out midway
maintain half out I midway
maintain midway half out
out slow midway I half out
out fast midway I half out
- half out I half out
in fast full out I half out
in slow full out I half out
maintain full out I half out
maintain half out I full out
out slow half out full out
out fast half out I full out
- full out I full out
Table 4
Delay = 1.00
TI T
cool I cool
cool I warm
warm I warm
warm I warmer
warmer I warmer
warmer I hot
hot I hot
hot I melt
melt I melt
Table 5
Delay = 1.00
R I RP
full in I full in
half in I half in
midway I midway
half out I half out
full out I full out
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Table 6
Delay = 1.00
P I PP
first I first
second I second
third I third
fourth I fourth
fifth I fifth
sixth | sixth
Table 7
Delay = 1.00
T | TP
cool cool
warm I warm
warmer | warmer
hot hot
melt | melt
Table 8
Delay = 1.00
DT | DTP
short I short
medshort I medshort
medium I medium
medlong I medlong
long | long
Table 9
Delay = 1.00
DTP I DTP2
short | short
medshort I medshort
medium I medium
medlong I medlong
long I long
Table 10
Delay = 0.00
TP TV I TM
cool - I cool
warm low I cool
- null I cool
warm normal I warm
warmer low I warm
warmer normal I warmer
hot low I warmer
hot normal I hot
melt low | hot
melt normal melt
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Table 11
Delay = 0.00
PP PV | PM
first - first
second low I first
- null I first
second normal I second
third low I second
third normal I third
fourth low I third
fourth normal I fourth
fifth low I fourth
fifth normal I fifth
sixth low I fifth
sixth normal I sixth
Table 12
Delay = 0.00
RP RV I
full in -
- null I
half in normal
midway normal
half out normal
full out normal
RM
I full in
full in
half in
I midway
I half out
I full out
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Table 13
Delay = 0.00
PM RM I PS
first - I first
second half out first
second full out I first
first full in I second
first half in I second
first midway I second
first half out I second
second - second
third half out I second
third full out I second
second full in third
second half in I third
second midway I third
second half out I third
third - I third
fourth half out I third
fourth full out I third
third full in I fourth
third half in I fourth
third midway I fourth
third half out I fourth
fourth - I fourth
fifth half out I fourth
fifth full out fourth
fourth full in I fifth
fourth half in I fifth
fourth midway I fifth
fourth half out I fifth
fifth - I fifth
sixth half out I fifth
sixth full out I fifth
fifth full in I sixth
fifth half in I sixth
fifth midway I sixth
fifth half out I sixth
sixth - sixth
Table 14
Delay = 1.00
TS I TS2
cool cool
warm I warm
warmer I warmer
hot I hot
melt I melt
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Table 15
Delay = 0.00
TM TS2 PM I TS
cool cool - I cool
cool warm first I cool
cool warm second I cool
cool warm third I cool
cool warm fourth I cool
cool warm fifth I cool
cool warm - warm
cool warmer - I warm
cool hot - I warm
cool melt - I warm
cool - fifth I warm
cool - sixth I warm
warm - - I warm
warmer - - I warmer
hot - - | hot
melt - - | melt
Table 16
Delay = 0.00
RM TS RR TR IP | DL
Table 17
Delay = 0.00
PR ST I IF
- first I -1
second second I -1
third second I -1
third third I -1
fourth second I -1
fourth third I -1
fourth fourth I -1
fifth second I -1
fifth third I -1
fifth fourth I -1
fifth fifth I -1
sixth - I -1
first - I 1
- sixth I 1
second second I 1
second third I 1
second fourth I 1
second fifth I 1
third third I 1
third fourth I 1
third fifth I 1
fourth fourth I 1
fourth fifth 1
fifth fifth I 1
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Table 18
Delay = 1.00
PS | PS2
first I first
second second
third I third
fourth | fourth
fifth | fifth
sixth I sixth
Table 19
Delay = 0.00
DO DL ID I
way neg - dkobs
- way neg dkbal
too neg - dkobs
- too neg dkbal
neg - dkobs I
- neg dkbal I
zero - dkobs I
- zero dkbal I
pos - dkobs I
- pos dkbal |
too pos - dkobs
- too pos dkbal
way pos - dkobs
- way pos dkbal
Table 20
Delay = 0.00
PS PS2 DTP2 I
DK
way neg
way neg
too neg
too neg
neg
neg
zero
zero
pos
pos
too pos
too pos
way pos
way pos
DO
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Table 21
Delay = 0.00
PS PS2 I SU
first - I way neg
second second I way neg
second third I way neg
second fourth I way neg
second fifth I way neg
- sixth I way neg
third third way neg
third fourth I way neg
third fifth I way neg
fourth fourth I way neg
fourth fifth I way neg
fifth fifth I way neg
first first I neg
first second I neg
second second I neg
second third neg
third third neg
third fourth I neg
fourth fourth neg
fourth fifth I neg
fifth fifth I neg
fifth sixth I neg
sixth sixth I neg
first first I neg 0
first second I neg 0
second second I neg 0
second third neg 0
third third neg 0
third fourth neg 0
fourth fourth I neg 0
fourth fifth I neg 0
fifth fifth neg 0
fifth sixth I neg 0
sixth sixth I neg 0
first first I p0 0
second first I pos 0
second second I pos 0
third second I pos 0
third third Ipos 0
fourth third I pos 0
fourth fourth I pos 0
fifth fourth Ipos 0
fifth fifth pos 0
sixth fifth I p0 0
sixth sixth I p0 0
first first I pos
second first I pos
second second I pos
third second pos
third third I pos
fourth third I pos
fourth fourth pos
fifth fourth I pos
fifth fifth I pos
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sixth fifth I pos
sixth sixth I pos
- first I way pos
second second I way pos
third second I way pos
third third I way pos
fourth second I way pos
fourth third I way pos
fourth fourth I way pos
fifth second way pos
fifth third I way pos
fifth fourth I way pos
fifth fifth I way pos
sixth - way pos
Table 22
Delay =
SU I
neg I
neg 0I
way neg
neg I
pos I
way pos
pos 0 I
pos I
Tabl
Dela
dks
s ne
m ne
zer
m po
s po
0.00
TE
way neg
way neg
I neg
neg
pos
I pos
way pos
way pos
e 23
y = 0.00
1 dks2 dkal dka2
g - - -
- s neg - -
- - s neg -
-
-
-sneg
g - - -
- m neg - -
- -m neg -
- - -m neg
0 - - -
- zero - -
- - zero -
- - - zero
s - - -
- m pos - -
- - m pos -
- - -m pos
s - - -
-s pos - -
- - s pos -
- - -s pos
Table 24
Delay = 0.00
IY
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
IFD
pi
pid
pi
pid
pi
pid
pi
pid
pi
pid
pi
pid
pi
pid
pi
pid
pi
pid
pi
pid
dkr
s neg
s neg
s neg
s neg
m neg
m neg
m neg
m neg
zero
zero
zero
zero
m pos
m pos
m pos
m pos
s pos
s pos
s pos
s pos
DK ST PR PS DTP2 TE I dksl
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Table 25
Delay = 0.00
DK ST PR PS DTP2 TE I dks2
- - - - - pos I s neg
second
third
fourth
- firs
- seco
- thir
- four
- fifth
- sixth
neg
neg
pos
pos
sixt
fift
- si
first
second
third
fourth
firs
seco
thir
four
- fifth
- sixth
neg
neg
pos
pos
sixt
fift
- si
- first
- second
- third
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way
too
too
way
way
too
too
way
firs
- - short - I sneg
- - medshort - I s neg
- - medium - s neg
- - medlong - s neg
- - - - s neg
- - - - s neg
- - - - s neg
- - - - s neg
t - - - Isneg
nd - - - I sneg
d - - - Isneg
th - - - Isneg
- third - - I sneg
- fourth - - I s neg
- fifth - - I sneg
- sixth - - I s neg
h - - - Isneg
h - - - Isneg
- - - - s neg
xth second - - I s neg
- - - - Is neg
- - - - s neg
- - 5po I m neg
- - short - I m neg
- - medshort - I m neg
- - medium - I mneg
- - medlong - I m neg
- - - - Im neg
- - - - Im neg
- - - - m neg
- - - - m neg
t - - - Imneg
nd - - - Imneg
d - - - Imneg
th - - - Imneg
- third - - mneg
- fourth - - I mneg
- fifth - - I m neg
- sixth - - I m neg
h - - - Imneg
h - - - Imneg
- - - - m neg
xth second - - m neg
- - - - m neg
- - - - m neg
S - - ~pos zero
- short - I zero
- - medshort - I zero
- - medium - I zero
- - medlong - I zero
- - - - I zero
- - - - I zero
- - - - I zero
-fourth - - - - | zero
- - first - - - I zero
- - second - - - | zero
- - third - - - I zero
- - fourth - - - I zero
- - - third - - I zero
- - - fourth - - I zero
- - - fifth - - I zero
- - - sixth - - I zero
- fifth sixth - - - I zero
- sixth fifth - - - I zero
way neg - - - - - I zero
too neg - sixth second - - I zero
too pos - - - - - I zero
way pos - - - - - I zero
- - - - - pos I m pos
- - - - short - I m pos
- - - - medshort - I m pos
- - - - medium - I m pos
- - - - medlong - I m pos
- first - - - - Impos
- second - - - - I m pos
- third - - - - Impos
- fourth - - - - Impos
- - first - - - Impos
- - second - - - I m pos
- - third - - - Impos
- - fourth - - - Impos
- - - third - - Impos
- - - fourth - - Impos
- - - fifth - - I m pos
- - - sixth - - Impos
- fifth sixth - - - I m pos
- sixth fifth - - - I mpos
way neg - - - - - Impos
too neg - sixth second - - m pos
too pos - - - - - Impos
way pos - - - - - Impos
- - - - - - Ispos
Table 26
Delay = 0.00
DK ST PR PS DTP2 TE I dkal
Table 27
Delay = 0.00
DK ST PR PS DTP2 TE I dka2
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Table 28
Delay =
dkr
s neg
m neg
zero fu
zero fu
0.00
RM P
11 in
11 out
- - seco
- - thir
- - four
- - fift
- - sixt
- - thir
- - four
- - fift
- - four
- - fift
- - fift
m neg -
zero -
m neg midway
zero -
m pos midway
zero -
m pos -
zero full in
zero full out
m pos -
s pos -
- - seco
- - thir
- - four
- - fift
- - firs
- - thir
- - four
- - seco
- - seco
- - thir
- - seco
Table
Delay
DK
Table
Delay
DK
S ST IF IB I TRQ
- - - 0 I in fast
- - - 0 I in fast
- - - 0 I in fast
- - - 0 lin fast
- - -iminus I in fast
- first 1 - I in fast
nd second 1 - I in fast
d second 1 - I in fast
th second 1 - I in fast
h second 1 - in fast
h - 1 - in fast
d third 1 - in fast
th third 1 - I in fast
h third 1 - I in fast
th fourth 1 - I in fast
h fourth 1 - in fast
h fifth 1 - I in fast
-
- - 0 1 in slow
- - - 01 in slow
- - - 0 I maintain
- - - 0 I maintain
- - - 0 I maintain
- - - 0 Iout slow
- - - 0 jout slow
- - - 0 lout fast
- - - 0 lout fast
- - - 0 1 out fast
- - - 0 jout fast
- - - 1 plus lout fast
- sixth - - out fast
nd fifth -1 - I out fast
d fifth -1 - I out fast
th fifth -1 - I out fast
h fifth -1 - I out fast
t - -1 - lout fast
d fourth -1 - I out fast
th fourth -1 - I out fast
nd fourth -1 - I out fast
nd third -1 - I out fast
d third -1 - I out fast
nd second -1 - 1 out fast
29
30
0.00
ST
0.00
ST
PS RM TE IY SP I SR
PS RM TE IY SP K I
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SL
Table 31
Delay =
Y I
in fast
in slow
maintain
out slow
out fast
0.00
RA
I in fast
I in slow
maintain
I out slow
I out fast
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Table 32
Delay =
TRQ
0.00
S IL S2 S3 YP RM
in fast - mitsnl
in fast - mitsnl
in fast - mitsnl
in slow - mitsnl
in slow - mitsnl
in slow - mitsnl
- neg csdl
- neg csdl
- neg csdl
maintain - mitsnl
-zero cscl
in fast - mitsnl
in fast - mitsnl
in slow - mitsnl
in slow -mitsnl
out slow mitsnl
out slow - mitsnl
out fast - mitsnl
out fast - mitsnl
- neg csdl
- neg csdl
- zeo csdl
- -05 csl
out slow - mitsnl
out slow - mitsnl
out slow - mitsnl
- p0s cscil
- p05 csdl
- s 0 cslt
out fast - mitsnl
out fast - mitsnl
out fast - mitsnl
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
- i
- i
-Inm
in f
in s
main
in f
in s
main
1i
1li
im
in f
in s
main
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
main
-o o
o
o
-n f
ou
1
1
1
1
out
out
in f
in s
out
out
out
out
Y
n fast - I in fast
n slow - I in fast
aintain - I in fast
ast - I in fast
low - I in fast
tain - in fast
ast - I in fast
low - I in fast
tain - in fast
n fast - I in slow
n slow - in slow
aintain - I in slow
ast - I in slow
low - in slow
tain - in slow
- - I maintain
- - I maintain
tain - I maintain
ut slow - I maintain
ut fast - I maintain
ut slow - I maintain
ut fast - I maintain
in fast - I maintain
in slow - maintain
in fast - I maintain
in slow - I maintain
slow - I maintain
fast - I maintain
ast - I maintain
low -I maintain
slow - I maintain
fast - I maintain
slow - I maintain
fast - I maintain
in fast full in I maintain
in slow full in I maintain
- full in I maintain
- full in I maintain
out slow full out I maintain
out fast full out I maintain
1 maintain -I out slow
1 out slow - I out slow
1 out fast - I out slow
maintain - out slow
out slow - I out slow
out fast - I out slow
1 maintain - I out fast
1 out slow - I out fast
1 out fast - out fast
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Table 33
Delay = 1.00
S I SP
neg I neg
zero zero
pos I pos
Table 34
Delay = 0.00
SR SL
- neg
neg -
- zero
zero -
- pos
pos -
IF I S
-1 I neg
1 I neg
-1 I zero
1 I zero
-1 I pos
1 I pos
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Table 35
Delay =
ST
first
0.00
PS SU
second second -
second third -
second fourth -
second fifth -
third third -
third fourth -
third fifth -
fourth fourth -
fourth fifth -
fifth fifth -
- - way pos
- sixth -
- - way neg
- - neg
- - neg 0
- - pos 0
- - pos
- first way neg
- second way neg
second third way neg
third third way neg
third fourth way neg
fourth third way neg
fourth fourth way neg
fourth fifth way neg
fifth - way neg
sixth - way neg
- first neg
- second neg
second third neg
third third neg
third fourth neg
fourth third neg
fourth fourth neg
fourth fifth neg
fifth - neg
sixth - neg
- first neg 0
- second neg 0
second third neg 0
third third neg 0
third fourth neg 0
fourth third neg 0
fourth fourth neg 0
fourth fifth neg 0
fifth - neg 0
sixth - neg 0
- first pos 0
- second pos 0
second third pos 0
third third pos 0
third fourth pos 0
fourth third pos 0
IF |
1ii
ii1
1 i
ii1
1 |
- I
- |
-1 I
-1 |
-1 |
-1 I
-1 I
- I
- I
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
S3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
212
fourth fourth pos 0 - I 1
fourth fifth pos 0 - I 1
fifth - posO - I 1
sixth - posO - 1
- first pos - I 1
- second pos - I 1
second third pos - | 1
third third pos - I 1
third fourth pos - I 1
fourth third pos - 1
fourth fourth pos - I 1
fourth fifth pos - I 1
fifth - p0s - I 1
sixth - pos - | 1
Table 36
Delay = 0.00
TS EP TX IS | S2
hot - - - I 0
melt - - - I 0
- 1 - - | 0
- - 1 - I 0
- - - 1 0
cool 0 0 0 1
warm 0 0 0 I 1
warmer 0 0 0 I 1
Table 37
Delay = 1.00
Y YP
in fast I in fast
in slow I in slow
maintain maintain
out slow I out slow
out fast I out fast
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable IS
Direction : Non-decreasing with time
The sink states are : state 1,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable TX
Direction : Non-decreasing with time
The sink states are : state 1,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable EP
Direction : Non-decreasing with time
The sink states are : state 1,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable K
Direction : Non-decreasing with time
The sink states are : state 1,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable IY
Direction : Unchange with time
Maximum Rate : 0.000 state per time unit
The sink states are : state 0, state 1,
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Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable
Direction : Unchange with time
Maximum Rate : 0.000 state per time unit
The sink states are : state 0, state 1,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable
Direction : Unchange with time
Maximum Rate : 0.000 state per time unit
The sink states are : state 0, state 1,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable
Direction : Unchange with time
Maximum Rate : 0.000 state per time unit
The sink states are : state 0, state 1,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable
Direction : Unchange with time
Maximum Rate : 0.000 state per time unit
The sink states are : state 0, state 1,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable RR
Direction : Unchange with time
Maximum Rate : 0.000 state per time unit
The sink states are : state 0, state 1, state 2,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable TR
Direction : Unchange with time
Maximum Rate : 0.000 state per time unit
The sink states are : state 0, state 1, state 2,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable PR
Direction : Unchange with time
Maximum Rate : 0.000 state per time unit
The sink states are : state 0, state 1, state 2,
state 5,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable ST
Direction : Unchange with time
Maximum Rate : 0.000 state per time unit
The sink states are : state 0, state 1, state 2,
state 5,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable
The sink states are : state 1,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable
The sink states are : state 1,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable
Direction : Non-decreasing with time
Maximum Rate : 0.100 state per time unit
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable
Direction : Non-decreasing with time
Maximum Rate : 0.100 state per time unit
state 3, state 4,
state 3, state 4,
state 3, state 4,
state 3, state 4,
S2
SM
T
TP
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IFD
ID
IP
IF
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable TV
The sink states are : state 1, state 2,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable P
Maximum Rate : 0.100 state per time unit
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable PP
Maximum Rate : 0.100 state per time unit
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable PV
The sink states are : state 1, state 2,
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable R
Maximum Rate : 0.100 state per time unit
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable RP
Maximum Rate : 0.100 state per time unit
Dynamic Consistency Rules for the variable RV
The sink states are : state 1,
Time Invariant Boundaries:
ST: State 5
TR: State 0
PR: State 0
RV: State 0
TV: State 0
SM: State 0
EP: State 0
TX: State 0
IS: State 0
IL: State 0
IB: State 0
IP: State 1
ID: State 0
IFD: State 0
IY: State 0
Normal Behavior not of interest:
The causes are:
Node RP:
State 0
The effects are (at 0.000 time units later):
Node R:
State 2
State 3
State 4
The causes are:
Node RP:
State 1
The effects are (at 0.000 time units later):
Node R:
State 3
State 4
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The causes are:
Node RP:
State 2
The effects are (at
Node R:
State 0
State 4
The causes are:
Node RP:
State 3
The effects are (at
Node R:
State 0
State 1
The causes are:
Node RP:
State 4
The effects are (at
Node R:
State 0
State 1
State 2
The causes are:
Node TP:
State 0
The effects are (at
Node T:
State 2
State 3
State 4
The causes are:
Node TP:
State 1
The effects are (at
Node T:
State 0
State 3
State 4
The causes are:
Node TP:
State 2
The effects are (at
Node T:
State 0
State 1
State 4
0.000 time units later):
0.000 time units later):
0.000 time units later):
0.000 time units later):
0.000 time units later):
0.000 time units later):
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The causes are:
Node TP:
State 3
The effects are (at
Node T:
State 0
State 1
State 2
The causes are:
Node TP:
State 4
The effects are (at
Node T:
State 0
State 1
State 2
State 3
The causes are:
Node PP:
State 0
The effects are (at
Node P:
State 2
State 3
State 4
State 5
The causes are:
Node PP:
State 1
The effects are (at
Node P:
State
State
State
0.000 time units later):
0.000 time units later):
0.000 time units later):
0.000 time units later):
3
4
5
The causes are:
Node PP:
State 2
The effects are (at
Node P:
State 0
State 4
State 5
The causes are:
Node PP:
State 3
0.000 time units later):
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The effects are (at
Node P:
State 0
State 1
State 5
The causes are:
Node PP:
State 4
The effects are (at
Node P:
State
State
State
0.000 time units later):
0.000 time units later):
0
1
2
The causes are:
Node PP:
State 5
The effects are (at
Node P:
State 0
State 1
State 2
State 3
0.000 time units later):
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